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Editor’s Note
Thank you for downloading the first digital
edition of the PACE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SPORTS
& ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM.
As you scroll
through the pages of this issue, you may notice the
Forum has a new look. Recognizing the significant
advancements in technology that have revolutionized
the legal field in the past few years, the Volume 4
Editorial Board sought to update and adapt the Forum to be accessible digitally, formatting the issue
for tablets and e-readers. As you read, take advantage of clickable Tables of Contents and links to
online sources throughout the issue.
This year marks the fourth anniversary of
PIPSELF, as the Forum is known colloquially to the
Pace community. In four short years, PIPSELF has
grown considerably, thanks to the dedication and determination of past and present Editorial Boards.
From the inaugural volume, featuring compositions
compiled by and prepared for publication solely by
the four founding members, the journal has expanded to feature a fully staffed Editorial Board and
a roster of Associate Editors.
The staff of PIPSELF has worked diligently
this year selecting and preparing innovative and engaging articles concerning emerging issues in the
fields of intellectual property, sports, and entertainment law for this issue, and we look forward to publishing our second issue this spring. We encourage
our readers to feel welcome to send comments and
feedback: e-mail us at pipself@law.pace.edu or visit
our Twitter @PIPSELF.
— Danielle Meeks
Editor-in-Chief
Volume 4
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Abstract
In today’s difficult economic times, state governments are more hard pressed than ever to come
up with new sources of revenue to at least stay revenue neutral. Leave it to the perpetually moneyhungry State of New York to come up with this gem
of an idea for generating tax revenues: In 2005, the
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance attempted to impose sales tax on a nightclub’s
offering of exotic dancing to its customers. This resulted in one nightclub instigating a legal challenge
to the state’s attempt to impose sales taxes on exotic
dancing. This resulted in the matter of 677 New
Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, which was ultimately decided by the New
York Court of Appeals in October 2012.
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INTRODUCTION
In today’s difficult economic times, state governments are more hard pressed than ever to come
up with new sources of revenue to at least stay revenue neutral. Leave it to the perpetually money-hungry State of New York to come up with this gem of an
idea for generating tax revenues: In 2005, the New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance attempted to impose sales tax on a nightclub’s offering
of exotic dancing to its customers. This resulted in
the matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New
York Tax Appeals Tribunal, ultimately decided by
the New York Court of Appeals in October 2012,
where one nightclub instigated a legal challenge to
the state’s attempt to impose sales taxes on exotic
dancing.1
I. THE FACTS
The plaintiff corporation operated an adult entertainment establishment called Nite Moves (“the
club”).2 Nite Moves is an adult juice bar “where patrons may view exotic dances performed by women in
various stages of undress.”3 Revenue is generated
from four sources:
general admission charges, which entitle
patrons to enter the club, mingle with the
dancers and view on-stage performances,
as well as any table or lap dances performed on the open floor; ‘couch sales,’
1 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct.
422 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-38).
2 677 New Loudon Corp v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 925 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
3 Id.
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representing the fee charged when a
dancer performs for a customer in one of
the club’s private rooms; register sales
from the nonalcoholic beverages sold to
patrons; and house fees paid by the dancers to the club.4

During a 2005 audit, the Division of Taxation
(“the Division”) audited the club and determined that
the club’s door admission fees and private dance fees
were subject to New York State sales taxes, which
the Division alleged that the club did not pay. 5 Thus,
the Division assessed the club’s unpaid sales taxes in
the amount of $124,921.94.6 Needless to say, the
club did not agree with Division’s assessment, and
challenged the Division in court. Unfortunately for
Nite Moves, the New York Appellate Division ruled
in favor of the Division of Taxation.7 The Appellate
Division found, among other things, that the Division
of Taxation had a rational basis for subjecting the
club’s exotic dancing to the sales tax,8 that the club
failed to meet its burden of proof that it qualified for
a sales tax exemption, 9 and most importantly, that
exotic dancing is not a choreographed, artistic performance that merits exemption from the sales tax. 10
II. THE ISSUE
According to New York State Tax Law, the
state will impose a tax on admissions fees in excess
Id.
Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 692.
8 Id. at 690.
9 Id. at 691.
10 Id. at 691-92.
4
5
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of ten cents on:
the use of any place of amusement in the
state, except charges for admission to race
tracks, boxing, sparring or wrestling
matches or exhibitions which charges are
taxed under any other law of this state, or
dramatic or musical arts performances, or
live circus performances, or motion picture
theaters, and except charges to a patron for
admission to, or use of, facilities for sporting activities in which such patron is to be a
participant, such as bowling alleys and
swimming pools.11

Thus, the central issue that the New York
Court of Appeals had to decide was whether exotic
dancing was in fact a choreographed, artistic activity
that qualified for exemption from the New York
State sales tax. The club contended that its dance
activity was in fact choreographed performances that
should be exempt from taxation while the Division
contended that the club’s activities were well within
the statutory definition of a taxable place of amusement. The statute defines places of amusement as
“any place where any facilities for entertainment,
amusement, or sports are provided.” 12
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a 4-3 decision,13 the New York Court of ApN.Y. TAX LAW § 1105(f)(1) (Consol. 2012) (emphasis added).
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(d)(2) (Consol. 2012).
13 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012). Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Pigott and Jones concur in the judgment. Judge Smith
wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Judge Lippman and
Judge Read.
11
12
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peals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision,14
holding that exotic dancing is not a choreographed,
artistic event thus subject to the New York State
sales tax. In its majority opinion, the court first noted the Division’s legislative history showed wide latitude in defining those entertainment activities which
are subject to taxation.
The Legislature expansively defined places
of amusement that are subject to this tax to
include “any place where any facilities for
entertainment, amusement, or sports are
provided.” The tax, therefore, applies to a
vast array of entertainment including attendances at sporting events, such as baseball, basketball or football games, collegiate
athletic events, stock car races, carnivals
and fairs, amusement parks, rodeos, zoos,
horse shows, arcades, variety shows, magic
performances, ice shows, aquatic events,
and animal acts. Plainly, no specific type of
recreation is singled out for taxation..15

Therefore, if one accepts the premise that lap dancing is indeed a form of “entertainment,” then it would
logically follow, according to the majority, that exotic
dancing is included in the non-exhaustive listing of
taxable entertainment activity.
However, in relying on the legislative intent,
the court also noted that the Legislature created a
specific exception for certain forms of entertainment.
Thus, if an entertainment activity fell within the definition of “dramatic or musical arts” performances,
then the venue that provided the performances
14
15

677 New Loudon Corp., 979 N.E.2d at 1122.
Id.

8

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

New York’s Taxable Lap Dancing

would be exempt from having to collect and pay New
York sales tax. “[W]ith the evident purpose of promoting cultural and artistic performances in local
communities, the Legislature created an exemption
that excluded from taxation admission charges for a
discrete form of entertainment – ‘dramatic or musical
arts performances.’”16
The majority’s second point in its opinion was
that the club’s entertainment activities did not qualify for the tax exemption. This is because the court
agreed with the Appellate Division and thus believed
that the club did not meet its burden of proof that its
exotic dance routines qualified as artistic choreographed performances.17 The majority believed the
club’s evidence supporting its position was faulty for
two reasons.
Firstly, the club’s expert witness, who was a
cultural anthropologist who researched the field of
exotic dancing, never saw any of the dances performed at the club herself.18 “Petitioner’s expert, by
her own admission, did not view any of the private
dances performed at petitioner’s club and, instead,
based her entire opinion in this regard upon her observations of private dances performed in other adult
Id.
Id. at 1123 (“In order for petitioner to be entitled to the
exclusion for “dramatic or musical arts performances,” it was
required to prove that the fees constituted admission charges
for performances that were dance routines qualifying as
choreographed performances. Petitioner failed to meet this
burden as it related to the fees collected for the performances in
so-called “private rooms”; none of the evidence presented
depicted such performances and petitioner’s expert’s opinion
was not based on any personal knowledge or observation of
“private” dances that happened at petitioner’s club.”).
18 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 925 N.Y.S.2d 686, 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
16
17
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entertainment venues.”19 Consequently, the Division
completely discredited the club’s expert, and determined the performances to be taxable.20
In my opinion, the expert witness certainly
should have exercised some due diligence (and some
common sense) and personally seen some of the
club’s dance routines herself. However, just to play
Devil’s Advocate here, we should consider the following: (1) the expert was a cultural anthropologist
by profession;21 (2) she extensively researched the
field of exotic dancing;22 and (3) she had witnessed
similar dance routines at other venues.23 Therefore,
this is a person with both the academic training and
practical experience who could make an informed
judgment as to whether the club’s routines were in
fact choreographed dances.
Secondly, the court upheld the Appellate Division’s finding that the club’s exotic dance routines
were not choreographed performances. The Appellate Division determined that this type of dancing
does not rise to the level of a choreographed perforId. at 691.
Id. (“Although petitioner argues that the detailed
testimony of its expert was more than sufficient to discharge
its burden on this point, the Tribunal essentially discounted
this testimony in its entirety, leaving petitioner with little
more than the Nite Moves DVD to demonstrate its entitlement
to the requested exemption.”); see also 19 N.Y.3d at 1060. (“The
Tribunal articulated a rational basis for discrediting her: it
found her testimony was compromised by her opinion that the
private performances were the same as the main stage
performances despite the fact that she neither observed nor
had personal knowledge of what occurred in the private
areas.”).
21 Id. at 690.
22 Id.
23 Id.
19
20
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mance that requires formalized training. “The record reflects that the club’s dancers are not required
to have any formal dance training and, in lieu thereof, often rely upon videos or suggestions from other
dancers to learn their craft.”24
In my opinion, this suggests that both the majority and the Appellate Division strongly believe
that any idiot (male or female) could walk into any
nightclub, apply for a position as an exotic dancer,
and get the job. I defy any of those self-appointed
critics to try it themselves and see if they could pull
it off. If any of them can (and I absolutely doubt it!!!),
then I will retract everything I have written here and
shut up.
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion hits the majority hard with his assertion that the majority is
imposing its own moral judgment on what kind of
dancing is taxable. He makes quite clear that although he finds exotic dance personally unappealing,
it is grossly unfair to subject it to taxation solely on
that basis.
Like the majority and the Tribunal, I find
this particular form of dance unedifying —
indeed, I am stuffy enough to find it distasteful. Perhaps for similar reasons, I do
not read Hustler magazine; I would rather
read the New Yorker. I would be appalled,
however, if the State were to exact from
Hustler a tax that the New Yorker did not
have to pay, on the ground that what appears in Hustler is insufficiently “cultural
and artistic.” That sort of discrimination on
24

Id. at 691.
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the basis of content would surely be unconstitutional. It is not clear to me why the
discrimination that the majority approves
in this case stands on any firmer constitutional footing.25

Judge Smith takes exception to the majority’s
splitting dance activity into what it deems acceptable
versus what it deems objectionable. “The majority,
and the Tribunal, have implicitly defined the statutory words ‘choreographic . . . performance’ to mean
‘highbrow dance’ or ‘dance worthy of a five-syllable
adjective.’”26 This lends itself to the possibility that a
performance of the Joffrey Ballet at New York’s Lincoln Center is completely safe from taxation, whereas
a striptease in a low rent bar on the wrong side of
town is taxable. How fair is that? In Judge Smith’s
opinion, a dance is a dance is a dance – period. “The
people who paid these admission charges paid to see
women dancing. It does not matter if the dance was
artistic or crude, boring or erotic. Under New York’s
Tax Law, a dance is a dance.”27 I believe Judge
Smith is spot on with his analysis. Whether it is tap
dancing, ballet dancing, ballroom dancing, salsa
dancing, Dancing with the Stars, or even exotic dancing in this case, the operative word in all those titles
is still dance.
Next, Judge Smith rips apart the majority’s
conclusion that exotic dancing is not choreography.
He noted that the actual tax regulation included the
word “choreography” within the definition of “musi25 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121, 1125 (N.Y. 2012) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
26 Id. at 1124 (Smith, J., dissenting).
27 Id. (emphasis added).
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cal arts” that would be exempt from the tax. 28 Thus,
as long as the entertainment in question involved
choreographed routines, it would be exempt from the
sales tax – irrespective of its tastefulness.
V. WHAT IS DANCE AND WHAT IS
CHOREOGRAPHY, THEN?
According to Dictionary.com, dance is defined
as “to move one’s feet or body, or both, rhythmically
in a pattern of steps, especially to the accompaniment of music.”29 Dictionary.com also defines choreography as “the technique of representing the various movements in dancing by a system of notation.”30
Choreography requires both practice and precision. In order to successfully complete any dance
routine, the person or persons involved must get
their timing down, be physically coordinated, and
most importantly, have the talent and ability to be
successful. In Judge Smith’s eyes, this point is
equally applicable irrespective of the type of dance
performance. “It is undisputed that the dancers
worked hard to prepare their acts, and that pole
dancing is actually quite difficult. . . .”31 If even pole
dancing requires actual talent, this blows apart the
majority’s presumption that anybody can do exotic
dancing.
Why?
Even exotic dancing requires
rhythm, timing, coordination, and practice. Not everyone has the ability to dance; dancing is a specialId.
Dance, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dance (last visited Mar.
2, 2014).
30 Choreography, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/choreography (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014).
31 677 New Loudon Corp., 979 N.E.2d at 1124.
28
29
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ized skill.
VI. SIMILAR ACTIVITIES TREATED DISSIMILARLY:
ARKANSAS WRITERS’ PROJECT, INC. V. RAGLAND
The issue of differentiating between similar
activities is not new. Obviously no one knows if the
United States Supreme Court will step in to decide if
there is a constitutionally impermissible distinction
between nude dancing and other types of dancing.
In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
Commissioner of Revenue of Arkansas, the Court examined the constitutionality of an Arkansas sales tax
that was imposed on some publications but not others.32 The tax was imposed on all sales of tangible
personal property. 33 However, the state allowed several exemptions to the tax, including newspapers,
and certain other publications related to sports, religion, and trade or professional journals. 34
The Arkansas Times (“the Times”) was a
monthly general interest magazine. “The magazine
includes articles on a variety of subjects, including
religion and sports.”35 The state, after an audit, assessed taxes on the Times.36 The Times agreed to
pay the assessment and future taxes on the condition
that it could renew its challenge to the Arkansas tax
32 Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987).
33 Id. at 224.
34 Id. (“These include ‘[g]ross receipts or gross proceeds
derived from the sale of newspapers,’ § 84-1904(f)
(newspaper exemption), and ‘religious, professional,
trade and sports journals and/or publications printed and
published within this State . . . when sold through
regular subscriptions.’ § 84-1904(j) (magazine
exemption).”).
35 Id.
36 Id.
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exemption if there were any future court rulings or
changes in the tax law that would justify such a challenge.37
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided
Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner, in
which it invalidated a Minnesota use tax on “the cost
of paper and ink products consumed in the production of a publication.”38 The Court struck down the
tax on the grounds that the tax and exemption
scheme was targeted at the press. In other words,
the taxing scheme in that case put an impermissible
burden on publishers to pay the use tax while it was
never imposed on any other business in the state of
Minnesota.
We have long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of
rights protected by the First Amendment.
A tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications within the
press, places a heavy burden on the State to
justify its action. Since Minnesota has offered no satisfactory justification for its tax
on the use of ink and paper, the tax violates
the First Amendment, and the judgment below is Reversed.39

37 Id. at 225 (“Appellant initially contested the assessment,
but eventually reached a settlement with the State and agreed
to pay the tax beginning in October 1982. However, appellant
reserved the right to renew its challenge if there were a change
in the tax law or a court ruling drawing into question the
validity of Arkansas’ exemption structure.”).
38 Minneapolis Star v. Minn. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 575, 577
(1983).
39 Id. at 592 (citation omitted).
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Back in Arkansas, the Times, relying on the
Minneapolis Star case, brought a lawsuit against the
state to get a refund of all the sales taxes it had paid
since October 1982. 40 The litigation went all the way
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which denied the
Times’ petition and upheld the tax. 41 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Arkansas court
and struck down the tax on the ground that, even absent a discriminatory motive, this tax was unconstitutional because it was imposed on some Arkansas
publishers, but not others.
On the facts of this case, the fundamental
question is not whether the tax singles out
the press as a whole, but whether it targets
a small group within the press. While we
indicated in Minneapolis Star that a genuinely nondiscriminatory tax on the receipts
of newspapers would be constitutionally
permissible, the Arkansas sales tax cannot
be characterized as nondiscriminatory, because it is not evenly applied to all magazines. To the contrary, the magazine exemption means that only a few Arkansas
magazines pay any sales tax; in that respect, it operates in much the same way as
did the $100,000 exemption to the Minnesota use tax. Because the Arkansas sales tax
scheme treats some magazines less favorably than others, it suffers from the second
type of discrimination identified in Minneapolis Star. Indeed, this case involves a
more disturbing use of selective taxation
than Minneapolis Star, because the basis on
which Arkansas differentiates between
40
41

Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 225.
Id. at 226.
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magazines is particularly repugnant to
First Amendment principles: a magazine’s
tax status depends entirely on its content.
‘[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’42

The bottom line, obviously, is that if a taxing
authority is going to impose a tax, it should be uniformly imposed on all within the jurisdiction. It certainly would not look good if the state of New York
were to grant a sales tax exemption to the Wall
Street Journal, generally accepted to be an upscale
publication, but not the Weekly World News, a publication (and I use that term loosely as applied to it
here) that I believe does not let little things like accuracy and veracity get in the way of a good, attention grabbing headline. Some of the notorious headlines the Weekly World News is rather infamous for
include the following: “Earth to Collide with Nibiru
on December 21, 2012!,”43 “Sean Penn to Replace
Chavez,”44 “Dennis Rodman Named Leader of North
Korea,”45 “Super Bowl Blackout – Joe Biden Did
42 Id. at 229 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) (citation omitted).
43 Frank Lake, Earth to Collide with Nibiru on December 21,
2012!, WEEKLY WORLD NEWS, Dec. 20, 2012,
http://weeklyworldnews.com/aliens/42896/earth-to-collide-withnibiru-on-decembe-21-2012/.
44 Frank Lake, Sean Penn to Replace Chavez, WEEKLY WORLD
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2013,
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/55101/sean-penn-toreplace-chavez/.
45 Tap Vann, Dennis Rodman Named Leader of North Korea,
WEEKLY WORLD NEWS, Mar. 4, 2013,
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/55030/dennis-rodmannamed-leader-of-north-korea/.
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It!,”46 or my favorite, “Bigfoot Kept Lumberjack as
Love Slave.”47
Even if one does not hold the Weekly World
News in the highest esteem, it would be grossly unfair to impose a tax on it merely because it is a bit
lowbrow. Yet, this is the very same thing the New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance is
doing by excluding nude dancing from the generic
definition of “choreographed dance” for tax purposes.
VII. IS NUDE DANCING REALLY ENTITLED TO FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION? YES, BUT…
Supreme Court jurisprudence has given nude
dancing First Amendment protection. In fact, the
court noted that activities that are protected by the
First Amendment included nudity. For example, in
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the Court recognized that nude dancing was expressive speech
within the First Amendment.48
Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it displays the nude
human figure. “[N]udity alone” does not
46 Tap Vann, Super Bowl Blackout – Joe Biden Did it!,
WEEKLY WORLD NEWS, Feb. 4, 2013.
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/54471/super-bowlblackout-joe-biden-did-it/.
47 K. Thor Jensen, Tabloid Headlines We Wish Were Real,
UGO (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.ugo.com/web-culture/tabloidheadlines-we-wish-were-real-bigfoot-kept-lumberjack
(displaying picture of the headline “Bigfoot Kept Lumberjack as
Slave”); Steve Mandich, A Year in the Life of Bigfoot, BIGFOOT IS
REAL, http://www.stevemandich.com/otherstuff/bigfootyear.htm
(last updated Jan. 13, 2011) (describing the October 30, 2001
story “Bigfoot Kept a Lumberjack as a Slave” as “a Tacoma
lumberjack held captive by Bigfoot for three months came to
call the beast ‘Wookums.’”).
48 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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place otherwise protected material outside
the mantle of the First Amendment. . . .
Furthermore, as the state courts in this
case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from
official regulation.49

In two later cases, however, the Court upheld
public indecency statutes. In upholding the statutes,
the court mentioned that nude dancing was within
the very limited purview of the First Amendment,
but the plurality opinion in both cases also mentioned that their First Amendment protections are
neither unlimited nor absolute.
First, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., a 1991
case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Indiana
statute outlawing public nudity.50 The statute here
required that exotic dancers wear pasties and a Gstring while performing.51 Even then, the Court recognized that nude dancing still had First
Amendment protection, albeit limited. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, probably not a fan of nude dancing,
stated in the opinion: “[n]ude dancing of the kind
sought to be performed here is expressive conduct
within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,
though we view it as marginally so.”52
Nine years later, in 2000, the Court decided
Erie v. Pap’s A.M.53 Here, the Court looked at an
Erie, Pennsylvania statute that provided the following:

Id. at 66.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
51 Id. at 563.
52 Id. at 566.
53 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
49
50
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1. A person who knowingly or intentionally,
in a public place:
a. engages in sexual intercourse
b. engages in deviate sexual intercourse
as defined by the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code
c. appears in a state of nudity, or
d. fondles the genitals of himself, herself
or another person commits Public Indecency, a Summary Offense.
2. “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genital [sic], pubic
area or buttocks with less than a fully
opaque covering; the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any part of the nipple; the exposure of any device, costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or
simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft . . . .54

In Pap’s A.M., Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion, in which she reinforced the Barnes
Court’s rationale that nude dancing is entitled to only limited First Amendment protection. “Being ‘in a
state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition. As we explained in Barnes, however, nude
dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the
outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”55
As a result of these two cases, the Court places nude
dancing, allegedly expressive speech, on a much lower pedestal than, say, political speech or commercial
speech.
54 Id. at 283 n.* (quoting Ordinance 75-1994, codified as
Article 711 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Erie).
55 Id. at 289.
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Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist never
defined exactly how “marginal”56 First Amendment
protection for nude dancing really is, and Justice
O’Connor never gave a definitive description of her
“outer ambit”57 of First Amendment protection for
nude dancing, either. Justice O’Connor also mentions in Pap’s A.M. that society has a much greater
interest in protecting political speech than exotic
dancing, which she considers akin to being an unwanted stepchild.
And as Justice Stevens eloquently stated
for the plurality in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 70 (1976), “even
though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression
of erotic materials that have some arguably
artistic value, it is manifest that society’s
interest in protecting this type of expression
is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate,” and “few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see” specified anatomical areas exhibited at establishments
like Kandyland.58
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289; see also Kevin Case, “Lewd and
Immoral”: Nude Dancing, Sexual Expression, and the First
Amendment, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1185, 1201 (2006) (“Like
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Barnes, she provided no explanation
for why nude dancing was banished to the ‘outer ambit,’
although she, like Justice Souter in Barnes, quoted the passage
from American Mini Theatres about society’s interest in
protecting sexual expression being of a ‘wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude’ than the interest in protecting political
speech.”).
58 Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 294.
56
57
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Can this possibly be true? Is “unfettered political debate” that important in helping society where
we would otherwise be hopelessly lost without it?
Does Justice O’Connor really believe we would prefer
to send our sons and daughters off to war to preserve
the First Amendment rights of political office holders
to lie to their constituents on a daily basis?59 To each
his own, I suppose.
In my opinion, if Justice
O’Connor were that concerned about societal harm, I
would suggest to her that professional liars (who I
will call “politicians”) routinely inflict much more
harm on society than exposing certain body parts ever could.
IIX. JUDICIAL ANTIPATHY TOWARDS NUDITY
From the day that Adam and Eve realized that
they were naked in the Garden of Eden, 60 nudity has
always been a hot topic, especially in the legal world.
Yet, as the Barnes and Pap’s A.M. cases have shown,
the Court, at best, has given a lukewarm endorsement to the proposition that nude dancing (no matter
how distasteful) is a form of expressive speech. This
type of speech, allegedly under the umbrella of First
Amendment protection, is deemed not really worthy
of strict scrutiny analysis that other forms of pro59 See, e.g., Bill Haltom, The Constitutional Right to Lie, 43NOV TENN. B.J. 32 (2007) (“Let’s face it, my fellow Americans.
Lying politicians are as American as apple pie.”).
60 Genesis 3:8-11 (“Then the man and his wife heard the sound
of the LORD God as he was walking in the garden in the cool of
the day, and they hid from the LORD God among the trees of the
garden. But the LORD God called to the man, ‘Where are you?’
He answered, ‘I heard you in the garden, and I was afraid
because I was naked; so I hid.’ And he said, ‘Who told you that
you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree that I
commanded you not to eat from?’”).
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tected speech would be given.
Why exactly do courts hesitate to give nude
dancing full protection under the First Amendment?
Could it be that there might be some deep-seated,
patriarchal cultural mindset that would suggest that
the nude female body is “evil,” and somehow something to be afraid of? And perhaps the only way to
suppress the evilness is for courts to make sure that
the nude female form does not gain access to legal
protection (free speech, taxation, equal protection
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, and who knows what
else)?
There is at least one paradigm61 that does suggest a judicial aversion to the nude female form that,
I believe, is completely devoid of any rational basis
(how ironic).
What is it about the nude female body that
inspires irrationality, fear, and pandemonium, or at least inspires judges to
write bad decisions? In City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M. and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the
Supreme Court’s “nude dancing” cases, the
Court accepted and acted upon culturally
entrenched views of the nude female form:
that the female body is a site of unreason;
that it is barely intelligible; that it is inviting yet dangerous; and that it causes mayhem, disease, and destruction. This view of
the seductive, dangerous, writhing woman,
so powerful that she is inextricable from the
wreckage she causes, has a long and feverish history in Western culture, be it the Bi61 See generally Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls! The Supreme
Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1109
(2005).
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ble, great literature, or pulp movies. This
time she has caused more trouble: She has
wreaked havoc in the First Amendment.62

Evidently, there does not seem to be a similar
judicial hysteria when it comes to male nudity. Assuming the above quote is true, this must mean that
exposed male genitalia is not nearly as dangerous,
potentially attractive, and simultaneously fear inducing as female genitalia. Thus, women looking at
a nude, gyrating male body would not result in male
prostitution, female-on-male rape, or the decline in
real estate values in neighborhoods where nude male
entertainment would be available.
Surely, there are images of male virility embodied in certain celebrities, for example, that would
inspire naked animal lust in the female heart as
well. I would assume male figures like Brad Pitt,
George Clooney, Denzel Washington, Mel Gibson or
even the Rat Pack (Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin,
Sammy Davis, Jr. and Peter Lawford) in their prime
would inspire similar lustful thoughts in the female
gender. The above examples of male libido notwithstanding, the male body is obviously not nearly as
sexy or dangerous in the minds of middle-aged to elderly judges.
The courts have implicitly recognized that
without some coherent limiting principle,
all sorts of businesses could adopt sexualized branding, making gender-specific sex
appeal a qualification for nurses, secretaries and even lawyers. Although such a
rule would also allow employers to sexualize male employees, and might seem su62

Id.
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perficially equal, it would not be in practice.
Because more business owners are male
and prevailing gender norms encourage
men to commodify women, there would be a
stronger demand for female sexuality than
male sexuality, just as movie audiences appear to prefer to see female nudity more
than male nudity.63

That said, does the exposure of female body
parts really lead to all this lawlessness the Pap’s
A.M. Court so greatly fears? Can an exposed pair of
breasts or an uncovered vagina really lead to the end
of civilization as we know it? We shall soon see…
A. The Ridiculous, Illogical “Secondary Effects”
Rationale of Pap’s A.M.
In Pap’s A.M., the plurality opinion relied
quite heavily on the so-called secondary effects resulting from full nudity in live entertainment. The
City of Erie, in enacting its ban on public nudity, justified its ordinance on the premise that live, nude entertainment automatically leads to criminal activity.
The preamble to the ordinance states that
“the Council of the City of Erie has, at
various times over more than a century,
expressed its findings that certain lewd,
immoral activities carried on in public
places for profit are highly detrimental to
the public health, safety and welfare, and
lead to the debasement of both women and
men, promote violence, public intoxication,
prostitution and other serious criminal
63 Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing; Reconciling
Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (2007).
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activity.64

Admittedly, I am hard pressed to come to that conclusion. Actually, I see several logical flaws in the
Court’s attempt to justify its secondary effects argument.
First, this reasoning assumes that anyone who
goes into a strip club will automatically lose his wits
and self-control, get drunk, get into fights, do drugs,
and solicit a prostitute (at best) or commit rape (at
worst). Although I am not a fan of strip clubs myself,
I have gone to strip clubs several times in my younger days. At no time thereafter did I feel the need to
commit any crime as the involuntary after-effect of
going into a strip club. If anything, I was just plain
bored. I have to believe that common sense would
suggest that most people do not cave in to some irresistible primal impulse to engage in criminality
and/or debauchery after seeing a live nude performance. In my view, this argument is very weak, at
best.
The next logical flaw in the Court’s justification was that the City of Erie wanted to place limitations on live nude entertainment in response to an
increase in such establishments.
In the preamble to the ordinance, the city
council stated that it was adopting the regulation for the purpose of limiting a recent
increase in nude live entertainment within
the City, which activity adversely impacts
and threatens to impact on the public
health, safety and welfare by providing an
atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual
harassment, public intoxication, prostitu64

City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297 (2000).

26

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

New York’s Taxable Lap Dancing
tion, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects.65

Taking this argument at face value, this seems to
suggest that if nude entertainment were available at
a private office party in an upscale neighborhood (as
opposed to the seedy areas where strip clubs presumably operate), the perceived incidences of violence, prostitution, drunkenness and the like would
be at a much lower rate. This does not make any logical sense to me. Prostitution, for example, is defined
as “the act or practice of engaging in sexual intercourse for money.”66 Where is it written in stone
that nude dance clubs are automatic training
grounds for prostitutes? Yes, it is true that some
strippers are also prostitutes.67 There are some who
will trade sex for drugs.68 There are some who work
at high-end “escort” services who serve wealthy, influential clients (former New York Governor Eliot
Spitzer, for example).69 The point here is that these
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 290.
Prostitution, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/prostitution (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014).
67 See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, Former Prostitute and
Stripper BACK in the Classroom (But This Time She’s Only
Teaching Adults), MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:20 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2187698/Melissa-PetroFormer-prostitute-stripper-BACK-classroom-time-shesteaching-adults.html.
68 See, e.g., Jan Skutch, Savannah Doctor Accused of Trading
Drugs for Sex with Strippers, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Jan. 31, 2013,
7:59PM), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/crime-courts/201301-31/savannah-doctor-accused-trading-drugs-sex-strippers.
69 Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, Spitzer is Linked to
Prostitution Ring, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/nyregion/10cndspitzer.html.
65
66
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bad acts can happen anywhere, and I would not be so
quick to assume that nude entertainment automatically leads to the dark side of the human condition.
The third logical flaw in the Court’s secondary
effects rationale exposes the weakest point of them
all: the idea of requiring female dancers to wear pasties and a G-string would miraculously eliminate the
secondary effects (which would include raising the
neighborhood property values; the Court never bothered to try to explain how that could be possible).
Perhaps that idea might be plausible if the pasties
had barbed wire in front and back, and the G-string
was actually a cast iron chastity belt. This logic (or
lack thereof) further assumes that if I for example
wanted to meet a prostitute for the weekend and
smoke crack with her after having sex, I would lose
that desire the very second I saw a female dancer
wearing pasties and a G-string. No matter how
strong my “cravings” might be, they would automatically disintegrate as soon as I saw covered-up body
parts. This idea is just laughable; if I wanted it bad
enough, I can certainly find it. Needless to say, (but
I will) I think the absolute stupidity of the Court’s
reasoning speaks for itself here, and I can certainly
understand the original premise 70 regarding the fear
of the nude female body that can result in some court
decisions (such as this one) that are just asinine!
Aside from the potential implications of
Pap’s A.M., the fact remains that applying
the secondary effects doctrine in the context
of nude dancing to justify public nudity
laws like the Erie ordinance simply fails to
pass the laugh test. Compliance typically
requires nothing but pasties and a G-string.
70

Adler, supra note 61, at 1109.
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How much of an effect can this possibly
have on the harmful secondary effects that
cities like Erie assert? Will the mere masking of a nipple with a dime-sized circle of latex magically send prostitutes elsewhere,
eliminate assaults, reduce AIDS, and restore property values? The premise is ludicrous. Justice O’Connor attempts to respond to this obvious flaw in her secondary
effects analysis by arguing that cities
should have latitude to ‘experiment’ with
solutions to such serious problems. Some
experiments, however, are more justified
than others. Perhaps Justice O’Connor
should have applied the same ‘common
sense’ that she so approved of when discussing a municipality’s burden in showing secondary effects.71

CONCLUSION
As ridiculous as it sounds, consider the following: In New York City, the sales tax rate (as of this
writing) is 8.875 per cent.72 Now that the New York
Court of Appeals has ruled in favor of the Department of Taxation and Finance, this now means that
the next time someone goes into a strip club and
wants to give a ten dollar tip to an exotic dancer, it
will not be enough; he will have to give a tip of ten
dollars and eighty nine cents. If we carry this scenario to its logical conclusion, the dancer could conceivably wedge the ten-dollar bill into her G-String.
But then, where does she put the other eighty-nine
Case, supra note 57, at 1211.
NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF TAX & FIN., ST-810, QUARTERLY
SALES AND USE TAX RETURN FOR PART-QUARTERLY (MONTHLY)
FILERS 3 (2013),
http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/st/st810.pdf.
71
72
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cents? Might she need to have a change purse or
coin sorter somehow attached to her costume? In
addition, this could raise the possibility that she may
claim the coin sorter as an itemized deduction on her
federal tax return for work related clothing.73
On July 5, 2013, Nite Moves filed a petition
with the United States Supreme Court to review the
Court of Appeals’ decision.74 My prognostication at
the time was that the currently conservative Court
would most likely hide behind its secondary effects
illogic and uphold the New York tax. Unfortunately,
things did not make it that far. On October 17, 2013,
the United States Supreme Court denied Nite Moves’
petition for certiorari.75 Now that this is the final
disposition of the issue, I have a suggestion where
Nite Moves could provide nude entertainment and
still qualify for the sales tax exemption.
My suggestion is this: Nite Moves could give
nude performances of Shakespeare plays (Macbeth,
Hamlet, King Lear, Taming of the Shrew, etc. They
could even throw in a nude interpretation of Ocean’s
Eleven.76). The hook would still be live nude entertainment, and I think such a performance would be
well within both the spirit (and more important) the
letter of the law. I doubt that anyone from the Division could convincingly (let alone coherently) argue
that Shakespeare is not art. As the old adage suggests, “where there’s a will, there’s a way.” Thus, as
I.R.C. § 162 (2012).
677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012), petition for cert. filed,
2013 WL 3458158 (U.S. Jul. 5, 2013) (No. 13-38).
75 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012), petition denied, 134
S.Ct. 422 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-38).
76 OCEAN’S ELEVEN (Warner Brothers, 1960).
73
74
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long as such a performance is planned and done right
within the rules of New York State tax law, not even
a G-string could get in the way.
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Abstract
This Article examines the preliminary injunction standard in pharmaceutical patent infringement
actions pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act. Prior to
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange,
L.L.C. in 2006, federal courts applied a presumption
of irreparable harm when a patent holder established
a likelihood of success on the merits. While the eBay
Court abrogated the presumption of irreparable
harm in permanent injunctions, courts have been
unclear as to application of eBay on preliminary injunctions. This Article will further examine preliminary injunctions in Hatch-Waxman actions in the
District of New Jersey since eBay in 2006 and argue
that courts still tacitly apply the irreparable harm
presumption.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, sales of prescription drugs in the
United States totaled over $300 billion.1 In the same
year, sales of generic drugs were valued at $78 billion.2 Six of the world’s ten largest pharmaceutical
companies are based in the United States. 3 Approximately eighty percent of the world’s research in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are conducted by

1 Brittany Hart, Pharmaceutical Sales Top $300 Billion in
2010, DAYTON BUS. J. (Apr. 19, 2011, 2:58 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/news/2011/04/19/pharmaceu
tical-sales-top-300-billion.html.
2 The Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States,
SELECTUSA, http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industrysnapshots/pharmaceutical-industry-united-states (last visited
Feb. 5, 2014).
3 Pharmaceutical Industry, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/index.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2014).
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American pharmaceutical companies.4
In other
words, the drug business is big business in America.
The pharmaceutical industry can be roughly
divided into two categories; brand name manufacturers, also called “innovator companies,” and generic
manufacturers.5 Generic drugs are bioequivalent 6
versions of brand name medication and present significant savings to consumers.7 The development
cost of a generic drug is much lower in comparison to
that of a brand name drug.8 The process of research
and clinical trials for a new drug usually takes ten to
fifteen years and can cost an innovator company upwards of $800 million.9 Brand name medications are
protected by patents and the process in which generic drugs enter the market is governed by the
Hatch-Waxman Act.10
The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed with the
4 The Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States, supra
note 2.
5 See Greater Access to Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm14354
5.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
6 Christopher J. Kochevar, Note, Reforming Judicial Review
of Bioequivalence Determinations, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2040, 2042
(2012) (“‘[B]ioequivalence’ [is] an approximation of identity
between a generic drug and an approved innovator product.”).
7 Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 5. (“[T]he
average price for a prescription for a brand-name drug is
$84.20, while the average price for a generic drug prescription
is $30.56.”).
8 Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and
Sustainability: How to Achieve the Dual Objectives of the HatchWaxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SC. &
TECH. 441, 447 (2008).
9 Id. at 482.
10 Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 5.
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intention to give innovator companies additional incentives to develop new drugs while giving the
American consumer savings by expanding the generics market.11 Since the enactment of the HatchWaxman Act, the market share held by generic drugs
has increased from under twenty percent in 1984 to
nearly eighty percent in 2010.12
This Article will discuss the preliminary injunction factors as applied when an innovator company seeks to enjoin a generic maker from releasing
a competing product during the course of litigation
under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Specifically, this Article will argue that the presumption of irreparable
harm, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court in
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., still exists even if
the presumption is not explicitly applied. Part I will
briefly discuss Federal jurisdiction in patent matters.
Part II will discuss the four preliminary injunction
factors and its development in patent law, including
eBay and its subsequent line of cases. Part III will
explain the historical context which led to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and discuss in detail
the process by which a generic drug is approved for
market. Part IV will be a survey of pharmaceutical
patent cases before the District of New Jersey since
the eBay decision in 2006. This Article will conclude
by arguing that the presumption of harm still exists,13 how a tacit application of the presumption is
permissible under current law, and propose that
See infra Part III.B.
Liu, supra note 8, at 456; Karen von Koeckritz, Generic
Drug Trends –What’s Next?, PHARMACY TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2012/April20
12/Generic-Drug-Trends-Whats-Next-.
13 This Article will only discuss the presumption of harm as it
exists within the District of New Jersey.
11
12
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Congress amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to allow for
the presumption of harm in preliminary injunction
determinations.
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN PATENT MATTERS
Federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all matters “arising under any Act of
Congress relating patents, . . . copyrights and trademarks.”14 Patents have been within the ambit of
Federal jurisdiction since the earliest days of the
Republic.15 In 1982, Congress created the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as
one of the provisions of the Federal Courts Improvement Act.16 The legislation gave the Federal Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district
courts in patent cases.17 As a result, the new Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction in patent matters was much
broader than that of one of the courts it replaced, the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA).18 Previously, the CCPA only had jurisdic28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also 8 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02(1)(a)(i) (2013) (“Section 17 of the
Patent Act of 1836 conferred jurisdiction without regard to
amount over ‘all actions, suits, controversies, and cases arising
under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to
inventors the exclusive right to their inventions or
discoveries.’”).
16 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012); see also Joseph R. Re, Brief
Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Under § 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 654
(2001).
18 AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 6-7 (2002), available at
14
15
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tion over appeals from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.19 Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent suits filed in the district courts
were appealed to the regional circuit courts.20 Currently, circuit splits do not exist in patent law because all patent appeals are reviewed by the Federal
Circuit.21
II. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD:
PAST AND PRESENT
Congress has given courts power to “grant injunctions in accordance to the principles of equity” in
patent cases.22 Courts use the traditional four equitable factors to determine whether a preliminary injunction is proper.23
The first factor, likelihood of success on the
merits, undergoes a two-step analysis in patent in-

http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2951F5BA-25A3-457DB4B2CA99691EE6F1_Publication.pdf.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 630
F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980).
21 Cf. Erin V. Klewin, Note, Reconciling Federal Circuit
Choice of Law with eBay v. MercExchange’s Abrogation of the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary
Injunctions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2118-23 (2012) (noting
that in copyright matters, also affected by the holding in eBay,
the Federal Circuit only has jurisdiction in pendant matters
and applies regional circuit law in those cases).
22 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
23 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker,
Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (“(1) a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if an
injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of hardships tipping in
its favor; and (4) the injunction’s favorable impact on the public
interest.”).
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fringement cases.24 The plaintiff must establish that
the defendant has infringed on the patent. 25 First,
the court determines the scope of the patent claims. 26
Then, the allegedly infringing product is compared to
see if it lies within the scope of the patent. 27 Under
the doctrine of equivalents, a product may still be infringing if it performs in the same manner to achieve
the same results as the original invention.28
Further, the plaintiff must also establish that
the patent can withstand the defendant’s claim of invalidity.29 Typically, defendants allege that the patented product is obvious, meaning the patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 30 Courts employ a
four factor analysis in determining obviousness.31
The courts have also acknowledged that new inven-

24 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Arch. Resources, Inc.,
279 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Amazon.com, 239
F.3d at 1351).
25 Id.
26 Aventis Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 411 F.Supp.2d 490,
494 (D.N.J. 2006) (quoting Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1351).
27 Id.
28 Syntex Pharm. Int’l, Ltd. v. K-Line Pharm., Ltd., 721
F.Supp. 653, 660-61 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)).
29 See Tate, 279 F.3d at 1365 (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451).
30 Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532
F.Supp.2d 666, 674 (D.N.J. 2007) aff’g, 566 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir.
2009); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
31 Id. (citing PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,
491 F.3d 1342, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (“Factual determinations
that are relevant to the obviousness inquiry are: (1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations or objective
indicia of non-obviousness.”).
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tions are often built upon prior innovations. 32 The
Supreme Court has, on occasion, upheld patents comprised of knowledge of prior patents when the new
patent aimed to solve a problem previously not apparent.33
The second factor, irreparable harm, also
called irreparable injury, is defined as “[a]n injury
that cannot be adequately measured or compensated
by money.”34 In other words, an injury is irreparable
if money damages at the conclusion of a trial are insufficient to make the plaintiff whole. 35 Professor
Donald Chisum notes that courts have been inconsistent in irreparable harm determinations and “tend
to find irreparable injury when the plaintiff makes a
strong case of validity and infringement and to find
no such injury when plaintiff makes only a weak
case.”36 This inconsistency will be discussed in depth
further in this Article.37
The balance of hardships generally weighs in
favor of the innovator company in Hatch-Waxman
litigation. When a generic is released, the innovator
company suffers harm through price erosion and loss
of market share.38 Courts have been reluctant to
weigh the factor in favor of defendants since any loss
suffered by a generic maker incurred during the duration of the suit would simply be sales “time-

32 Id. (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 41820 (2007)).
33 Id. (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419).
34 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009).
35 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, at § 20.04(1)(e).
36 Id.
37 See infra Part IV.
38 See infra text accompanying notes 153-54.
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shifted” into the future.39 Thus, the balance of hardships rarely weigh in favor of the generic maker.40
Likewise, in Hatch-Waxman litigation, the
public interest will generally weigh in favor of the
plaintiff.41 Innovator companies often advance the
argument that the public interest is served when the
patent rights are enforced to exclude generic makers
during the patent’s term of exclusivity. 42 Further,
they also argue that profits generated during the exclusivity period fund research benefiting newer
medications.43 Generic makers will often argue that
the public interest is best served when the public has
access to lower cost medication.44 However, the Federal Circuit has been clear that the enforcement of
patent rights outweighs the public’s access to more
affordable medication.45
39 Albany Molecular Research, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc.,
No. 09-4638 (GEB-MCA), 2010 WL 2516465, at *11 (D.N.J.
June 14, 2010).
40 King Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5973 (GEB-DEA),
2010 WL 1957640, at *1, 6 (D.N.J. May 17, 2010) (explaining
that when a prior TRO enjoining the defendant from releasing a
generic was dissolved when the plaintiff’s authorized generic
maker released their version early, the court weighed the
balance of the hardships in favor neutrally because the
defendant’s exclusivity period as the first generic maker under
the Hatch-Waxman Act had been encroached upon, and denied
the preliminary injunction).
41 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d
1364, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The Hatch-Waxman Act does not
“encourage or excuse the infringement of infringing valid
pharmaceutical patents.”).
42 Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Novartis
I), No. 05-CV-1887 (DMC), 2007 WL 2669338, at *15 (D.N.J.
Sept. 6, 2007).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok
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A. The Presumption of Irreparable
Harm Prior to eBay
Soon after its establishment, the Federal Circuit held that a plaintiff is entitled to a presumption
of irreparable harm when it establishes a likelihood
success on the merits.46 The court further elaborated
in a subsequent case that the presumption is derived
“in part from the finite term of the patent grant, for
patent expiration is not suspended during litigation.”47 The value of the patent is based on exclusivity and monetary damages are insufficient to make
up for lost exclusivity.48
However, the Federal Circuit also held that
presumption of irreparable harm was a rebuttable
presumption.49 The Reebok case illustrates an instance when the presumption of irreparable harm
was rebutted through evidence.50 In November 1992,
Reebok began manufacturing and selling the SHAQ I
shoe and heavily promoted the shoe with basketball
great Shaquille O’Neal.51 Over a year later in December 1993, a patent was issued protecting the design of the shoe.52 As soon as the patent was issued,
Reebok served a complaint on J. Baker alleging that
their Olympian shoe infringed on the design of the
Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (“Selling a lower
priced product does not justify infringing a patent.”).
46 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, at § 20.04(1)(c)(iii)(e)(i) (citing
Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Corp., 718, F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
47 Id. (quoting H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc.,
820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d
679, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
50 Reebok Int’l v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
51 Id. at 1554.
52 Id.
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SHAQ I.53 J. Baker had been manufacturing and
selling the Olympian shoe since July 1993. 54
The district court denied Reebok’s motion to
enjoin J. Baker from selling their remaining inventory of the Olympians.55 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision because J. Baker
presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Reebok would suffer irreparable harm. 56 J.
Baker had established that Reebok had discontinued
the SHAQ I in favor a newer shoe, the SHAQ II. 57
The court reasoned that future purchasers of the
Olympians “would not likely confuse that shoe” with
the SHAQ I because Reebok had ceased all manufacture and promotion of the shoe.58 Because J. Baker
only had a limited supply of the Olympians, any
harm Reebok would have suffered could be sufficiently compensated by money damages.59 Thus, J.
Baker was successful in rebutting Reebok’s presumption of harm and the district court properly denied a
preliminary injunction to Reebok.60 However, Reebok is the exception rather than the rule; plaintiffs
who establish a likelihood of success on the merits
often succeed in enjoining the infringing party. 61
B. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
It is commonly understood that the holding in
Id.
Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1558.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1559.
61 See supra text accompanying note 36; see also discussion
infra Part IV.
53
54
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eBay eliminated the presumption of irreparable
harm in preliminary injunction determinations. 62
However, the issue before the Supreme Court in
eBay was a permanent injunction and neither preliminary injunctions nor the presumption of irreparable harm were explicitly mentioned.63
MercExchange patented a process that “facilitate[d] the sale of goods between private individuals
by establishing a central authority to promote trust
among participants” in an online marketplace. 64
eBay and Half.com, its subsidiary, had been negotiating with MercExchange to purchase its technology
but the talks broke down.65 After the cessation of the
negotiations, MercExchange filed a patent infringement suit against eBay.66
A jury found at trial that MercExchange’s patent was valid, eBay had infringed on their patent,
and awarded damages to the plaintiff. 67 However,
the district court denied permanent injunctive relief
to MercExchange.68 The Federal Circuit reversed,
citing to its general rule that courts will issue a per62 See, e.g., Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No.
03-4678 (SRC), 2009 WL 2182665, at *9 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009)
(“[T]he Court is of the view that the presumption of irreparable
harm did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in [eB]ay.”)
(citation omitted); Klewin, supra note 21, at 2129-30.
63 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390
(2006).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.; Miranda Jones, Note, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy
by Any Other Name is Patently Not the Same: How eBay v.
MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing
Entites, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035, 1054-55 (2007)
(explaining the dispute arose from MercExchange alleging that
eBay’s “Buy it Now” feature infringed their patents).
67 eBay, 547 U.S. at 390-91.
68 Id.
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manent injunction “once infringement and validity
have been adjudged.”69
Justice Thomas enunciated that courts should
not depart from traditional notions of equity without
legislative authorization.70 Justice Thomas further
cited to specific language in 35 U.S.C. § 283 revealing
the legislative intent not to stray from equitable
principles.71 Having rejected the Federal Circuit’s
general rule favoring permanent injunctions, the
case was remanded for proceedings consistent with
the traditional four part analysis for injunctive relief.72 When the matter was remanded to the lower
courts eBay refused to settle.73 By 2008, eBay had
purchased the patent and related technologies from
MercExchange.74
C. Confusion and Clarity After eBay
The Supreme Court was not clear as to whether its holding in eBay applied to the irreparable harm
presumption in preliminary injunctions.75 The Federal Circuit did not bring clarity when it sidestepped
69 Id. at 393-94 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,
401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations
omitted).
70 Id. at 391-92.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 394.
73 Ina Steiner, eBay v MercExchange Patent War: It’s Over,
ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM (Feb. 28, 2008),
http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/y08/m02/i28/s00.
74 Id.
75 eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (“We hold only that the decision
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the
equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such
discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other
cases governed by such standards.”).
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the irreparable harm presumption in one of its first
patent decisions post-eBay.76 In Abbott, the court vacated a preliminary injunction and reversed the district court’s irreparable harm determination.77 The
court reasoned that Abbott was not entitled to a finding of irreparable harm on the basis that Abbott
failed to establish the first factor. 78 While acknowledging the holding of eBay, the Federal Circuit was
not clear as to the survival of the irreparable harm
presumption.79 Without offering additional reasons
as to why Abbott was denied a finding of irreparable
harm, the Federal Circuit did not fully decouple the
first two preliminary injunction factors.80
The Federal Circuit sidestepped the presumption of harm issue for a second time in SanofiSynthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.81 Apotex argued that the
trial court erred in applying the presumption of irreparable harm contrary to the holding in eBay.82
The Federal Circuit reasoned that Sanofi had established irreparable harm and declined to rule on the
76 See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
77 Id. at 1347-48.
78 Id. at 1347.
79 Id. (“[W]e conclude that Abbott has not established a
likelihood of success on the merits. As a result, Abbott is no
longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm.”)
(emphasis added).
80 See id.
81 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
82 Id. at 1383, n.9 (“Apotex contends that applying such a
presumption is in direct contravention of the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. Because we
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Sanofi established several kinds of irreparable harm,
including irreversible price erosion, we need not address this
contention.”) (citations omitted).
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presumption.83 In 2008, Federal Circuit declined to
rule on presumption of harm for the third time in
Amado v. Microsoft Corporation stating it was unnecessary for the court to make a definitive ruling on
the issue.84
The lack of a clear ruling from the Federal Circuit led to confusion among the district courts.85
Some courts continued to apply the presumption of
harm noting that eBay only applied to permanent injunctions.86 Others ruled that eBay had eliminated
the presumption.87 There is even an instance where
a court ruled that eBay had eliminated the presumption but declined to apply the presumption only because the plaintiff failed to establish success on the
merits.88
In 2011, the Federal Circuit finally announced
Id.
Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (“We find it unnecessary to reach this argument,
however, because regardless of whether there remains a
rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm following eBay, the
district court was within its discretion to find an absence of
irreparable harm based on the evidence presented at trial.”)
(emphasis added).
85 See, e.g., Everett Labs., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc.,
573 F.Supp.2d 855, 866 (D.N.J. 2008) (“In the wake of [the
eBay] decision, the Federal Circuit has neither overruled its
cases applying the presumption of irreparable harm nor offered
an explicit directive on whether (1) to apply the presumption on
a motion for a preliminary injunction or (2) the presumption
exists at all.”).
86 See, e.g., Abbott Labs.v. Andrx Pharm., Inc. 452 F.3d 1331,
1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
87 See, e.g., Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No.
03-4678 (SRC), 2009 WL 2182665, at *9 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009).
88 Klewin, supra note 21, at 2136 (citing Wireless TV Studios,
Inc. v. Digital Dispatch Systems, Inc., No. 07 CV 5103, 2008 WL
2474626, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008)).
83
84
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that “eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable
harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of [preliminary] injunctive relief.”89 However, in
the absence of the presumption, courts can still reach
similar results by examining the patent holder’s
right to exclude. 90 In “traditional” cases of patent infringement where both the patentee and infringer
are manufacturing or using the technology courts are
more likely to find irreparable harm.91 This is in
contrast to “non-traditional” cases like eBay where
the patentee had not made a commercial use of the
patent.92
III. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT ACTIONS
The Hatch-Waxman Act93 was enacted to
achieve two competing goals: protecting pharmaceutical patent rights and encouraging competition from
generic pharmaceutical makers.94 This Part will describe historical background the Act, the provisions
of the Act, and the process outlined in the Act for the
approval of generic pharmaceuticals.

89 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1150-51.
92 Id. at 1150 (citing eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
93 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
94 Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590 (2003).
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A. Pharmaceutical Approvals Prior to the
Hatch-Waxman Act
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was
empowered by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) in 1938 to keep unsafe drugs from the
market by reviewing all new drugs prior to market
entry.95 Under this Act, before a new drug was permitted to enter the market the manufacturer was required to submit a new drug application (NDA). 96
The NDA contained scientific studies attesting to the
drug’s safety.97
The FDA maintained a policy that kept any
unpublished information submitted with an NDA as
confidential.98 It reasoned that if competitors had
access to the information contained in the NDA, they
could use the information as a shortcut in their own
NDA submittals.99 The FDA further reasoned that
competing companies making identical or similar
drugs would be less likely to invest in testing and
safety practices if they could demonstrate the safety
of their own products through the research of another drug maker.100 The policies promulgated by
the FDA at the time presented a barrier to generic
makers.101
In 1962, the FDCA was amended to require
drug makers to establish the effectiveness of their
drugs in the NDA process in addition to the prior re95 Id. at 587; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99f).
96 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 587.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id.
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quirements.102 Over time, drug makers were often
required to run at least two clinical trials in order to
“demonstrat[e] statistically significant benefits for
consumers.”103 Drug makers were often required to
file for a patent before clinical trials.104 The new requirements burdened the drug makers with lengthy
studies and trials which eroded the exclusivity periods of their patents.105
In 1970, the FDA created the Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA), an approval process
for generic drugs.106 However, there were relatively
few generic drugs on the market because the ANDA
process primarily applied to generic versions of drugs
approved prior to 1962.107 Despite streamlining the
ANDA process even further in 1980, there was very
little generic competition in the market.108
There was great concern over the rise of prescription drug prices in the early 1980s. 109 Drug
makers, without competition from generic makers,
were able to charge high prices to recoup the immense cost of the FDA application process in the
short period of effective exclusivity.110 The need to
Id. at 588.
Id.
104 Pamela J. Clements, The Hatch-Waxman Act and the
Conflict Between Antitrust Law & Patent Law, 48 IDEA 381,
386 (2008).
105 Id. (noting that in some instances, drug makers lost “up to
ten years” of exclusivity).
106 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 589.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 590.
109 Id.
110 See B. Scott Eidson, Note, How Safe is the Harbor?
Considering the Economic Implications of Patent Infringement
in Section 271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169, 1172
(2004).
102
103
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reduce drug prices through competition while increasing incentives for innovation set the stage for
the Hatch-Waxman Act.
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted with the
intention “to balance two conflicting policy objectives:
to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make
the investments necessary to research and develop
new drug products, while simultaneously enabling
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those
drugs to market.”111
First, Congress incentivized innovator companies by creating a process that could extend patent
exclusivity by up to five years.112 Secondly, a generic
drug could gain approval before the patent’s expiration, enabling a generic maker to release the product
to market at the moment of expiration. 113 Further,
the Act enabled a generic maker to challenge the patent’s validity, presenting an opportunity for generic
drugs to reach the market even sooner.114 The Act
established a new ANDA process that also enabled
generic makers to market versions of drugs approved
after 1962.115
The Act also gave additional incentives for generic makers by granting a 180 day period of marketing exclusivity for the first generic maker that

111 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984,
991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting on other
grounds)).
112 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 590-91.
113 Clements, supra note 104, at 388.
114 Id.
115 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 593.
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successfully challenges a patent.116 However, the exclusivity to a first filer can create a bottleneck for generics; the FDA will not approve any subsequent
ANDAs pending the approval of the first ANDA, even
in the absence of litigation.117
C. The ANDA Process Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patents of
all drugs approved through the NDA are recorded in
their publication, Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, more commonly known as the “Orange Book.”118 Innovator
companies enjoy a period of “data exclusivity” for five
years in which a generic maker may not submit an
ANDA.119 After the data exclusivity period expires,
generic drugs are approved provided that the generic
is the “same and bioequivalent” to an approved patented drug.120 Applications must contain the following:
(1) a full list of articles used as components
of the drug,
(2) a full statement of the composition of
the drug,
(3) a full description of the methods used in,
and the facilities and controls used for
the manufacture, processing and packing of the drug,
(4) samples of the drug and components as
required by the FDA, and
Id. at 603.
Id.
118 Id. at 595.
119 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012).
120 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), (j)(5)(F)(iii) (2012).
116
117
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(5) sample labeling.121

Generic makers must also file one of the following
certifications along with their ANDA:
(I)

that there are no patents listed in the
Orange Book for the drug (a “Paragraph I” certification);
(II) that the relevant patents have expired
(a “Paragraph II” certification);
(III) that the generic manufacturer will not
seek approval of the ANDA until after
the expiration of the relevant patent
(a “Paragraph III” certification); or
(IV) that such a patent is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the new generic drug for
which the ANDA is submitted (a “Paragraph IV” certification).122

Generally, the first three certifications do not
result in patent infringement litigation; the relevant
patents have either expired or the generic maker will
not release their product until after the patent’s expiration.123 However, a Paragraph IV certification
can be the opening salvo in litigation because the
certification puts an innovator company on notice
that their patent is being challenged. 124 Further, 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) provides that conduct pursuant to
an ANDA submittal with the purpose of challenging

121 Weisswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 595 (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(B)-(F) (2012)) (internal quotations omitted).
122 Id. at 600 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012)).
123 Id.
124 Id.
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a patent is considered infringement.125
The patent holder has forty five days to file
suit after being served notice that a Paragraph IV
certification has been filed.126 If the patent holder
does not file suit within the forty five day period the
ANDA may be approved and the patent holder forfeits their rights to a stay of FDA approval for the
generic.127 If the suit is filed within the forty five day
period, the FDA must stay the approval of the ANDA
for thirty months.128 The stay may be cut short by
the patent’s expiration, the patent’s invalidation by a
court ruling, or a finding that the patent was not infringed.129 The ANDA is approved upon a finding
that the patent is not valid or infringed. 130
The FDA grants a thirty month stay only
131
once.
An applicant will not be granted an additional stay for any subsequent Paragraph IV certifications.132 After the expiration of the stay, the innovator company may move for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the generic maker from releasing
their product.133
125 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Clements, supra note 104, at
389. But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of
infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.”).
126 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 600.
127 Id. at 601.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 602.
132 Id. at 603.
133 See id. at 601-03
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In the absence of a preliminary injunction, generic makers may attempt to release their product in
an “at-risk launch.”134 In such launches, the generic
maker can be liable for a significant amount of damages if the generic maker is later ruled to have infringed the patent.135 The threat of a large damage
award, which can exceed the expected revenues of a
generic drug, had kept at-risk launches at bay. 136
However, starting in 2007 generic makers have been
more aggressive in releasing product before the conclusion of litigation.137 Commentators have stressed
the importance of preliminary injunctions by noting
that preliminary injunctions have only been granted
in two instances following an at-risk launch.138
IV. SURVEY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
POST-EBAY IN THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
A Westlaw search reveals sixteen cases in the
District of New Jersey since the eBay decision in
2006 where an innovator company sought to enjoin a
generic maker from an at-risk launch.139 Prelimi134 Joseph M. O’Malley, Jr. et al., Failure to Launch,
INTELLECTUAL PROP. MAGAZINE at 30, 30 (Apr. 2011), available
at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1877.pdf.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 31.
139 Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 496 Fed.App’x 46
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying preliminary injunction); Warner
Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 451 Fed.App’x 935
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (appealing from the District of New Jersey,
holding that the trial court’s grant of preliminary injunction
was an abuse of discretion); Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Cobalt
Pharm. Inc., Nos. 07-4539(SRC)(MAS), 07-454(SRC)(MAS), 084054(SRC)(MAS), 2010 WL 4687839 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2010)
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nary injunctions were granted in seven instances. 140
Although the District of New Jersey has held in 2009
that eBay had abrogated the presumption of irreparable harm, a finding of likelihood of success on the
merits is still heavily linked to disposition of the sec(granting preliminary injunction); Albany Molecular Research,
Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 09-4638(GEB-MCA), 2010
WL 2516465 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (granting preliminary
injunction); Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark
Pharm. Inc., USA, No. 07-CV-5855(DMC), 2010 WL 2428561
(D.N.J. June 9, 2010) (denying preliminary injunction); King
Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5974(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL
1957640 (D.N.J. May 17, 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v.
Corepharma, LLC., No. 10-1878(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL 1850200
(D.N.J. May 7, 2010) (granting preliminary injunction);
Graceway Pharm., LLC v. Perrigo Co., 697 F.Supp.2d 600
(D.N.J. 2010) (denying preliminary injunction); Tyco Healthcare
Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 07-1299(SRC), 2009 WL
2422382 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009) (denying preliminary injunction);
Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 034678(SRC), 2009 WL 2182665 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009) (granting
preliminary injunction); AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F.
Supp.2d 579 (D.N.J. 2009), aff’d 633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(granting preliminary injunction); Everett Labs., Inc. v.
Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 573 F. Supp.2d 855 (D.N.J. Aug. 28,
2008) (granting preliminary injunction); Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 05-5727(HAA)(ES), 07-5489(HAA)(ES),
2008 WL 1722098 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008) (granting preliminary
injunction); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532
F. Supp.2d 666 (D.N.J. 2007) (denying preliminary injunction);
Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Novartis I),
No. 05-CV-1887(DMC), 2007 WL 2669338 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2007)
(denying preliminary injunction); Novartis Corp. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. (Novartis II), Nos. 04-4473(HAA)(ES), 061130(HAA)(ES), 2007 WL 1695689 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007)
(denying preliminary injunction).
140 Cobalt Pharm., 2010 WL 4687839; Albany Molecular, 2010
WL 2516465; King Pharm., 2010 WL 1850200; Ortho McNeil,
2009 WL 2182665; AstraZeneca, 623 F. Supp 579; Everett Labs.,
573 F. Supp.2d 855; Eisai, 2008 WL 1722098.
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ond injunction factor.141
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., a recent case before the District of New Jersey, illustrates how the first preliminary injunction factor can
be dispositive.142 The drug at issue was Boniva, a
treatment for osteoporosis.143 U.S. Patent 4,927,814
(the “’814 patent”) was for one of the ingredients for
Boniva, while the other two patents, U.S. Patents
7,410,957 (the “’957 patent”) and 7,718,634 (the “’634
patent”) were for the method of treatment. 144 Hoffman-La Roche, referred to throughout the case as
simply Roche, sought to enjoin generic makers from
releasing their versions of Boniva after the expiration of the ’814 patent in March 2012. 145
The defendants in Hoffman-La Roche mounted
a vigorous challenge to the validity of the ’957 and
’634 patents.146 The defendants cited to numerous
studies, reports, and patents dating back to the late
1990s trying to establish that the industry was researching a weekly or monthly treatment for osteoporosis.147 The defendants argued that the ’957 and
141 See Ortho McNeil, 2009 WL 2182665, at *9-10 (D.N.J. July
22, 2009).
142 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., Nos. 074417(SRC)(MAS), 08-3065(SRC)(MAS), 08-4053(SRC)(MAS),
10-6241(SRC)(MAS), 07-4661(SRC)(MAS), 08-4052(SRC)(MAS),
11-0579(SRC)(MAS), 07-4540(SRC)(MAS), 08-4054(SRC)(MAS),
10-6206(SRC)(MAS), 2012 WL 869572 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2012).
143 Id. at *1.
144 U.S. Patent No. 4,927,814 (filed July 9, 1987); U.S. Patent
No. 7,410,957 (filed May 6, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 7,718,634
(filed June 16, 2008).
145 Hoffman-La Roche v. Apotex, 2012 WL 869572, at *1.
146 For the obviousness standard, see Altana Pharma AG v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 F.Supp.2d 666, 674 (D.N.J. 2007)
aff’g, 566 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
147 Hoffman-La Roche v. Apotex, 2012 WL 869572, at *3-6.
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’634 patents would have been obvious to a pharmaceutical researcher on account of the published studies.148 Moreover, Roche did not highlight “the ingenuity of the inventors,” which is unusual when defending patent validity.149
The court concluded that Roche did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits and denied
the motion for preliminary injunction.150 However,
the court declined to consider the other factors on basis of Roche failing to establish the first factor. 151
The court similarly considered only first factor in two
other instances where the plaintiff’s application for
preliminary injunction was denied.152
While seeking a preliminary injunction, innovator companies often argue that an entry of a generic competitor causes price erosion and loss of
market share.153 This, in turn, causes job losses, reduction of research opportunities for newer drugs,
and a loss of goodwill and brand equity. 154
The court in AstraZeneca v. Apotex, Inc., in
concluding that AstraZeneca had shown sufficient
evidence of irreparable harm, analyzed each of the
plaintiff’s arguments in depth.155 First, the court
concluded that the damages stemming from a loss of
market share and price erosion are not irreparable
Id. at *6.
Id. at *8.
150 Id. at *8-9.
151 Id.
152 King Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5974(GEB-DEA),
2010 WL 1957640, at *6 (D.N.J. May 17, 2010); Tyco Healthcare
Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 07-1299(SRC), 2009 WL
2422382, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009).
153 AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F. Supp.2d 579, 608
(D.N.J. 2009).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 608-14.
148
149
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because loss of sales and profits are generally calculable.156 Moreover, the resulting loss of research opportunity and funding is also calculable. 157
The court also found that Apotex’s at-risk
launch could cause irreparable harm through personnel layoffs.158 The court agreed that layoffs, while
commonplace in business, can cause a loss of morale
and productivity that cannot be calculated.159 Finally, the court concluded an at-risk launch can
cause market confusion.160 Moreover, AstraZeneca’s
reputation could suffer if customers, after lowering
prices to compete with Apotex, feel that the drug was
originally priced “at an unfairly high level.”161 Loss
of goodwill as an irreparable harm is a concept originally from trademark law that has been incorporated
into patent law.162
Despite a thorough analysis in AstraZeneca,
there is little consistency within the District of New
Jersey. In some instances, the court has held that a
loss of goodwill is too speculative to be an irreparable
harm.163 In other instances, the court has held that
156 However, the court found that the loss of future sales could
not be calculable due to a licensing agreement already in place
between AstraZeneca and another generic maker who had
promised not to release their generic until a later date. Thus,
in this instance, lost future sales and licensing revenue
constituted an irreparable harm. Id. at 608-11.
157 Id. at 613.
158 Id. at 612.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 613.
161 Id.
162 See Roy H. Wepner & Richard W. Ellis, The Federal
Circuit’s Presumptively Erroneous Presumption of Irreparable
Harm, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 163-65 (2004).
163 Sanofi-Aventis, 2010 WL 2428561, at *17; Novartis I, 2007
WL 2669338, at *15.
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a potential loss of jobs is too speculative for irreparable harm at large companies, such as many of the innovator companies.164
The varied case law on how courts have evaluated irreparable harm in Hatch-Waxman actions validates Professor Chisum’s observations on irreparable harm determinations.165 The following cases
illustrate how the court usually finds irreparable
harm where it also finds a likelihood success from
the plaintiff.
In Novartis v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (Novartis
II). the court made a preliminary finding that
Novartis was unlikely to establish that Teva’s generic version of Lotrel infringed on Novartis’
patents.166 The court also found that Novartis failed
to establish Teva’s infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.167
Novartis further argued that Teva’s at-risk
launch of generic Lotrel would cause irreparable
harm through “lost sales revenue, lost market share,
irreversible price erosion, lost business and growth
prospects, and lost research opportunities.”168 The
court said that economic loss estimates set forth by
Novartis seemed to go against their arguments for
irreparable harm.169 Further, the court posited that
any potential economic damages are calculable and
thus could “be reparable by money damages.” 170
Thus, the irreparable harm determination in
See Novartis II, 2007 WL 1695689, at *28.
See supra notes 35-36, 152, 156 and accompanying text.
166 See Novartis II, 2007 WL 1695689, at *24.
167 Id. at *25.
168 Id. at *26 (internal quotations omitted).
169 Id. at *27.
170 Id. (citing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 871
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
164
165
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Novartis II is consistent with the definition in
Chisum’s treatise.171
However, the District of New Jersey found in a
subsequent case that an innovator company could
suffer irreparable harm while given similar economic
arguments. In Albany Molecular Research v. Dr.
Reddy’s Laboratories, a preliminary injunction was
sought to enjoin the defendant from an at-risk
launch172 of generic fexofenadine.173 Unlike the
Novartis court, the court in Albany Molecular found
that the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits.174
Like in Novartis II, the plaintiff argued that
an at-risk launch would mean a loss of market share,
permanent price erosion and loss of brand equity. 175
Although the court noted that most of the harm suffered by the plaintiff would be monetary in nature
and calculable, it held that a “loss of goodwill associated with the brand” is considered an irreparable
harm.176 However, in a case decided just a few days
before Albany Molecular, a different judge in District
of New Jersey ruled that loss of goodwill was too
speculative for irreparable harm in Hatch-Waxman
litigation.177 In that case, the court declined to issue
See supra text accompanying note 35.
Albany Molecular, 2010 WL 2516465, at *1.
173 Fexofenadine is an allergy medication, notable brand
names include Allegra. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Fexofenadine,
MEDLINEPLUS (last visited Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a697035.ht
ml.
174 Albany Molecular, 2010 WL 2516465, at *9.
175 Id. at *11.
176 Id.
177 Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm.
Inc., USA, No. 07-CV-5855(DMC), 2010 WL 2428561, at *17
(D.N.J. June 9, 2010).
171
172
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a preliminary injunction.178
In all seven instances where a preliminary injunction was granted by the District of New Jersey,
the court also found that the plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits.179 Likewise, in those
nine instances, the court also found that the plaintiff
had also established irreparable harm.180
Conversely, when the court declines to grant a preliminary injunction, it usually finds that the plaintiff
failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.181 Courts have refused to consider the remaining
factors once the plaintiff fails to establish the first
Id.
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Cobalt Pharm. Inc., Nos. 074539(SRC)(MAS), 07-454(SRC)(MAS), 08-4054(SRC)(MAS),
2010 WL 4687839, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2010); King Pharm.,
Inc. v. Corepharma, LLC., No. 10-1878(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL
1850200, at *5 (D.N.J. May 7, 2010); AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex,
Inc., 623 F. Supp.2d 579, 614 (D.N.J. 2009), aff’d 633 F.3d 1042
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
No. 03-4678(SRC), 2009 WL 2182665, at *11 (D.N.J. July 22,
2009); Everett Labs., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 573 F.
Supp.2d 855, 871 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2008); Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 05-5727(HAA)(ES), 07-5489(HAA)(ES),
2008 WL 1722098, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008); see also
Warner Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 451
Fed.App’x 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (showing that although the
Federal Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, the
District of New Jersey analyzed all four factors in favor of the
plaintiff).
180 See id.
181 Sanofi-Aventis, 2010 WL 2428561, at *17; Altana Pharma
AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 F. Supp.2d 666, 684 (D.N.J.
2007); Novartis II, 2007 WL 1695689, at *28; Novartis I, 2007
WL 2669338, at *13; see also Graceway Pharm., LLC v. Perrigo
Co., 697 F.Supp.2d 600, 610 (D.N.J. 2010) (due to the innovator
company’s bad faith actions and the doctrine of laches the court
would have granted the preliminary injunction, found a
likelihood of success and irreparable harm).
178
179
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factor in some instances.182 When the courts consider all four factors, they have been consistent in
determining a lack of irreparable harm when declining injunctive relief.
CONCLUSIONS
The District of New Jersey has recognized that
eBay had abrogated the presumption of irreparable
harm in preliminary injunction determinations as
early as 2008.183 However, it seems that the presumption is alive and well in Hatch-Waxman actions,
in practice if not in name.184 It is clear that likelihood of success on the merits influences the irreparable harm determination.185 It is hard to envision
that the cases cited in Part IV would have been decided differently if eBay did not abrogate the presumption of irreparable harm in patent cases.
A. The Irreparable Harm Presumption Is
Not as Dead as the Bosch Court
Would Lead You to Believe
Ironically, the case that is considered the
death knell of the presumption of irreparable harm
also gives courts sufficient latitude to apply the presumption tacitly.186 The patent at issue in Robert
182 Apotex, 2012 WL 869572, at *9; King Pharm., Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5974(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL 1957640, at *6
(D.N.J. May 17, 2010); Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm.
Co., No. 07-1299(SRC), 2009 WL 2422382, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 4,
2009).
183 Everett Labs., 573 F.Supp.2d at 866.
184 See supra Part IV.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 166.
186 Jason Rantanen, Bosch v. Pylon: Jettisoning the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Injunction Relief,
PATENTLY-O (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/bosch-v-pylon-
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Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corporation was
for windshield wiper blades.187 Bosch is part of a
multinational conglomerate that manufactures and
sells a wide variety of goods including automotive
parts, industrial machinery, and consumer products,
such as power tools.188 Pylon is company based in
Florida that manufactures wiper blades under license from DuPont and Michelin.189 After obtaining
a favorable judgment at the district court, Bosch unsuccessfully sought a permanent injunction against
Pylon.190
On appeal, the Federal Circuit examined the
four injunction factors de novo.191 Acknowledging
that neither eBay nor its subsequent cases clearly
addressed the presumption of irreparable harm, the
Federal Circuit emphatically stated that “eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injuncjettisoning-the-presumption-of-irreparable-harm-in-injunctionrelief.html.
187 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142,
1145 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
188 Business Sectors and Divisions, BOSCH GROUP,
http://www.bosch.com/en/com/bosch_group/business_sectors_div
isions/business_sectors_divisions_2.php (last visited Feb. 21,
2014).
189 About Us, PYLON, http://www.pylonhq.com/company.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
190 Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1145.
191 Id. at 1148 (The permanent injunction factors are: “(1) that
it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such a monetary damages are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.”) (quoting eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (emphasis
added).
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tive relief.”192
The court noted that plaintiffs “can no longer
rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a
request for [injunctive relief].”193 However, the court
also enunciated that “the fundamental nature of patents as property rights grant[ ] the owner the right
to exclude.”194 The court noted that in cases of traditional patent infringement, courts should not act
from a “clean slate” and look to precedent in making
an injunction determination.195 Applying the four
factor analysis, the court found that Bosch had made
a showing of irreparable harm by, among other
things, establishing that Pylon had taken market
share through infringing product.196 In reversing the
trial court’s decision, at least one commentator has
noted that the new standard may not be much different from the old.197 The presumption of irreparable
harm may be dead, but Bosch allows courts to apply
the old presumption in traditional patent infringement cases without calling it by name.
B. Non-Practicing Entities, Patent Trolls, and
Non-Traditional Patent Infringement
Given their context, both eBay and Bosch were
decided correctly.
MercExchange did not make
commercial use of their patents; it sought to license
their patents after unsuccessfully attempting to open

Id. at 1149.
Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1155.
197 Rantanen, supra note 186.
192
193
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on online marketplace.198 MercExchange is considered a non-practicing entity (NPE), which are sometimes pejoratively known as a patent troll. 199 Bosch,
on the other hand, is a global manufacturer that
spent approximately $5 billion in 2011 for research
and development.200
One of the more notable examples of a nonpracticing entity is Soverain Software. Soverain is
the holder of patents for online “shopping carts” used
in e-commerce.201 They do not manufacture products
of any kind nor do they sell goods over the internet or
otherwise.202 Instead, Soverain is known for initiating patent infringement suits and obtaining generous
settlements and licensing agreements.203 Due to
their litigious conduct, Soverain is widely known as a
patent troll. 204 In 2004, Soverain filed a patent in198 Brief for Respondent at 4, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 622506, at *4
(March 10, 2006).
199 Jones, supra note 66, at 1040.
200 Bosch to Invest $10 Million to Support Local Higher
Education and Research Initiatives, BOSCH PRESS (May 19,
2011), http://www.bosch-press.com/tbwebdb/boschusa/modules/oragetblob.dll/BERN%20Investment%202011.pdf?
db=TBWebDB_rbna&item=TBWebDB_texpdf&id=466,1&dispo
=a (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
201 Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart”
Patent and Saved Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013,
4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/hownewegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-onlineretail/.
202 Id.
203 Id. Notably, the term “patent troll” was used a total of five
times in Mullin’s article.
204 See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Newegg Wins Key ‘Shopping Cart’
Lawsuit Against Patent Troll, CNET (Jan. 28, 2013, 9:52 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57566195-93/newegg-winskey-shopping-cart-lawsuit-against-patent-troll/; Mike Masnick,
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fringement action against Amazon.com and The Gap
alleging infringements of patents for online payment
processing and shopping carts.205 Amazon.com later
settled the case days within the start of trial for $40
million.206
The Supreme Court was correct in eBay to abrogate the presumption of irreparable harm. By
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish irreparable harm, litigation and the threat of a
permanent injunction cannot be used to force a settlement or as leverage in licensing negotiations, especially in cases where the patent holder is an NPE.
C. Differences Between NPEs and the
Pharmaceutical Companies and Why Congress
Should Amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to Allow
for the Irreparable Harm Presumption
Today, it is possible to be an NPE and own a
significant amount of patents, especially those related to information technology and internet applications. Instagram is a free photo sharing app for
Internet enabled smartphones.207 By the time Instagram was acquired by Facebook in 2012, it held
around eight hundred patents.208 Industry experts
Newegg’s ‘Screw Patent Trolls!’ Strategy Leads to Victory,
TECHDIRT (Jan. 28, 2013, 12:48 PM), .
205 Dawn Kawamoto, Amazon Pays $40 Million to Settle
Patent Dispute, ZDNET (Aug. 11, 2005, 9:11 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/news/amazon-pays-40-million-to-settlepatent-dispute/144171.
206 Id.
207 FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013).
208 Tyler Kingkade, What Would $1 Billion Buy You Besides
Instagram & 800 Patents?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2012,
1:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/11/1-billionwould-buy-you_n_1417712.html.
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have valuated the labor costs of developing an app
similar to Instagram at under $200,000. 209 Even
considering costs for filing patents, it does not take a
significant investment to create an NPE, sit on a
stable of patents, and make money purely through
licensing. As mentioned before, developing a new
drug can cost upwards of $800 million.210 Although
pharmaceutical companies can negotiate licensing
agreements, innovator companies will try to recoup
their substantial investment by releasing product to
the market themselves.
Moreover, “patent trolling” in the pharmaceutical industry is unlikely due to the nature of research.
Unlike information technology patents,
which may be vague, pharmaceutical patents are for
a thoroughly researched chemical.211 Further, the
research behind pharmaceutical patents is also protected by the Hatch-Waxman Act’s data exclusivity
period.212 Thus, pharmaceutical patent infringement
is almost always between two producing entities.
D. Moving Forward
While the Federal Circuit has made clear in
Bosch that the irreparable harm presumption is no
more, courts have the latitude to conclude similarly
209 Andres Garzon, The Correct Price for $1-Billion-Instagram
is $175,500, PRICETAG (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://pricetaghq.com/blog/correct-price-1-billioninstagram#sthash.KkIMBklN.dpuf; see also Roy Chomko, The
Real Cost of Developing an App, MANUFACTURING.NET (July 30,
2012, 11:50 AM),
http://www.manufacturing.net/articles/2012/07/the-real-cost-ofdeveloping-an-app.
210 See supra text accompanying note 9.
211 Stu Hutson, Pharma “Patent Trolls” Remain Mostly the
Stuff of Myth, 15 NATURE MEDICINE 1240 (2009).
212 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 119.
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as if the presumption still applies.213 Latitude is not
a certainty and different jurisdictions or even judges
may conclude differently for the irreparable harm
factor while adhering to the holding in Bosch. As
discussed earlier in this Article, the rulings of Federal courts in New Jersey in Hatch-Waxman actions
are consistent with the irreparable harm presumption, even if they decline to apply it.214 However, the
same cannot be said of other jurisdictions.
A lack of certainty can lead to forum shop215
ping.
Knowing that a patent infringement suit
may take much longer than a 30 month stay, innovator companies will try to file suit in a jurisdiction
where the first two preliminary injunction factors
have not been decoupled.216 This problem can be
solved by amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to give
courts the power to apply the irreparable harm presumption. Firstly, courts can apply tests or presumptions outside of the four factors with legislative
authorization.217 Secondly, applying the irreparable
harm presumption is consistent with the legislative
aims of the Act by strengthening pharmaceutical paSee supra Conclusion, Section A.
See supra Part IV.
215 See Ronald T. Coleman, Jr. et al., Applicability of the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE
L.J. 3, 10 (2012) (“Perhaps most important, know your
jurisdiction. If a plaintiff has a choice as to where to bring a
lawsuit, look for a jurisdiction that continues to apply (or at
least has not foreclosed) the presumption of irreparable harm in
that kind of case. A potential defendant sometimes can exercise
forum selection as well by initiating a declaratory judgment
action in a forum that has applied eBay and demands proof of
irreparable harm.”).
216 See id.
217 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 39192 (2006).
213
214
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tent protections.
In conclusion, the presumption of irreparable
harm is still alive in Hatch-Waxman actions despite
reports to the contrary in eBay and Bosch. The tacit
application of the presumption is compatible with
current law because most instances of pharmaceutical patent infringement are considered to be “traditional.” Due to the immense costs of research and
clinical trials, pharmaceutical patents have enjoyed
heightened protection.
Amending the HatchWaxman Act to allow for the presumption would be
consistent with its original intent. However, even
without legislative action, eBay and Bosch do not
fundamentally change the outcomes of preliminary
injunction motions in Hatch-Waxman cases.
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Abstract
This Article argues why the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Big-Time Division I College Football and Men’s Basketball studentathletes are legally “employees” and why these student-athletes are inadequately compensated for their
revenue-producing skills.
Part II of this Article sets forth the common
law “right of control” test and the National Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test for students in a university setting, and shows how the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the judiciary determine whether a particular person, specifically a university student, meets these standards
and is legally an “employee”. Moreover, the NCAA
asserts it does not have to compensate these studentathletes above their grant-in-aid because their relationship with their universities is an educational one.
Part II also discusses the right of publicity tort to
show that the relationship between these particular
student-athletes and the NCAA is predominantly an
economic one and not an educational one.
Part III of this Article applies two tests, the
common law “right of control” test and the NLRB’s
special statutory test it developed and applied to
university students in Brown to show that these particular “student-athletes” are legally “employees.” As
such, they should be compensated more than the
grant-in-aid they already receive from the NCAA for
their revenue-producing skills. This section also discusses Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel,
and why Texas A&M University is reaping major financial benefit for the misappropriation of Manziel’s
“likeness.” Part III also discusses NCAA Proposal 26
and how the NCAA and its member schools are continuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate
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student-athletes’ “likenesses” for financial gain without compensating them. Additionally, this section illustrates that former student-athletes in addition to
current athletes recognize that the NCAA is exploiting them for commercial gain without compensation.
This section concludes with three potential solutions
to how the NCAA could pay the student-athletes and
at the same time advances the NCAA’s amateurism
dogma in college athletics. The NCAA can no longer
use its affirmative defense of “amateurism,” and
should develop a payment method to compensate the
services rendered by student-athletes who are the
true moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year student-athletes who compete in
revenue generating sports, such as Big-Time College
Football and Division I Men’s Basketball, produce
billions of dollars which are funneled directly to the
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National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).1
The idea of paying these particular student-athletes
is an ongoing debate. The large revenue generated
from the BCS Championship football series and
“March Madness” created a clamoring for compensating Big-Time College Football and Division I Men’s
Basketball players beyond that of an athletic scholarship, or what the NCAA calls a grant-in-aid.2
While operating in a purely capitalistic and professional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse
its amateurism concept in college athletics. These
particular student-athletes realize that the NCAA
commercialized the industry and generates billions of
dollars in revenue from doing so. Even though the
NCAA asserts the value of amateurism in college
athletics, the student-athletes are now attempting to
get a bigger piece of the pie.3
The NCAA initially created the term “studentathlete” to stop workers’ compensation lawsuits
against it in the 1950s and 1960s,4 and to obscure the
1 Nicholas Fram & Thomas Frampton, College Athletes
Deserve Employee Status, SF GATE, (March 25, 2012, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/College-athletes-deserveemployee-status-3430855.php.
2 Athletic Financial Aid Rules Mandated by the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), WASH. STATE UNIV.,
http://finaid.wsu.edu/media/675179/Athletic-Financial-AidRules-finaid-website.pdf (explaining athletic grant-in-aid
“consists of tuition, books, fees and room & board,” however,
“note that transportation and miscellaneous are not included”).
3 Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint:
Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012, 9:48 AM),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-payingcollege-athletes.
4 Jared Wade, How the NCAA Has Used the Term “StudentAthlete” to Avoid Paying Workers Comp Liabilities, NAT’L L.
REV. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-
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reality of the university-student-athlete employmentrelationship.5 Part I of this Article sets forth the
common law “right of control” test6 and the National
Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test
for students in a university setting,7 and shows how
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
judiciary determine whether a particular person,
specifically a university student, meets these standards and is legally an “employee.” Moreover, the
NCAA asserts it does not have to compensate these
student-athletes above their grant-in-aid because
their relationship with their universities is an educational one. This part also discusses the right of pub-

ncaa-has-used-term-student-athlete-to-avoid-paying-workerscomp-liabilities.
5 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The
Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete As Employee,
81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006).
6 St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (2005)
(“‘[w]hile we recognize that the common-law agency test
described by the Restatement ultimately assesses the amount
or degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an
individual, we find insufficient basis for the proposition that
those factors which do not include the concept of ‘control’ are
insignificant when compared to those that do. Section 220(2) of
the Restatement refers to 10 pertinent factors as ‘among
others,’ thereby specifically permitting the consideration of
other relevant factors as well, depending on the factual
circumstances presented . . . . Thus, the common-law agency
test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not
just those that involve a right of control . . . . To summarize, in
determining the distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor under Section 2(3) of the Act, we shall
apply the common-law agency test and consider all the
incidents of the individual’s relationship to the employing
entity.’” (quoting Roadway Package System, 326 N.L.R.B. 842,
850 (1998))).
7 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489 (2004).
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licity tort8 to show that the relationship between
these particular student-athletes and the NCAA is
predominantly an economic one and not an educational one.
Part II of this Article applies the common
“right of control” test and the NLRB’s special statutory test, developed in Brown,9 to student-athletes.
Both tests show that these particular studentathletes are legally employees and should be compensated by more than the grant-in-aid they already
receive from the NCAA for their revenue producing
skills. Also, this part will discuss Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel, and why Texas A&M University is reaping major financial benefit through the
misappropriation of Manziel’s likeness.
Part II will also discuss NCAA Proposal 26
and how the NCAA and its member schools are continuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate
their student-athletes for financial gain, without
compensation. Part II further shows that former
student-athletes, in addition to current athletes recognize the NCAA is exploiting them for commercial

8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977) (“The
common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated
is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness
to advertise the defendant’s business or product, or for some
similar commercial purpose. Apart from statute, however, the
rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It
applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though
the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit
sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some
states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of
the name or likeness.”).
9 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.
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gain without compensation.10 Finally, this part offers three solutions as to how the NCAA could compensate student-athletes, while simultaneously advancing the NCAA’s “amateurism” dogma in college
athletics.
This Article concludes that the NCAA can no
longer use its affirmative defense of “amateurism.”
Instead, the NCAA should develop a payment method to compensate the services rendered by studentathletes, who are the true moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise.
I. BACKGROUND
The NCAA is a voluntary association of approximately 1,200 colleges and universities. The
NCAA’s philosophy as it relates to the studentathlete is to promote amateurism.11In the NCAA Division I Manual, the first stated purpose is “[t]o initiate . . . and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to promote . . . athletics participation as a recreational pursuit.”12 Despite
the prominence of this assertion, the NCAA has
failed to further this purpose for athletes in the most
commercially lucrative sports, Big-Time College
Football (i.e., Division I Football) and Division I
Men’s Basketball.13
10 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. C 09-1967
CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882 CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 8, 2010).
11 Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring
Amateurism, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 167 (2012); see also NCAA
DIV. I MANUAL Bylaw art. 12.01.3 (2013), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf.
12 See NCAA DIV. I MANUAL Const. art. 1.2(a) (2013).
13 Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century:
Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist? 86 OR. L. REV.
329 (2007).

80

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

The NCAA Division I football season culminates with the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) National Championship game. The NCAA Division I
Men’s basketball season culminates with “March
Madness” and the Final Four, with the national
champion being crowned.14 Both events are big
business.
The University of Alabama played in the BCS
National Championship Game in 2012, resulting in a
total payout of $18.3 million dollars.15 Alabama received $2 million from the NCAA for directly participating.16 The remaining $16.3 million was divided
into 13 shares equally distributed into shares of approximately $1.26 million among the 12 member
Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) schools and the
SEC office.17 In addition to compensation for simply
participating, Alabama received a hefty payout for
winning the BCS National Championship in 2013. 18
Similarly, the University of Kentucky received
a large payout for winning the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship in 2012. In its most recent contract agreement with the television network CBS,
the NCAA $10.8 billion for the March Madness
broadcasting rights for the next fourteen years. 19
The direct value of the NCAA Division I Men’s BasFram & Frampton, supra note 1.
Jon Solomon, Profit from BCS National Championship
Game Won’t Be a Big Windfall, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Jan. 5,
2010, 9:01 PM), http://blog.al.com/birmingham-newsstories/2010/01/profit_from_bcs_national_champ.html.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Chris Smith, The Money Behind The BCS National
Championship, SPORTSMONEY (Jan. 7, 2013, 4:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/07/the-moneybehind-the-bcs-national-championship/.
19 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
14
15

81

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

ketball Tournament comes from the NCAA’s Revenue Distribution plan, which explains that payouts
are “to be distributed to the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship over a six-year rolling period.”20
“That six-year payment period means that games
played in the 2012 March Madness tournament will
not count towards annual conference payouts until
2017.”21
To better understand the NCAA’s revenue distribution model for March Madness, consider the
revenue generated by the Kentucky Wildcats in
2012. Kentucky played in six tournament games in
2012, five of which are included in the NCAA’s count
of games played, as championship games are not included.22 The NCAA revenue distribution model calculates each game as a “game unit,” and each “game
unit” for the 2012 tournament was $278,820. 23 Kentucky generated approximately $1.4 million for the
South Eastern Conference as a whole due to their
tournament success in 2012.24
A. The Common Law Test and a Statutory Test
to Establish the “Employee” Status of
College Students
“Division I athletic grant-in-aid students in
college football and men’s basketball can be considered ‘employees’ under both the National Labor Rela-

20 Chris Smith, March Madness: A Trip to The Final Four is
Worth $9.5 Million, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:45AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03/14/marchmadness-a-trip-to-the-final-four-is-worth-9-5-million/.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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tions Act and under most applicable state laws.” 25 If
a person is deemed an employee under the NLRA,
those employees are granted the rights to gather
amongst themselves and discuss their wages and
working conditions even if they are not part of a union.26 However, the NLRA only applies to employees
who work in most private sectors and specifically excludes protection to persons employed by Federal,
state, or local government.27 The question of whether a particular person is an employee has been essential in the development of American labor law. 28 The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the judiciary have developed different legal standards in
determining a person’s employee status. Thus, there
are several approaches the NLRB or the judiciary
can take in determining whether these particular
student-athletes in Division I college football and
basketball are legally employees. 29
1. The “Employee” Under the
National Labor Relations Act
The federal rights granted to employees, and
only to employees, under the NLRA are “the rights to
self-organization; to form, join, or assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; and to engage in other
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 86.
Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights (last
visited Jan. 17, 2014).
27 See id.
28 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 87; see also
ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 37-38
(2d ed. 2004) (describing courts’ early efforts to distinguish
between employees under the Act and other persons).
29 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 88.
25
26
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concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”30 Since
these collective bargaining rights are granted exclusively to employees under the statute, determining
whether a particular person is or is not an employee
is of paramount importance.31
The central issue with the NLRA when first
administered was that it defined both “employer” 32
and “employee”33 by reference only to each other, and
it used those definitions to distinguish the status of a
particular person in the same way. Because the
statutory language by itself fails to demarcate the
pronounced characteristics of either “employer” or
“employee” from other classes of entities or persons,
the judiciary and the NLRB have been guided mainly
by common law doctrines when determining the
meaning of the term “employee.”34 Relying solely on
common law principles, the NLRB interpreted the
NLRA’s definition of “employee” and developed the
“right of control” test.35 Under this legal standard,
the important factor in distinguishing an employee
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 89.
32 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ includes
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly. . . .”).
33 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ shall
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, . . . but shall not include any
individual . . . having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor . . .”).
34 E.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 89;
Klement Timber Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 681, 683 (1944).
35 Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (holding
that truck drivers were employees and, therefore, not
independent contractors because the employer had not fully
divested itself of the right to control drivers’ work); GORMAN &
FINKIN, supra note 28, at 38.
30
31
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from an independent contractor was the level of control the alleged employer maintained over the working life of the employee. 36 The Court first applied the
‘right of control test’ in NLRB v. United States Insurance Co. of America.37 The Court in its decision noted that the term “employee” excludes “any individual
having the status of an independent contractor.” 38
The Court went on and held general agency principles will be applied in a case-by-case basis in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.”39
Congress further endorsed the common law
“right of control” test as the proper interpretation of
the statute through the addition of the 1947 TaftHartley Amendments to the NLRA.40 The Amendments expressly excluded independent contractors
from the definition of employee. The common law, as
well as the NLRB and the judiciary, have long used
the term “independent contractor” to distinguish cer36See Nat’l Freight, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 (1964).
The right of control test was derived from the common law
doctrine of respondeat superior, which determines whether a
master might be liable for the torts of his servant. Under this
measure, a person who performs a particular task by his own
methods, not subject to the control of the alleged employer, is
an independent contractor, while a person who is subject to the
control of the employer, not only as to the ends to be
accomplished, but also as to the methods and means of
performing the work, is an employee. See Carnation Co., 172
N.L.R.B. 1882, 1888 (1968); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 28,
at 38.
37 NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254
(1968).
38 Id. at 256.
39 See id.
40 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not
include any individual . . . having the status of an independent
contractor.”).
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tain workers from employees, applying the right of
control standard to draw that distinction, referring to
the right of control standard as the basic measure for
determining whether individuals are employees under the NLRA.”41
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly upheld
the NLRB’s interpretation of employee and its reliance on the “right of control” standard. The Court
most recently upheld the NLRB’s interpretation of an
employee in National Labor Relations Board v. Town
& Country Electric, Inc.42 In this case Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill
several positions for a construction job in Minnesota.43 Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired
soon thereafter.44 These individuals applied with the
intention to organize Town & Country and were to
remain on union payroll during their time of employment.45 The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town
41 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 157; see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir.
1948) (stating that “the employer-employee relationship exists
when the person for whom the work is done has the right to
control and direct the work, not only as to the result
accomplished by the work, but also as to the details and means
by which that result is accomplished”); Teamsters Nat’l Auto.
Transp. Indus. Negotiating Comm., 335 N.L.R.B. 830, 832
(2001) (“[T]he contracting employer must have the power to give
the employees the work in question--the so-called ‘right of
control’ test.”) (footnote omitted).
42 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
43 Id. at 87.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 88.
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& Country had refused to interview or retain the
workers because of their union affiliation, a violation
of the National Labor Relations Act.46 The Board
held that the 11 individuals met the definition of
employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country’s claims that the individuals had been refused for
other reasons.47
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term “employee”
does not include those individuals who remain on union payroll during their time of employment with another company.48 The central question that the U.S.
Supreme Court dealt with on certiorari was: Does a
worker qualify as an “employee” under the NLRA if,
while working, he is simultaneously paid by a union
to help the union organize a company? 49
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals
can meet the definition of employee even if they are
paid by a union to organize a non-union company
while on company payroll.50 The Court found this
result consistent with the language and purpose of
the Act as well as the dictionary definition of employee.51 The Court also reasoned that the language
of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the
possibility of workers who are paid by union organiz-

Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-88; see also Town & Country Elec., Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 106 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1997).
48 Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th
Cir. 1994).
49 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87
(1995).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 90.
46
47
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ers.52
Since the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v.
Town & Country, the NLRB has further relied on
that decision in defining employee, as “[u]nder the
common law . . . a person who performs services for
another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”53
2. The NLRB’s Statutory Test from Brown for
Students Seeking Status as Employees
University students who receive academic
scholarships and perform services as teaching or research assistants appear to satisfy the common law
test for “employee.” The NLRB recognized the low
threshold the common law test presents to distinct
classes of persons attempting to be regarded as “employees” under the NLRA.54
The NLRB in Brown developed a new requirement. In order for university students to be
treated as employees and granted collective bargaining rights under the NLRA, they must satisfy both
the common law “right of control” test and the
NLRB’s additional special statutory test developed in
Brown.55 In that case, Brown University filed a petiId. at 93.
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (citing
Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 94); see also Boston
Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999) (quoting Town &
Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 91-93).
54 See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 491.
55 See id. at 487 (stating that “attempting to force the studentuniversity relationship into the traditional employer-employee
framework” is problematic and that “principles developed for
use in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the
academic world”’) (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 680-81 (1980)).
52
53
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tion with the NLRB, asking the Board to reconsider
and overturn the Board’s decision in NLRB v. New
York University.56 New York University dealt with
graduate student assistants who were admitted into
but not hired by the university. The central question
was whether the graduate student assistants’ supervision of teaching and research was an integral component of their academic development. The NLRB in
Brown held that the “financial support” the graduate
student assistants received in order to attend Brown
University made the relationship between the graduate student assistants and the university primarily
an educational one rather than an economic one.57
The NLRB’s decision in Brown is currently the
legal standard for determining whether a university
student is a statutory employee. In that decision the
NLRB majority acknowledged that the right to control standard must be satisfied as a general requirement.58 The NLRB further held that another specific
requirement for students was that unless the relationship between the school and the student was
“primarily economic,” rather than “primarily educational,” then the students were not employees. 59
Therefore, when students’ efforts are predominantly
See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483.
See id. at 486.
58 See id. at 490 (“Even assuming arguendo that this is so [i.e.,
that graduate student employees are employees at the common
law], it does not follow that they are employees within the
meaning of the Act. The issue of employee status under the Act
turns on whether Congress intended to cover the individual in
question. The issue is not to be decided purely on the basis of
older common-law concepts.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Board has certainly applied the common law “right of control”
test since its 2004 Brown decision in determining whether
workers were employees under the NLRA.
59 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487-89.
56
57
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educational and not economic, then those individuals
are not employees within the meaning of the
NLRA.60 From that test it logically follows that
when a student who works for a university performs
services that are not primarily educational or academic and the relationship to the university with respect to those services is an economic one, the student may be an employee under the NLRA, provided
that he also meets the common law test for that
term.
B. Tort: Right of Publicity
To assert a claim for the tort of right of publicity, a person must demonstrate that one or more of
his or her protected attributes that are reasonably
deemed private were appropriated by another party
for that party’s own use or benefit without his or her
consent.61 The Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically notes that a person who appropriates the name
or likeness of another for his or her own use or benefit is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy.62 The “own use” or “benefit” of another person’s protected attributes has been interpreted in
some states to mean a commercial benefit. 63 Other
states however, have applied it to instances where a
person uses another’s name or likeness for his or her
own purposes and benefit even though the use is not
a commercial or pecuniary benefit.64
Id.
Id.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977)
(“Appropriation of Name or Likeness: One who appropriates to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”).
63 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
60
61
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C. The NCAA National Letter of Intent
The National Letter of Intent, signed by the
potential student-athlete, is a binding contract between the individual and the university that the student-athlete attends.65 If the individual is under the
age of 21, a parent or registered guardian must cosign the agreement.66 A coach or representative of
the coaching staff cannot be present when the individual is signing.67 Once the Letter of Intent is
signed no other school can recruit that person. The
agreement is for a period of one year.68 Usually the
individual receives a scholarship towards tuition and
a stipend for room and board.69 If for any reason the
student does not meet the academic or chosen sport
performance expectations the school has the right to
terminate the agreement. 70 After one year the student-athlete’s scholarship or stipend is continued if
he or she has met academic and sport performance
expectations.71 The sequence carries forward for a
four-year matriculation at the chosen school.72
1. Student-Athlete Statement – Division I
Form 08-3a Section IV
Before the student-athlete is allowed to participate in practice, he or she must sign various sections
of Form 08-3a, the Student-Athlete Statement. Sec65 Barile v. Univ. of Virginia, 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Ohio
1981).
66 Signing a Letter of Intent, VARSITYEDGE.COM,
http://www.varsityedge.com/nei/varsity.nsf/main/national+lette
r+of+intent.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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tion IV of the statement contains wording which allows a student-athlete’s name or picture to promote
the NCAA and the school he or she is attending. The
exact wording is as follows:
You authorize the NCAA (or third party
acting on behalf of the NCAA, e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing committee) to use your name or picture to generally promote NCAA championships or
other NCAA events, activities or programs.73

If student-athletes do not sign the StudentAthlete Form, they are deemed ineligible for practice
and competition until the form is signed and completed. This is the same form that the NCAA references in their claim that they have the right to license the likeness and image of former studentathletes.74 The legal question then becomes: does the
form govern former student-athletes, enabling the
NCAA and its member schools to use former studentathletes’ likeness for its own commercial and promotional purposes?75
D. NCAA Proposal 26-2010
A controversial proposal by the NCAA would
broaden the way companies are allowed to use college athletes in advertising campaigns, giving athletic departments more opportunities to trade on play-

73 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C
09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
74 Id. at *4.
75 Id. at *5.
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ers’ popularity.76
Athletics officials who support the proposal
say that they are not seeking to exploit athletes, and
that the changes would align outdated NCAA rules
with today’s technologies.77 Some players also supported the amendment. 78
Contrarily, opponents of the proposal say that
the changes are overreaching. It allows sponsors to
expand their reach without compensating players for
the use of their likeness in commercial promotions.79
While players would continue to earn nothing for the
use of their likenesses, their colleges, conferences, or
the NCAA would reap profits from the advertisers.80
Up until the time of the proposal, corporate
sponsorship companies were allowed to include pictures or images of college athletes in their advertisements as long as the athletes did not promote
commercial ventures. In addition, companies were
permitted to show only their corporate logos and
names, not their products.81
Under the proposal, corporate sponsorship
companies would now be allowed to advertise their
products and services in association with pictures or
images of college athletes, as long as the players did
not specifically endorse the products.82 The person76 Lauren Smith, Controversial NCAA Proposal Would Allow
Colleges to Cash In on Players’ Images, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Oct. 5, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/NCAA-ProposalWould-Let/2881.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Cabinet Sponsors Possible Amendments to Likeness
Proposal, NCAA (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2011/march/cabinet
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nel who have the authority to make the proposal, a
powerful NCAA committee made up of athletics officials and faculty members, said that it provides colleges, conferences, and the NCAA greater flexibility
in developing relationships with commercial entities
that benefit the athletics program.” 83 Ellen J. Staurowsky, a professor and chair of the graduate program in the Department of Sport Management and
Media at Ithaca College said, “There is a little bit of
disingenuousness in this. Until the players are compensated, these kinds of things are problematic.” 84
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applying the NLRA Common Law Test and
the Federal Labor Standards Act
1. The Right of Control Test
Under the common law tests in determining if
a particular person is an employee, the case for college student-athletes employee status is strong.
“Their labor and talent generate huge revenues for
universities, just like the services rendered by professional athletes for their leagues.”).85 These particular student-athletes are employees from the
standpoint of the common law “right of control” test:
school officials directly control their labor and exercise a level of oversight over players’ lives far greater
than that of most employees in the United States. 86
%2Bsponsors%2Bpossible%2Bamendments%2Bto%2Blikeness
%2Bproposaldf30.html; Smith, supra note 76.
82 Id.
83 Smith, supra note 76.
84 Id.
85 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
86 Id.
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Critics argue that paying college athletes is
only providing them with additional compensation on
top of the already valuable compensation they get
from universities in the form of scholarships.87 One
key principle from Brown was that the NRLB asserted that graduate student assistants, whether in an
instruction or research role, were primarily there for
educational purposes and the scholarships they received to perform their duties were requisite to obtaining their higher education degrees.88 No one
would argue that playing college football or men’s
basketball is a prerequisite to obtaining an undergraduate or graduate degree. 89
Federal law, which dictates the requirement of
a university student to meet the standard “right of
control” test and the Brown statutory test to be considered an employee, only applies to students in private institutions.90 University student-athletes competing at private institutions will probably be able to
satisfy both tests, but college athletes playing for
public institutions will be subject to state labor law,
which has generally been more favorable to studentemployees.91 Over the last ten years, undergraduate
student-employees have successfully formed unions
consisting of dining hall workers, clerical assistants,
and dormitory advisors.92
Like such studentemployees, student-athletes also render services to
their universities by filling stadiums and arenas and
87 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 157; see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir.
1948).
88 Id.
89 Fram & Frampton supra note 1.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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generating revenue. State labor law has already
held that students who are employed as dining hall
workers, clerical assistants, and dormitory advisors
meet the legal standard for an employee.93 If a university student meets the legal standard of an employee by being employed as a food server in dining
halls, answering telephone calls as a telemarketing
fund raiser, or as a student advisor, then it logically
follows that the student whose scholarship requires
that he compete in college football or basketball
meets the same standard and should be recognized
as an employee.94 This question has been debated at
length, but to this point there has been no definitive
answer.
2. The Economic Reality Test
In determining an employee under the Federal
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) the U.S Supreme Court
applied the “economic reality” test in United States v.
Silk.95 The five-factor “economic reality” test would
be useful in determining whether or not studentathletes are actually employees. The factors are as
follows:
(1) the degree of control exercised by the
alleged employer;
(2) the extent of the relative investments of
the [alleged] employee and employer;
(3) the degree to which the “employee’s”
opportunity for profit and loss is
determined by the “employer”;
(4) the skill and initiative required in
performing the job; and
Id.
Id.
95 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
93
94
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(5) the permanency of the relationship.96

To examine if student-athletes are employees
under the “economic reality” test, I interviewed a
current University of Connecticut (“UCONN”) Division I Varsity Football player, who had just completed his third season as a linebacker for the UCONN
football team.97 Like all other Division I College
Football players, his Monday through Saturday inseason and off-season schedules are structured by his
football coaches and are strictly regimented. 98 The
football player explained that the athletic department tailors his academic class schedule around his
mandatory practice sessions.99 He explained that the
football coaches require the players to eat every meal
throughout the day together as a team, including a
midmorning and an afternoon snack together. The
linebacker coach uses this lunchtime as a film viewing session to review game UCONN campus dining
hall.100 Following breakfast, the football player attends his first class from 11:00 to 11:50 a.m. He
stated that the athletic program requires him “to
make sure that he gets classes that don’t cut into
practice time or conflict with any of the UCONN
football team’s workouts.”101
The football player attends his second class
from 1:00 to 2:15 p.m. In between the first and sec96 Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.
1987) (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).
97 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football
player (Jan. 29, 2013). Interviewee requested to remain
anonymous.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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ond class, he reports to the dining hall for a team
lunch exclusively for linebackers.102 The linebacker
plays and strategies.103 The football player said,
“Coach Wholley will usually make us watch a video
of our last opponent and tells us what we will be doing, and what he wants to see out of us in our afternoon practice.”104 From 3:00 to 5:30 p.m., the football
player participates in an on-the-field practice that
consists of football drills and conditioning.105 Following the afternoon practice, he reports for the team
dinner and then attends an evening class.106 Additional requirements include that he must room with
other members of the team, sit in the front row of the
classroom for each of his classes, comply with a bedtime curfew six nights of the week, and the night before each game he must sleep in the campus hotel
with the other players.107
Applying the UCONN football player’s situation to the first factor of the “economics reality” test,
it shows that there is a high degree of control that
the football player’s coaches whom are hired by the
University of Connecticut have over him.
The second factor deals with the extent of the
relative investments between the student-athletes
and their respective schools. Division I college football programs, barring any NCAA penalties or sanctions against them, are allowed 85 scholarships per
year to be given out to student-athletes. The scholarships granted to those 85 individuals are good for
one year, and the amount of scholarship granted to
Id.
Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
102
103
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each student-athlete is contingent upon their athletic
and academic performance at the university.108 A
grant-in-aid is a transfer of money from the federal
government to a state or local government or individual person for the purposes of funding a project or
program.109 Grant money is not a loan, and does not
have to be repaid, but it does have to be spent according to the federal government’s guidelines for that
particular grant.110
Applying this to the football player’s situation,
the federal government gives a fund to the University of Connecticut (an academic institution funded by
the state government) for the specific purpose of furthering the UCONN football program. 111 The student-athlete, in this case, the football player, gets the
grant-in-aid for one year with the expectation that
his athletic performance will help the football team.
If enrolled at an NCAA member school and to remain
eligible to compete in NCAA intercollegiate competition, the student-athlete must adhere to academic
performance standards, set forth by the school itself,
the NCAA athletic conference the school is member

108 Lynn O’Shaugnessy, 7 Things You Need to Know About
Sports. The College Solution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jun.
22, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/the-collegesolution/2010/06/22/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-sportsscholarships.
109 Grant-In-Aid Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/grant-in-aid.asp (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014).
110 See id.
111 Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady, Most NCAA
Division I Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY
(Jul. 1, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaafinances-subsidies/2142443/.
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of, and the NCAA’s rules.112 A general rule for student-athletes to remain eligible is they must be accepted for enrollment in compliance with the school’s
rules, eligible to practice under the conference and
NCAA rules, and be registered for at least 12 credit
hours for each academic term.113
The NCAA allows a student-athlete to remain
eligible for five years of athletic competition within
five calendar years of the athlete’s full-time enrollment.114 Student-athletes must earn at least six
credit hours each term to be eligible for the following
term, in addition to meeting minimum GPA requirements for graduation.115 For example, at
UCONN, the football player must maintain a GPA of
at least 1.8, and if he falls below the criteria he
would be placed on academic probation.116
To summarize, the football player must meet
the requirements of academic standing as well as the
rigorous time commitment for his chosen sport. This
includes on field practice and team meetings, mandatory team wide strength and conditioning sessions,
and the actual games. In return for assurance of the
football player’s effort for optimum performance on
the field and in the classroom, the school gave him
grant-in-aid of $26,562 for the year. In addition, for
each academic term the football player received an
112 UNIV. OF CONN. 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK
6-7, available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/conn/genrel/
auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_event/SAHandbook.pdf.
113 See id. at 7.
114 See id. at 14, 16.
115 Remaining Eligible: Academics, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/remaining-eligible-academics (last visited
Jan. 18, 2014).
116 UNIV. OF CONN. 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK,
supra note 112, at 34.
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additional $1,650 to cover the cost of student fees,
housing, on/off campus meal plans, books, supplies
and transportation. This illustrates that the “relative
investments” between the student-athlete and the
school, the alleged employee and employer, have
been met. The football player as the employee gives
up much of his time and is controlled, scheduled, and
enforced by his coaches (employees of the University
of Connecticut) and in return, he receives a one-year
stipend.
The relationship between the football player
and UCONN could also be considered an “employee
at-will” relationship, due to the fact that if he fails to
meet the academic eligibility requirements, or does
not comply with the rules in the “Division I StudentAthlete Statement,” UCONN can, after his first full
academic year as a Division I student-athlete, deny
him grant-in-aid for the upcoming year.
The third factor of the “economic reality” test,
that the employee’s opportunity for profit and loss is
determined by the employer, 117 is easily met. The
football player is required to attend every practice
and strength and conditioning workout set up by the
coaching staff. The football player says that due to
the time commitment, although not expressively
stated in the Division I Student-Athlete Statement,
it is impossible for him to hold a part-time job.118 His
daytime hours are filled with academics and his
commitment to the team activities.119 It would be
reasonable to argue that his participation in
UCONN’s football program is a job in itself (through
117 Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.
1987) (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).
118 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football
player (Jan. 29, 2013).
119 Id.
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daily preparation leading to performance at football
games) and the school compensates him for this.
As to the fourth factor,120 the skill required to
handle the football player’s job is limited to a certain
few gifted athletes. For any Division I College Football player in the Football Bowl Subdivision, it is a
rare combination of size, speed, and strength that
enable an individual to successfully compete at that
level. This football player, who received high school
and college All-American honors for his football
skills, must continue to train daily to maintain his
optimum athletic ability.
Finally, the fifth factor, “the permanency of
the relationship,”121 could be reasonably argued to be
an “employee at will” agreement. UCONN, at any
time, can deny the football player an additional year
of grant-in-aid. Before deciding to commit to playing
football at UCONN, the football player had to sign
the “NCAA National Letter of Intent” and the “Division I Student-Athlete Statement” that details all of
the NCAA guidelines, including his full commitment
to the UCONN football program.
If for any reason the football player fails to
comply with the terms set forth in both forms, the
school could deny him a second grant-in-aid year.
Also, it is at the school and the coaches’ discretion
whether the football player is “deserving” of an additional grant-in-aid year. The football player said that
the school can deny him an additional grant-in-aid
year if, “The coaches don’t think I am cutting it.” 122
In other words, whether or not the football player re120 Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1042 (citing United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).
121 Id.
122 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football
player (Jan. 29, 2013).

102

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

ceives an additional grant-in-aid is in the hands of
the coaches and how they view his performance on
the football field.
B. Applying the Brown Statutory Test
The NLRB in Brown examined four criteria to
decide whether graduate assistants were employees
in line with the NLRA. The four criteria were: (1)
“the status of graduate assistants as students,” (2)
“the role of graduate student assistantships in graduate education,” (3) “the graduate student assistants’
relationship with the faculty,” and (4) “the financial
support they receive to attend Brown.”123
The first three criteria from the Brown Board
as it relates to student-athletes as employees are easily met. It is merely impossible to argue against the
first criterion because student-athletes, like graduate
assistants, routinely attend class to receive an academic degree. The second factor goes to the role of
the graduate student assistantships predominately
for educational purposes and as a prerequisite to an
educational degree.124 Playing Big-Time College
Football or Division I Men’s Basketball is certainly
not a prerequisite to obtaining a higher education
degree. The third factor has been analyzed and it
has been shown that coaches of Division I athletic
teams’ exercise a great degree of regulation over
their student-athletes.
1. Interpreting the Fourth Factor in Brown
The logic underlying the fourth factor of the
Brown analysis is flawed. Even if the fourth factor
was logical, Big-Time College Football and Men’s
123
124

Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
Id. at 483.
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Basketball student-athletes would still be NLRA employees.125 The Brown Board relied upon a fourth
element concluding that the graduate assistants
were primarily students and not employees. 126 The
financial rewards graduate assistants received were
not compensation for teaching and research services
performed, but were merely financial aid to permit
attendance at Brown University.127 In support of its
conclusion, the NLRB underscored two aspects of
graduate assistants’ financial packages. First, the
amount provided to teaching assistants (TAs) and
resident assistants (RAs) was the same as that provided to graduate fellows for whom no teaching or
research activity was required.128 Second, the fact
that the financial aid awarded to graduate assistants
was unrelated to the quality or value of services they
rendered, indicated that the payment was not compensation for their services, but was financial assistance to attend school.129
The Brown Board improperly analyzed the
fourth factor of its own analysis. The proper analysis
in determining whether a payment is compensation
for services rendered, as opposed to financial aid, is
whether the payment to the particular person would
cease if the services were stopped.130 It is inconceivSee generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5.
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 The NCAA requires schools to refer to the agreement
between the university and the athlete as a “grant-in-aid” or
scholarship, rather than as an employment contract providing
pay or other compensation. Article 12.1.1 of the Division I
Manual makes it clear that an athlete is not permitted to
receive “pay” for athletic services: “An individual loses amateur
status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
125
126
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able to believe that if TAs and RAs were to withhold
their services either collectively or individually, they
would continue to receive full scholarships and stipends. It follows logically that the financial aid given to such personnel must be compensation for their
services to the university.
Even if this proper analysis of the Brown
fourth factor was looked at in regards to studentathletes, athletic grants-in-aid are never given without the requirement of athletic services being rendered.131 Even third or fourth string personnel on a
college football team or a 12th man on a Division I
Men’s Basketball team must still attend all practices,
abide by team rules, undertake the required and
“voluntary” strength and conditioning, and perform
all activities identical to their grant-in-aid superstar
counterparts. Further, the NCAA makes it clear
that no third parties receive grants-in-aid without
having to participate in the athletic program as a
condition in order to continue being granted the
“scholarship” for their athletic services.132
Finally, comparing the athletic scholarship
with the merit-based or need-based scholarship
awarded to a non-athlete undergraduate or a graduate assistant also shows that the former is compensation.133 Athletic scholarships are granted only if
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his
or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form
in that sport.” NCAA DIV. I MANUAL Bylaw art. 12.1.2 (2013),
available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf.
And under NCAA bylaws, the grant-in-aid is not considered
“pay” and thus is permitted. See id. Bylaw art. 12.01.4 (2013).
131 Id. Bylaw art. 12.01.1.
132 Id. Bylaw art. 15.01.2.
133 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 155.
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the athlete provides athletic services while meritbased or need-based scholarships awarded to nonathletes require no such reciprocity.134 Merit-based
and need-based scholarships are given to enable students to attend universities, but the universities
have the option to discontinue scholarships if the
student-athletes do not compete for them.135
C. The Predominantly Economic Relationship
Between Grant-in-Aid Student-Athletes and
Their Colleges
Applying the NLRB’s test in Brown to grantin-aid Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball student-athletes shows that they
are not average students and their relationship with
their universities is an economic one. 136 In order to
show that a university-athlete relationship is predominantly economic in nature, the standard in the
past was to demonstrate that the relationship was

Id.
Id.
136 Academic ability is independent of athletic talent.
Consequently, a university program that screens admissions
applications based upon potential academic success necessarily
excludes many talented athletes, leaving a team on the playing
field with diminished athletic potential. As former NCAA
Executive Director Byers remembered:
The big timers--building a national entertainment business--wanted the great players on
the field, whether or not they met customary
academic requirements. In the new open-door
era, [in which virtually all high school seniors
were academically “eligible” for college athletics
because of the wholesale abrogation of academic
entrance requirements,] victory-minded coaches
sensed a potential recruiting paradise.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5 at 136.
134
135
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not primarily academic.137 “The NCAA academic
standards are designed to serve the employers’
enormous commercial interests, enabling universities
to recruit and retain gifted athletes rather than to
promote true academic achievement.”138 These “student-athletes” are not primarily students.139 The
majority of these individuals are inadequately prepared to handle the academics at their respective
universities and thus unable to adequately further
their education.140 The NCAA denotes these individuals as student-athletes in order to disguise their legal status of employees in the commercial college
sports entertainment industry.141
The Board in Brown decided that the relationship between graduate assistants is primarily an academic one as opposed to an economic one.142 If the
relationship was found to be for a university’s commercial benefit, then the decision may have gone the
other way. The Board refused to “assert jurisdiction
over relationships that are primarily educational.”143
1. Johnny Manziel’s Right of Publicity: The
Misappropriation of His Likeness for the
Commercial Benefit of Texas A&M University
If an NCAA student-athlete uses his or her
likeness for his or her own commercial benefit, it
may result in that athlete’s ineligibility. When this
same student-athlete makes his debut onto the camId. at 135.
Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 157 (citing interviews with various college athletes
about the secondary emphasis placed on academics).
141 Id. at 135.
142 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489 (2004).
143 See id.
137
138
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pus field or court and performs at a high level, the
NCAA and the athlete’s school recognize that they
can reap commercial benefits from the athlete’s performance, which is actually exploiting the studentathlete.144 This poses a legal question for the NCAA
and its relationship with the current student-athlete.
Exploiting the student-athlete for a commercial benefit actually undermines the NCAA’s amateurism
dogma.
Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel and
his family recognized the intent of the NCAA and began to take steps to trademark his coveted name,
“Johnny Football.”145
A trademark is “a word,
phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others. . . . In effect, a trademark
is the commercial substitute for one’s signature.” 146
Texas A&M University did not hesitate to try and
reap the commercial benefit from Manziel’s star status. “Texas A&M is working in concert with the
Manziel family to trademark the nickname,” said
Shan Hinckley, who is an Assistant Vice President of
Business Development at the school and runs the
Texas A&M University Aggies’ licensing program. 147
The news was reported to the NCAA less than
two weeks after the investment organization filed for
144 Joye Pruitt, NCAA: Why Student-Athletes Should Be Paid
for Achievements in College, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/650687-ncaa-why-studentathletes-should-be-paid-for-achievements-incollege?comment_id=4313772.
145 Darren Rovell, A&M, Family Covet ‘Johnny Football’,
ESPN (Nov. 11, 2012), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/8619087/johnny-manziel-family-trademarkjohnny-football.
146 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (9th ed. 2009).
147 Rovell, supra note 145.
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the “Johnny Football” trademark.148 The lawyer who
filed the trademark did not comment after the investigation but a university official confirmed the lawyer
was not working with Texas A&M University or the
Manziel family.149 The NCAA made it known that in
order for Johnny Manziel to keep his eligibility, neither Texas A&M nor his family could sell products
that in any way hint of a connection to the Texas
A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel.150 Also, the
NCAA notified Texas A&M to ensure that the school
prohibits vendors from selling products hinting to the
moniker “Johnny Football.”151
The Manziel family may have to wait two
more years to attempt to own the trademark “Johnny
Football” for licensing and merchandising deals,
since Manziel just finished his freshman football
season.152 NCAA regulations require that a Division
I football player remain in school for at least three
years. In order for Manziel to maintain his athletic
eligibility at Texas A&M the NCAA asserted that
neither the university or Manziel and his family can
sell products that connect ‘Johnny Football’ to
Id.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Kenny Ryan, While NCAA Rules Prohibit Manziel from
Profiting from His Own Success, It Can’t Stop Others, Daily
Times (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://dailytimes.com/manziel/article_d469e192-4691-11e28554-0019bb2963f4.html.
152 See generally Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (1999). A party can rebut the
presumption that a registered trademark is valid and that
registrant is entitled to exclusive use of mark by showing that
the party used the mark in commerce first, since a fundamental
tenet of trademark law is that ownership of an inherently
distinctive mark is governed by priority of use.
148
149
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Manziel himself.153 Moreover, the NCAA put Texas
A&M on notice that they must take reasonable
affirmative steps to stop vendors from doing the
same.154 Once the NCAA told the school to enforce
this policy against vendors, Texas A&M took
appropriate steps in October and November 2012.155
However, Manziel’s number 2 jersey was available at
the school’s bookstore on Friday, November 9, 2012.
The bookstore completely sold out his jersey over
that weekend and another shipment of his number 2
jersey arrived on Monday November 12, 2012. 156
From that point on it was a revolving door of number
2 Texas A&M football jerseys being shipped to the
store and purchased by consumers. Before that, the
only two Texas A&M football jerseys on the shelves
in the Texas A&M bookstore that were available for
purchase bore the numbers 1 and 12.157 There was
never a Texas A&M football jersey with the number
2 on it in the bookstore available for purchase before
Manziel’s jersey.158
Since Manziel’s name, image or the moniker
“Johnny Football” was not placed anywhere on the
Texas A&M football jersey that had the number 2 on
it, the NCAA and Texas A&M University would argue that they are in no way exploiting Manziel’s
likeness. The school would say that it never attached
153 Joseph Jacobsen, Google and Stanford Help Texas A&M
Save Its Football Season, Capture the “Johnny Football” Asset,
and Begin to Realign Student-Athlete Rights, 22 TEX. ENT. &
SPORTS L.J. 7 (2013), available at http://teslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/TESLAW-Journal-Fall2013.pdf.
154 See id.
155 Ryan, supra note 151.
156 Telephone interview with a Texas A&M Merchandise
Representative (Oct. 15, 2012).
157 Id.
158 Id.
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Johnny Manziel’s name, image, or likeness to the
sold commercial merchandise and thus never exploited him for the school’s financial gain.
However, once a person is well-known entity
and a drawing card for revenue generating public
consumption, a person’s likeness is not limited to
name, moniker, and image. A person’s likeness can
also be an identifiable mark or trait of a person. This
is evident in the California Court of Appeal case,
Motshenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.159
In Motshenbacher, Lothar Motshenbacher was
a Formula I race driver who had his car painted in
esoteric color designs so that they would stand apart
from the other cars.160 R. J. Reynolds created a
commercial with cars on the track and the plaintiff’s
car in the foreground. The plaintiff’s image was
scrambled so he could not be identified and some of
the car’s characteristics were changed. 161 The car’s
number was changed from 11 to 71, and a wing
spoiler was added to the back of the car.162 The red
color and the white pinstripes remained, however,
giving the illusion that Motshenbacher was driving
the car.163 The initial decision of the trial court
found in favor of the defendant, with the court finding that (1) the person driving the car was unrecognizable and therefore unidentifiable, and (2) a reasonable inference could not be drawn that the driver
was Motschenbacher, or any other driver. 164 But the
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s
159 Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821, 824 (1974).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 822.
164 Id. at 822.
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decision and stated that the fact that the likeness of
the driver (alleged to be Motschenbacher) was unrecognizable in the commercial, the number of the racing car had been changed from 11 to 71 and the fact
that car now had an added spoiler did not preclude a
finding that the driver was identifiable as Motschenbacher in view of the distinctive decorations on the
car. The California Court of Appeal for those reasons
held that the use of the car was a misappropriation
of an identifiable attribute of Motschenbacher, thus
violating his right of publicity.165
Applying the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning to the Texas A&M number 2 football jersey,
when a Texas A&M student, alumni member, or general college football fan walks into the Texas A&M
bookstore, a more than reasonable inference will be
drawn that the player who wears that Texas A&M
number 2 football jersey on Saturdays is Johnny
Manziel. First, it is the Texas A&M Football Team
jersey and second, the number 2 is on the jersey and
the inference can be made that the jersey is that of
Johnny Manziel. In view of the distinctive commercial object, the number 2 Texas A&M Football jersey
is identifiable by the majority of the public as Johnny
Manziel’s jersey. For these reasons, the NCAA and
Texas A&M’s use of the number 2 Texas A&M football jersey on it is a misappropriation of an identifiable attribute of Johnny Manziel for the sole advantages of the NCAA and Texas A&M University
advantage, thus violating Manziel’s right of publicity.
Additionally, Texas A&M knows that it can
make money indirectly from Johnny Manziel by selling jerseys, T-shirts and hats with the signature
165

Id. at 827.
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number 2 placed on them, but they’re not permitted
to use Manziel’s name, likeness or “Johnny Football”
moniker.166 That did not stop Texas A&M from doing what they are allowed to do within the NCAA
rules.167 Over the course of the 2012-2013 college
football season, 2,500 Texas A&M Replica Football
jerseys and 1,400 t-shirts with the number 2 were
sold at the Texas A&M campus store.168 Another
shipment of T-shirts was made to the Texas A&M
campus store sometime in early December after the
T-shirts sold out.169
Footballs and helmets signed by Manziel,
(or at least advertised as signed by him, as Texas
A&M University officials say many of the items
are fake), have sold for more than $400. 170 One
seller on eBay who claims to be selling the original
“Johnny Football” shirt boasts in his listing that
he has sold 625 footballs and helmets. 171 Also
listed is a version of a pullover-hooded sweatshirt
with a new phrase growing in commercial popularity, “HEISMANZIEL.” 172 Other items listed for
commercial consumption were bumper stickers,
trading cards, custom figurines, iPhone cases, and
mugs.173
Scenarios like the one with Johnny Manziel
have been an ongoing commercial benefit for the
166 Darren Rovell, Will Johnny Manziel Ever Cash In?, ESPN
(Dec. 7, 2012, 10:47 AM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2547/willjohnny-manziel-ever-cash-in.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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NCAA member schools for several years. It would be
unreasonable to think that the University of Florida
did not make a small fortune by selling University of
Florida football jerseys with the number 15 when
Tim Tebow was the quarterback for the Gators. It is
also reasonable to believe that the University of Texas increased its revenue by selling the University of
Texas football jerseys with the number 10 the year
Vince Young was playing quarterback for the Longhorns. However, there will be much larger revenues
generated for Texas A&M University with respect to
sales of the football jerseys with the number #2 over
the next two years. Texas A&M’s Vice President
John Cook said, “Frankly, we’re not doing anything
that hasn’t been done before. The difference is he’s
[Quarterback Johnny Manziel] a freshman.”174 It is
an important difference. Johnny Manziel flourished
as a star quarterback as a true freshman. Under the
NCAA bylaws, Manziel will be forced to play at the
Division I College Football level for at least two more
years before becoming eligible to enter the National
Football League draft. 175
In all likelihood Johnny Manziel will play his
second and third year of Division I college football
eligibility as quarterback for the Texas A&M Aggies
and the money at the campus bookstore will continue
to flow in. The average price of a replica football jersey, whether college or professional, is between $60
and $70. Replica T-shirts sell for approximately $20
each.176 Furthermore, one can speculate that other
merchandise will be sold at Texas A&M given the
fact the school officials will surely think of innovative
Id.
Id.
176 Id.
174
175
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ways to try and disguise the inference of Manziel’s
name, image or likeness. It is more than reasonable
to infer and conclude that the revenue Texas A&M
University will generate from the sales of commercial
merchandise while Johnny Manziel is still playing
quarterback for the Aggies during the 2013-2014 and
2014-2015 college football seasons will be similar if
not greater than in the 2012-2013 season.
The amount of potential revenue that Manziel
will generate for the school is certainly substantial.
Yet it is simply incomprehensible that under the current NCAA bylaws, Manziel will not receive any
monetary compensation for any item sold bearing a
resemblance to him. Texas A&M will certainly cash
in big if it continues to sell commercial merchandise
carrying the number 2, and continuing to misappropriate Johnny’s Manziel’s likeness for its own commercial benefit.
NCAA President Mark Emmert feels that it is
a non-issue that Manziel can market his image and
likeness while enrolled at an NCAA member school.
Although an athlete like Manziel can generate future
profits for himself through his image and likeness, it
does not mean he should be able to do so while enrolled at Texas A&M. He further contends that one
of the reasons it is hard to figure an appropriate
monetary compensation for Manziel is because it is
not known how much Manziel himself helped to sell
any item, whether a Football Jersey, T-shirt, football,
Texas A&M helmet, etc. President Emmert said,
The position of the NCAA has always been
that when a student is playing for their
university, they are getting the full advantage of being part of that university.
They are able to build on that popularity,
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and when they go pro, they are extraordinarily well-positioned to monetize their
brand. And why will Johnny Manziel be
able to do that? Because he played at Texas
A&M and was successful and perhaps won
the Heisman.177

President Emmert further contends, “It’s not
just that it’s a No. 2 [jersey], . . . [i]t’s a Texas A&M
No. 2. I can’t parse out the value of the number on
one side and the university on the other. They go together.”178
However, this statement does not focus on the
reality of why there would be such substantial sales
of Texas A&M number 2 jerseys and T-shirts. The
reason is that the number 2 is a recognizable attribute as Johnny Manziel’s Texas A&M football jersey
number. It is a difficult inference to make that the
success Johnny Manziel experienced as freshman college football quarterback would automatically lead
him to the National Football League, enabling him to
reap the benefits of his brand “Johnny Football.”179
What if Manziel suffers a career ending injury while
in college or suffers an injury that will weaken his
playing ability as a quarterback for the remainder of
his career?
Emmert, in his assertion, is guaranteeing that
Manziel will have a successful professional career in
the National Football League, or other professional
football league, after his time at Texas A&M. This is
a risky assumption to make in a violent game like
football where injuries occur often and unexpectedly.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
179 Id.
177
178
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D. NCAA Proposal 26: An Attempt to Further
Disguise the NCAA “Money Machine” by
Exploiting Student-Athletes’ Likenesses
Technological advancements, such as the improvement of video game graphics, have forced the
NCAA to change its rules that govern corporate
sponsorship attaching themselves to studentathletes. For example, the NCAA’s current rules allow a corporate sponsor, such as NIKE, to attach its
brand name to current student-athletes, where those
same athletes appear at NCAA sanctioned events.
Moreover, the current rules allow corporate sponsors
to attach themselves to student-athletes and advertise their brand, as long as it is contemporaneous
with “promoting NCAA athletic competitions or other
NCAA sanctioned events.”180
The NCAA is continuously testing the waters
in this respect. In March 2011, the NCAA Cabinet
sponsored possible amendments to its likeness proposal.181 The Cabinet, in an article posted on the
NCAA website, stated,
Prop[osal] No. 2010-26, aims to accommodate advancements in technology and facilitate more authentic promotions associating
schools with their sponsors while maintaining the Association’s fundamental principles that prohibit commercial exploitation
of student-athletes.182

The proposal that follows the principles developed by the 2008 Presidential Task Force on ComCabinet Sponsors Possible Amendments to Likeness
Proposal, supra note 82.
181 Id.
182 Id.
180
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mercial Activity in Division I Athletics continues
many of the safeguards contained within the current
legislation, which allows the use of student-athlete’s
name or likeness for “promotions, advertisements
and media activities if specific conditions are met.” 183
“Among current conditions carried over into the new
legislation” of Proposal No. 2010-26 are: (1) studentathlete permission and (2) athletic director approval
for each activity. Additionally the new proposal
takes those two core requirements and adds a refinement:
Promotional activity by a sponsor of an institution, conference or the NCAA must
clearly identify the commercial entity’s
sponsor affiliation (for example, an official
sponsor of the institution or event) when
student-athlete images are shown.184

The two current conditions in Proposal 201026 are tainted and represent legal issues for the
NCAA. In regard to a student-athlete’s permission
to use their likeness for the NCAA’s purported commercial purposes, the NCAA would be able to do this
even if they never approached the athlete for consent
to use his image for the association’s own commercial
purposes.185 Technically, the student-athlete had already consented to this by signing the NCAA’s Student-Athlete Form 08-3a found in the NCAA Division
1 National Letter of Intent.
1. Student-Athlete Permission
As previously mentioned, before the studentId.
Id.
185 Id.
183
184
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athlete is allowed to participate in practice he or she
must sign various sections of Student-Athlete Statement Form 08-3a, which contains the language referring to the use of their images and likeness to promote NCAA championships, activities, events, or
other programs. The wording is vague and ambiguous. This could present a legal dilemma for the
NCAA. As mentioned earlier, the student-athletes
must sign Form 08-3a in order to participate in team
practices and games, NCAA athletic competitions,
among other NCAA member institutions.
These student-athletes are essentially left
with no reasonable alternative but to sign Form 083a. It is unreasonable to argue that a studentathlete would refuse to sign Form 08-3a, and thus
voluntarily pass up their NCAA athletic eligibility
because of their preference for the NCAA not to use
their name, image, or likeness to further promote the
association.
2. Athletic Director Approval
Proposal 26 arose from a debate. Some NCAA
athletic directors supported the idea of attaching a
brand, such as NIKE, to a current student-athlete.
Some athletic directors approved this because they
each recognize that attaching a corporate sponsor to
a current student-athlete’s name image or likeness
would create a new source of revenue to college
sports programs.186 Given the way the purported
amendments in Proposal 26 are drafted, athletic directors will now search for imaginative ways to gen186 Jerry Briggs, Caution Advised on NCAA Legislation Over
Likenesses: Potential Revenue Source Could Lead to
Controversy, MY SAN ANTONIO (Jan. 16, 2011).
http://www.mysanantonio.com/sports/article/Caution-advisedon-NCAA-legislation-over-959224.php.
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erate revenue for their athletic department by attaching brands to well-known student-athletes’
names, images, or likeness.187 University of Texas
San Antonio Athletic Director Lynn Hickey argued if
the NCAA wants to use the student-athletes’ images
and likeness for promotion it should be done in a way
to help them rather than exploit them. 188 Athletic
Director Hickey then added,
It would be great to do something that
would give the kids more visibility or to give
more credit to the program,” Hickey said.
“But how are you going to determine if
you’re just not producing revenue for the
corporate group vs. the university’s interests?189

It is hard to say, but it is more likely than not
that the NCAA has created a new source of revenue
generation for itself and is exploiting the studentathletes for its own commercial benefit. Moreover,
some athletic directors of the NCAA’s member
schools already recognize student-athletes as a drawing card to the public, thus attaching a brand to wellknown student-athletes would create a huge revenue
stream.
Proposal 26 is aimed at avoiding the exploitation of current student athletes while broadening the
scope of what sponsors can do with promotions.
Aside from the already mentioned current rules in
the legislation, athletes would not endorse commercial products. The current proposal combines these
three core requirements of student-athlete permisId.
Id.
189 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
187
188
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sion, athletic director approval, and non-commercial
products and adds refinements, including: “A promotional activity by a sponsor of an institution, conference or NCAA must clearly identify entity’s sponsor
affiliation.”190 This raises issues and demonstrates
why these student-athletes should be compensated
for their revenue producing skills. Mike Rodgers, the
faculty athletics representative at Baylor University,
argued for this new refinement set forth in Docket
No. Proposal 2010-26 to the NCAA Division I Amateurism Cabinet.191
There have been several arguments for paying
student-athletes in the past. A common argument
that several officials have made is generally summarized as follows, “Why would we not pay these student-athletes?
They are the people that draw
111,000 paid spectators for Saturday football games
at the Big House (The University of Michigan Football Stadium). They are the people who sell out Cameron Indoor Field House for every Duke University
Home Basketball Game.”
But now the NCAA and some of its member
schools’ athletic directors want to attach corporate
sponsorships to these student-athletes’ names, images, and likeness to make more money, without giving
the athletes any portion of the revenue. It would be
difficult for the NCAA to argue that a decision to use
these student-athletes’ images or likenesses in any
way that it or its member schools saw fit, would center around the student-athlete’s welfare as opposed
to the exploitation of these athlete for their own
commercial benefit.
Id.
Cabinet Sponsors Possible Amendments to Likeness
Proposal, supra note 82.
190
191
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In the year 2014, it is a realistic fact that high
level student-athletes are a huge attraction to the
general public.192 There is no problem with the
NCAA and its member institutions attaching current
student-athletes to corporate sponsorships, but if this
is the NCAA’s projected future of how it will operate
its commercial enterprise, the NCAA must begin to
compensate these student-athletes, because failing to
do so would clearly be exploiting these athletes’
names, images, and likeness for its sole commercial
benefit.193
E. Recognition of the NCAA’s Manifest
Disregard and Exploitation of Student-Athletes
Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball have both transformed into revenue-generating machines.194 The college football
teams who participate in different Bowl Games receive a hefty payout. The majority of the money is
distributed equally to that conference’s member institutions in addition to a windfall for the teams
competing in the Bowl Games.195 Division I Men’s
Basketball fares relatively well as well, with the
NCAA licensing the rights to CBS and its member
channels for 14 years to exclusively broadcast the
March Madness tournament for $10.8 billion.196
These statistics, along with the financial aid
these student-athletes get specifically to compete in
Briggs, supra note 186.
Id.
194 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
195 Jon Solomon, Profit from BCS National Championship
Game Won’t Be a Big Windfall, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, (Jan. 5,
2010 at 9:01 PM), http://blog.al.com/birmingham-newsstories/2010/01/profit_from_bcs_national_champ.html.
196 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
192
193
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NCAA competitions, shows that they are getting
compensated for their athletic services rendered to
their universities. It has been demonstrated, but not
held to date by the NLRB or the judiciary, that the
Big-Time College Football and Division I studentathlete-university relationship is predominantly an
economic and not an educational one.197 Therefore,
they should be considered employees under the
NLRB legal standards. Additionally, both former and
current Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball student-athletes have acknowledged that the NCAA has turned into a “money making machine” for its own commercial benefit. 198
The lawsuit filed by former University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Men’s Basketball player
Ed O’Bannon,199 demonstrates that former studentathletes recognize that the NCAA misappropriates
their likenesses for its own commercial benefit, and
fails to compensate these once NCAA studentathletes even though these athletes are no longer enrolled in college. Several former Big-Time College
Football and Division I Men’s Basketball players attempted to join O’Bannon’s lawsuit in a consolidated
class action Complaint filed in July 2013. 200 The
players received a class action certification for the
lawsuit against the NCAA, and the lawsuit is set for
trial in early 2014.
Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
See John J. Leppler, Is the Unauthorized Use of Former
Collegiate Student-Athletes’ “Likeness” a Violation of Their
Right of Publicity? 26-27 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
available at http://works.bepress.com/john_leppler/1/.
199 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-1967
CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
200 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Licensing Litig., No.
C 09-019667 CW, 2013 WL 3810438 (N.D.Cal. July 19, 2013)
197
198
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1. O’Bannon v. NCAA and Student-Athlete
Statement Division I Form 08-3a Section IV
O’Bannon, barring a settlement, will most
likely be tried in 2014201 and may ultimately foreclose that the relationship between these studentathletes and their universities is purely an economic
one, and therefore student-athletes should be compensated for their athletic services rendered to their
universities.
Ed O’Bannon, a former college basketball
player for UCLA, filed the aforementioned class action lawsuit in July 2009 against the NCAA, CLC,
and EA claiming that the defendants were conspiring
to use former collegiate players’ images and likenesses for commercial benefit in perpetuity, because the
former players had relinquished their personal attribute rights by signing the Student-Athlete Statement Division I Form 08-3a Section IV.202 EA sought
a dismissal, arguing that the company was simply
following the rules laid down by the NCAA: former
athletes’ rights were relinquished and they did not
have to be compensated for the use of their images or
likenesses.203 Judge Claudia Wilken of the US District Court of Northern California agreed with EA,
Inc. and granted the company a dismissal in May
2011.204 In doing so, Judge Wilken stated:
201 Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint:
Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012, 9:48 AM),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-payingcollege-athletes.
202 O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *2; see Leppler, supra note
198 at 23.
203 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
CV-09-1967-CW, 2013 WL 5402512 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013).
204 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
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This purported conspiracy involves ‘Defendants’ concerted action to require all
current student-athletes to sign forms each
year that purport to require each of them to
relinquish all rights in perpetuity for the
use of their images, likeness and/or names’
and to deny any compensation ‘through restrictions in the [NCAA] Bylaws.’ The Consolidated Amended Complaint, however,
does not contain any allegations to suggest
that EA agreed to participate in this conspiracy.205

But Judge Wilken left the door open for the
plaintiff to introduce evidence that would show that
EA was involved with a conspiracy to use the former
athletes for commercial benefit without compensation.206 O’Bannon’s attorney Jon King later argued
that the rules that apply to current student-athletes
should not govern former student-athletes in relation
to compensation if their images or likenesses are
used for commercial benefit, and that EA conspired
with the NCAA and CLC not to pay them. 207
If the plaintiffs win O’Bannon, the decision
will not only forever affect the way the NCAA conducts its commercial business but may also prove the
relationship between these particular studentathletes and their universities is predominantly an
economic one, leading to the conclusion that the student-athletes should be compensated by more than
just a financial aid package.
Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
207 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No.
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
205
206
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2. What the Future May Hold for the NCAA as
a Result of the Forthcoming
O’Bannon Decision
Regardless of whether the Manziel family
eventually receives the “Johnny Football” football
trademark, the Manziel family recognizes the
NCAA’s restriction of student-athletes to license
their likenesses, so that the NCAA is the only entity
currently allowed to use each student-athlete’s likeness for its own commercial benefit. This demonstrates the economic nature of this relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA.
One further point with respect to the
O’Bannon case, U.S. District Court Judge Alfred
Covello has ordered ESPN to provide Ed O’Bannon
and his attorneys with its television and licensing
contracts for Division I Men’s Basketball and Football since 2005.208 The order sets the table for
O’Bannon to gain a much better understanding of
how much the NCAA profits from current and former
players’ names, images and likenesses.209 The order
also highlights how the O’Bannon case threatens not
only the NCAA and its member institutions, but also
companies that have profited from Division I Men’s
Basketball and football through contracts with the
NCAA and members.210 Judge Covello’s ruling is a
208 Michael McCann, Judge Orders ESPN to Turn Over
Contracts in Ed O’Bannon Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2,
2012, 4:26 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/
michael_mccann/10/02/Ed-O-Bannon-ESPN/index.html.
209 Id.
210 Id.
O’Bannon claims that, among other things,
Form 08-3a and Article 12.5.1.1 enable NCAA to
enter into licensing agreements with companies
that distribute products containing student athletes’ images . . . and [the athletes] do not re-
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reminder that the O’Bannon case presents real financial and legal risk for the NCAA, CLC or any of
the NCAA’s member institutions.211
The information that ESPN was enjoined to
disclose by Judge Covello, which ESPN considered
privileged, is nowhere near the biggest worry.212 Regardless of whether the plaintiffs win, the NCAA,
CLC, EA, and any other entity (including ESPN) will
be forced to surrender its own private knowledge of
just how much it has profited from the labor of Big
Time College Football and Division I Men’s Basketball student-athletes.213 If the plaintiffs in fact win
in 2014, it follows that the court will hold that the
NCAA wrongly profited from the names, images, and
likenesses of the student-athletes.214 If the NCAA
did this knowingly, then the companies connected

ceive compensation for the use of their images.
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 80. O’Bannon asserts that
NCAA’s and CLC’s actions excluded him and
other former student athletes from the collegiate licensing market. He claims that, because
NCAA has rights to images of him from his collegiate career, it, along with its co-conspirators,
fix the price for the use of his image at ‘zero.’
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 86. He maintains that this
conduct ‘has artificially limited supply and depressed prices paid by Defendants and their coconspirators to Plaintiff and the members of the
Class for use of their images after cessation of
participation
in
intercollegiate
sports.’
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 182.
O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *3.
211 McCann, supra note 208.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.; see also O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010).
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with the NCAA have arguably done the same. 215
Regardless of the outcome of O’Bannon, it is
no longer a secret as to how much the NCAA benefits
from these particular student-athletes.216 If the
plaintiffs lose, it is only a matter of time as to when
the judiciary and the NLRB will come to conclude
that the relationship between the schools and their
grant-in-aid Big-Time College Football and Division I
Men’s Basketball student-athletes is predominantly
an economic one, and therefore student-athletes
should be compensated by the school for their services rendered.
A. Possible Methods of Compensation for
Student-Athletes
The cornerstone of the NCAA’s argument is
that it wants to instill the notion of amateurism in
college athletics.217 Since the beginning of college
athletics, student-athletes have played for pride and
for the love of the game, without being compensated
for their performance on the fields and courts. However, the time has come for the NCAA to shy away
from this ancient hallmark, and begin to pay players.
Wallace Renfro, an NCAA Senior Policy analyst,
commented on the NCAA’s economic model that redistributes money from revenue generating sports to
other parts of the athletic department at a university.218 Renfro drafted a memo to NCAA President,
Mark Emmert, noting that the term student-athlete
McCann, supra note 208.
Id.
217 Pruitt, supra note 144.
218 Tom Farrey,‘Student-Athlete’ Term in Question, ESPN
(Sept. 19, 2012, 8:31 PM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8396753/ncaa-policy-chiefproposes-dropping-student-athlete-term.
215
216
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is one that “Walter Byers created to counter the criticism that we are paying college athletes when we began providing grants-in-aid.”219 Walter Byers, the
first executive director of the NCAA, coined the
phrase grant-in-aid, and the term has been used ever
since to describe an athletic scholarship. 220
Renfro wrote the memo to Emmert in response
to the O’Bannon suit’s claim that the NCAA violates
antitrust laws by preventing universities from allowing athletes to be compensated beyond the monetary
amount of a grant-in-aid. An important quote from
the memo, which Emmert has not yet responded to,
is as follows:
We have always had a cradle-to-grave approach to amateurism,’ Renfro wrote. ‘You
are born an amateur, but like innocence
once lost, it cannot be regained. But our
commitment to amateurism has often been
based on something other than how we define amateurism in our own constitution. In
the most romantic sense we think of amateurism as playing sports for the love of the
game, for the camaraderie among competitors, for the pride of victory for school or
colors, and then we use this romanticized
sense of amateurism to define the entire enterprise of collegiate athletics.221

This quote alone speaks volumes. The NCAA
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
221 Id. (internal quotes omitted); see Eamonn Brennan, First
Wave of NCAA Documents Arrive, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2012, 1:05
PM),
http://m.espn.go.com/general/blogs/blogpost?blogname=collegeb
asketballnation&id=64203&wjb=.
219
220
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understands that the amateurism veil is pierced, and
the NCAA must move forward and leave behind the
antiquated notion that the student-athlete only receives the grant-in-aid money, when evidence clearly
shows that the student-athletes deserve more or at
least “a cut of the pie” from the revenue they generate for the NCAA from their services rendered.222
However, there are ways to compensate the
student-athletes and at the same time promote the
amateurism of college athletics, even if the studentathlete and NCAA relationship is predominantly an
economic one.223 There are three different possibilities.
First, the NCAA should set up an escrow account for each student-athlete, where money earned
from NCAA licensing and merchandising deals with
respect to each player will be deposited.224 Having
this type escrow account for each student-athlete
would be more effective than the potential of having
the NLRB regulate the distribution of the licensing
and merchandising revenue. The marketplace will
determine what each student-athlete earns – the
same scheme used in professional sports leagues.225
Second, the NCAA could pay players based on
their merit and performance in games. In this scenario, the financial situation would not be determined by the celebrity status of the studentathlete.226 From a performance standpoint, compen222 Steve Haywood, Top College Athletes Deserve a Piece of the
Pie. ONMILWAUKEE.COM (May 14, 2008, 6:53 PM),
http://onmilwaukee.com/myOMC/authors/stevehaywood/haywoo
dblog051408.html.
223 Farrey, supra note 218.
224 Pruitt, supra note 144.
225 Id.
226 Id.
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sating student-athletes for their athletic performances would lead to a stronger work ethic. This in turn
would motivate both the superstar just out of high
school, and the third or fourth stringer to work harder to obtain loftier goals. 227 This would ultimately
provide a better showcase of the student-athletes’
talents and provide a greater financial contribution
to their team and their university.228
With respect to the “merit” stipulation, if the
NCAA were to compensate athletes based on a certain grade point averages, greater academic excellence would be encouraged.229 Most NCAA member
institutions reward athletes for their athletic standing and fail miserably when overseeing and evaluating h student-athlete performance in the classroom.230 If the NCAA truly feels that the relationship between it and the student-athlete is predominantly an educational one, and would not want the
NLRB to get involved, then it would be best at this
stage to pay the student-athlete and also provide the
student-athlete with incentive to work hard to perform well in academics.
CONCLUSION
Grant-in-aid student-athletes that compete in
the two revenue-generating sports, Big-Time College
Football and NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball are
not student-athletes as the NCAA asserts, but are
employees under the NLRA.231 Student-athletes
meet both the common law test and the statutory
test applicable to university students, and they
Id.
Id.
229 Pruitt, supra note 144.
230 Id.
231 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 92.
227
228

131

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut?

should be compensated for their athletic services
rendered to the university.232
The NCAA refers to these athletes as “studentathletes” which leads to significant legal implications.233 The term signifies that student-athletes are
amateurs who should not expect any form of reward
after participating in NCAA collegiate sports. However, the reality is these students are employees under the NLRA because they meet the common law
“right of control” test and the NLRA’s statutory employee standard.234 From an economic standpoint,
Big-Time College Football and Division I Men’s Basketball both generate millions of dollars each year.235
The NCAA provides the media with programming material for advertising and directly retains all
profits, yet it insists that the persons generating the
revenue are amateurs.236 Moreover, the revenues
generated benefit only the NCAA and its member institutions. The NCAA’s decision to repeatedly deny
student-athletes payment from a legal and economic
standpoint is no longer justifiable. Grant-in-aid BigTime College Football and Division I Men’s Basketball student-athletes should not be referred to as
amateurs because the NCAA has commercialized the
industry and has led to the exploitation of those student-athletes for its own commercial benefit.237
“Once the innocence is lost, it can never be regained.”238 It is no longer a secret that the NCAA
cannot claim its affirmative defense of amateurId.
Id. at 86.
234 Id.
235 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.
236 Id.
237 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5.
238 Farrey, supra note 218.
232
233
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ism.239 The NCAA should accept that these particular student-athletes are the moneymakers for its lucrative commercial enterprise, and should develop a
payment method for fair compensation, above the
grant-in-aid, for their services rendered and the revenue produced for their school, the NCAA, and its
member institutions.

239

Id.
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Abstract
This Article argues why human flesh, because
of its inherent properties and its necessity for human
survival, should not qualify as a tangible medium of
expression under the Copyright Act of 1976. Through
policy concerns and property law this Article demonstrates why the fixation requirement, necessary to
obtain copyright protection of a “work,” must be flexible and eliminate human flesh as an acceptable,
tangible medium of expression, to avoid the disastrous risk of the court falling into the role of “21st
Century judicial slave masters.”
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INTRODUCTION
“Though the earth and all inferior creatures, be
common to all men, yet every man has a property in
his own person: this no body has any right to but
himself.” ~ John Locke1
The human skin is the body’s largest organ,
spanning a total area of twenty-two square feet and
weighing an average of eight pounds.2 The skin constantly regenerates itself, shedding up to one million
skin cells daily.3 Human skin is miraculous; it regulates body temperature, permits sensory stimuli, and
provides protection against harmful infections, dehydration, and injury.4 In addition to the human flesh
providing human beings with life, it is a way for
many people to demonstrate individual expression,
1 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 209 (London,
Printed for R. Butler 1821) (1690).
2 Skin, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC,
http://science.nationalgeographic.com/science/health-andhuman-body/human-body/skin-article.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2014); Skin Problems & Treatment Health Center, WEBMB,
http://www.webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/pictureof-the-skin (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Skin
Problems].
3 Ed Grabianowski, How Many Skin Cells Do You Shed Every
Day?, DISCOVERY FIT & HEALTH ,
http://health.howstuffworks.com/skincare/information/anatomy/shed-skin-cells.htm (last visited Feb.
2, 2014).
4 See id.; see also Skin Problems, supra note 2.
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whether that be through body art, body modifications, unique body piercings, tattoos, skin stretching,
plastic surgery, or skin alternation for cultural traditions.
In 2011, Warner Brothers released the muchanticipated sequel, The Hangover Part II.5 The film
raked in big bucks at the box office and caused an
uproar in the copyright community when one of the
characters, Stu Price, wakes up one morning after a
wild night in Bangkok, permanently sporting around
his left eye a replica of Mike Tyson’s infamous, tribal
facial tattoo.6 The scene won laughs globally; however, the tattoo artist who imprinted the tribal art on
the heavyweight-boxing champion’s flesh, S. Victor
Whitmill, was not amused and filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Warner Brothers on April
28, 2011.7
Warner Brothers did not know that when
Whitmill tattooed the tribal piece on Tyson’s face in
February of 2003, Tyson signed a release form that
acknowledged, “all artwork, sketches and drawings
related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of [his]
tattoo are property of Paradox-Studio Dermagraphics.”8 Warner Brothers never asked Whitmill
for permission to use, reproduce, or create derivative
works of Tyson’s tattoo in advertising and promotion
5 THE HANGOVER PART II (Warner Brothers 2011); see Jon
Reichman & Aaron Johnson, Hangover Ink, INTELL. PROP.
MAG., July/Aug. 2011, at 28, 28, available at
http://www.kenyon.com/newspublications/publications/2011/~/m
edia/Files/Publication%20PDFs/2011_IPM_JulyAug.ashx.
6 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28.
7 Id.
8 Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 3,
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11CV00752, 2011
WL 2038147, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2011).
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of the film.9
In addition to alleging copyright infringement, Whitmill filed a preliminary injunction in an
attempt to stop Warner Brothers from releasing the
film, but the presiding judge denied the injunction,
acknowledging that “[Whitmill had a] strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits for copyright infringement.”10 Warner Brothers and Whitmill eventually settled outside of court, preventing the Eastern District of Missouri from establishing firm legal
precedent on the controversial issue of copyrighting
tattoos.11 As scholars and attorneys in the intellectual property field across the country weighed in on
this controversy, the question of whether human
flesh is copyrightable was at the core of the debate. 12
The United States Constitution states, “Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 13
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright protection
is given to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.”14 Originality
under the Copyright Act requires the author independently create the work using a low modicum of
Id. at *6-7.
Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28.
11 See id.
12 See id.; see also Declaration of David Nimmer at 3, Whitmill
v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11CV00752, 2011 WL
10744102, at 2 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011).
13 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
14 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
9

10
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creativity.15 A work of authorship affixed to human
skin would likely be copyrightable as a “pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work,” but its copyrightability
hinges on the fixation requirement. This Article will
argue why human flesh should not qualify as a “tangible medium of expression” under the Copyright Act
of 1976.
The above copyright provisions endow the author with complete property rights to control her
work for her lifespan, plus, seventy years after her
death; only once this period has lapsed does the author lose control over her work.16 This Article,
through policy considerations and basic property and
privacy law, specific to the personal rights in an individual’s body, will demonstrate why the fixation
requirement must be flexible and categorize human
flesh as an intangible medium of expression 17 to
avoid the disastrous risk of the court falling into the
15 Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV.
511, 525 (2013) (citing Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)). Works of authorship including:
“(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
16 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); see Melissa A. Bogden, Comment,
Fixing Fixation: The RAM Copy Doctrine, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181,
186 (2011).
17 Intangible medium of expression refers to the negative of
“tangible medium of expression.” A work of authorship
qualifies for copyright protection when “fixed within a tangible
medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). However, a
work that resides in an intangible medium of expression does
not qualify for copyright protection. Throughout this Article,
the meaning of intangible medium of expression remains
consistent with this footnote’s explanation.
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role of “21st Century judicial slave masters.”18
Part I provides a brief look at the legislative
intent behind the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976,
with particular focus on the reasons the fixation requirement is a necessity for copyright protection.
Further, this Part will examine, through precedent
and policy, what the legal standard for fixation is in
the 21st Century, paying special attention to what
constitutes a “tangible medium of expression.”
Part II will argue why the human skin does
not constitute a “tangible medium of expression,” arguing that the regenerative nature of human skin
disallows qualification under the standard laid out
by the court for “sufficient permanence.” Additionally, this Part will discuss how through transitory duration’s functional standard, body art, plastic surgery, or a layperson’s tattoo are not reproduced for
economic value, differentiating between reproductions by Warner Brothers in The Hangover Part II
and the makeup designer for the Broadway play,
Cats. Finally, this Part will argue that above both
the requirements of permanency and transitory duration, because human skin is necessary for an individual’s survival, it is a useful article and uncopyrightable.
Part III addresses the personal rights in one’s
own body, discussing an individual’s privacy and
property interests set forth in the United States Con18 In this Article, I coin the phrase “21 st Century judicial slave
masters.” In terms of this Article, this phrase means that the
United States judiciary will act as modern day slave master
exercising behavior similar to 19th Century slave masters that
existed prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
However, courts will take on the role of “21st Century judicial
slave masters” by controlling individuals through the remedial
copyright laws.
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stitution. Further, this Part looks at these interests’
relationship to a copyright holder’s property rights,
ultimately concluding that an individual’s personal
rights in her body supersede copyright law.
Part IV will present the dangers that the legal
system will face if courts consider human flesh as a
viable medium of expression for copyright protection.
This Part will examine the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on slavery, relating to the property rights
endowed to an author for her copyrighted work. Utilizing various policies, this Part will show why normal copyright remedies, enforced by the courts for
copyright infringement, can create disastrous consequences leading to modern day slavery. In the 21st
Century, it becomes necessary, depending on an individual’s status, for a person to recognize the arguments below before allowing an ink needle, surgical
scalpel, henna brush, or piercing gun to touch the
skin.19
I. MOLDING THE MEDIUM: THE HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT’S FIXATION REQUIREMENT
Copyright protection under United States copyright law requires that an author must create an
original work of authorship, and that work must be
fixed in a “tangible medium of expression;” neither
can survive without the other.20 The Copyright Act
See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 29.
Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on
Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV 825, 830 (“Under U.S. copyright law, fixation is what
creates both an author and a commodifiable subject, neither of
which exists as a legal entity in copyright law before the act of
fixation occurs.”); see also Trotter Hardy, Introduction to
Boundaries of Intellectual Property Symposium, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV.825, 842 (2009).
19
20
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considers a work fixed in a “tangible medium of expression” if:
[I]ts embodiment in a copy or phonorecord,
by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission. 21

This statutory language presents two reasons
for the existence of the fixation requirement: (1) use
of the work by others, creating a permanency to use
the work in the future; and (2) the concept of authority, which only considers a work fixed if the author of
the original work or her agent physically performs
the task of fixation.22
A. Fixation’s Legislative History
The fixation concept is rooted in the printing
press; evident through the Supreme Court’s holding
in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,
that player piano rolls did not constitute copies under the Copyright Act of 1909. 23 The Copyright Act
required copies to be recorded in print through “intelligible notion,” because the rolls were only readable

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See Hardy, supra note 20, at 842; see also Perzanowski,
supra note 15, at 526.
23 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908).
21
22
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by machine.24 However, prior to the Copyright Act of
1976, the Copyright Act of 1909 did not make the
fixation requirement mandatory to obtain copyright
protection, but instead afforded copyright protection
to “all the writing[s] of an author.”25 This broad language demonstrated that although the statutory language did not explicitly state the necessity of fixation, the concept still existed through the methods by
which authors obtained copyright protection for their
works through either: notice with the presence of the
copyright symbol, displayed as ©, on the work, or
providing the United States Copyright Office with a
copy of the unpublished work.26
In 1964, three members of Congress presented
a revision to the 1909 Copyright Act, which later became section 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act. The
proposal discussed the concept of fixation and required original works of authorship be fixed in a
“tangible medium of expression” in order to secure
copyright protection. Further, the revision, in section 15, explained what constitutes a copy, differentiating between the ownership of the copyright and
the material object that the work is first fixed in or
embodied.27 Although the 1964 revision (now the
1965 bill) laid foundation for the new requirement, it
24 Carrie Ryan Gallia, Note, To Fix or Not to Fix: Copyright’s
Fixation Requirement and the Rights of Theatrical
Collaborators, 92 MINN. L. REV. 231, 238 (2007) (quoting WhiteSmith Music, 209 U.S. at 17) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25 See Hardy, supra note 20, at 844.
26 See id.; see also Bogden, supra note 16, at 188 (discussing
the 1909 Copyright Act’s lack of fixation requirement because
copyright protection only extended to specified categories of
works listed in the Act: maps, charts, and books).
27 Hardy, supra note 20, at 846 (noting that section 15 later
became section 202 of the Copyright Act of 1976).
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still lacked a concrete definition for “fixation.” It was
not until 1966, after broadcasters and commentators
spoke out about whether computer software qualified
as fixed, did the Judiciary Committee add what is
today’s current definition of fixation to the 1965
bill.28 Today’s broad fixation definition “was intended to ‘avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable
distinctions . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon
the form or medium in which the work is fixed.’”29
B. The Fixation Requirement in the 21st Century
Scholars agree that fixation’s purpose is to
limit the privileges of copyright protection to works
in tangible form; intangible works qualify for zero
protection.30 The fixation requirement holds the capability of removing an author’s work from being a
mere, unprotectable idea and labels it as one of the
many “bundle of sticks” rights a person owns in
property.31
Fixation, in most cases, is easy to meet, which
explains why there is rarely any controversy surrounding the requirement.32 In a majority of cases,
courts acknowledge the fixation requirement, state
that it is met, and move on; cases that challenge fixation usually do so based on the case’s particular
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
30 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28; see also
Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 9.
31 See Joshua C. Liederman, Note & Comment: Changing the
Channel: The Copyright Fixation Debate, 36 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 289, 312-13 (2010) (“In essence, fixation
acts as the ‘trigger’ for copyright protection, removing the work
from a mere idea and creates a property that is eligible for
copyright protection.”).
32 Hardy, supra note 20, at 849.
28
29
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facts.33 However, depending on the subject matter,
the fixation requirement can be murky; therefore,
fixation can be separated into three elements: (1) the
embodiment requirement, in which the work must be
embodied in a material object; (2) the permanency
requirement, mandating that the work is sufficiently
stable or permanent to permit perception;34 and (3)
the durational requirement, where the work “must
remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than
transitory duration.’”35 Case law provides that problems with fixation arise in both the permanency and
durational requirements, leading courts, mostly in
the computer technology arena, to further define
these two requirements.36
1. Permanency
The 1976 Copyright Act never required that a
copy have “absolute permanence” to be fixed. 37 Permanency only requires – sufficient – not absolute
permanence, to satisfy fixation’s meaning under section 102.38 Courts apply permanency in a functional
standard, classifying a reproduction as fixed by depending on “whether action can be performed to or
with the reproduction and not arbitrarily on its degree of permanency.”39
The Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v.
See id. at 850.
See Bogden, supra note 16, at 188; see also MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[B][2]
(2012) (stating that the embodiment and permanency
requirement are two separate concepts).
35 Hardy, supra note 20, at 851 (citing Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)).
36 See Liederman, supra note 31, at 298.
37 Id. at 300.
38 Id. at 298-99.
39 Id. at 299.
33
34
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Peak Computer Inc. (“MAI”),40 is to credit for establishing this framework; however, it is a standard
used when dealing specifically with Random Access
Memory (“RAM”) in a computer. In MAI, the Court’s
task was to determine whether the unauthorized reproduction of a computer’s temporary memory constituted copyright infringement. The Court held that
copies of RAM are fixed because such memory is held
long enough for a computer company service to make
a diagnosis of the problem with the computer.41 The
Ninth Circuit went further, stating that loading
software into a computer creates a RAM copy, allowing the RAM copy to be “perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated.”42
2. Transitory Duration
Like, permanency, a majority of transitory duration’s framework was established through computer technology case law. The Copyright Act, although
it mentions that fixation requires a “more than transitory duration,” has no concrete period of time that
specifies how long the reproduction must be stored or
held in the material object.43 Courts use a functional
approach to analyze transitory duration, focusing on
“what should be done with the reproduction” as opposed to the reproduction’s temporariness. This
temporal requirement must be applied and inter40 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th
Cir. 1993). Since the MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc.
decision, courts across the country have treated the Ninth
Circuit’s precedent as controlling authority. See Liederman,
supra note 31, at 290 n.11.
41 Liederman, supra note 31, at 298.
42 Id. at 299.
43 Id. at 304 (further stating that this was the consensus of
the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc.).
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preted in the context of the situation.44
In 1998, when the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) was passed, the United States
Copyright Office clarified the meaning of transitory
duration, reiterating language of the requirement in
the 1976 Copyright Act that a copy does not need to
last for any specified amount of time. 45 In the
DMCA, the United States Copyright Office extended
the functional standard for determining transitory
duration to encompass the reproductions economic
value. “[T]he economic value derived from a reproduction lies in the ability to copy, perceive or communicate it.”46 Even though the courts established a
workable, prevailing view for transitory duration, 47
there is still apprehension on implementing a temporal threshold, laying out how temporary is temporary – days, hours, minutes, seconds, or nanoseconds?48 Transitory duration in the 21st Century
makes it fundamental to challenge the liberal bounds
of this requirement based on a case’s specific factual
background.
44 Id. at 302. In the late 1990s, courts were at a consensus
that a copy could be for “the briefest of existence” in a
computer’s RAM and still support a finding of infringement. Id.
at 303 (citing Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Taho Specialty, Inc.,
55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Nev. 1999)).
45 Id. at 303-04.
46 See id. at 304 (stating that by a person making a copy of a
product, even if temporary, it clearly demonstrates the
realization that the product has economic value).
47 The Fourth Circuit established the minority test for
transitory duration that considers the function/use of the copy
requiring both, (1) “[a] qualitative aspect ‘describ[ing] the status
of the transition,’” and (2) “[a] quantitative aspect ‘describ[ing]
the period during which the function occurs.’” Liederman,
supra note 31, at 306.
48 See id. at 305.

148

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

Slaves to Copyright

II. DOES HUMAN FLESH QUALIFY AS FIXED IN A
TANGIBLE MEDIUM OF EXPRESSION?
David Nimmer, a leading scholar on Copyright, states that “live bodies do not qualify as a ‘medium of expression’ sufficient to ground copyright
protection.”49 Professionals in the tattoo industry
agree with Nimmer’s logic, believing that “[t]he image [in the skin] is just what happens to be left after
you spend a moment in time with a particular person. It’s an intangible object.”50 This Part will argue
why, based on three legal reasons, the human skin is
an intangible medium of expression and not copyrightable.51 The first two arguments will focus on
two requirements necessary for an author’s work to
be fixed within a “tangible medium of expression:”
permanency and transitory duration. The third argument recognizes that although the human flesh
may not fit perfectly into the intangible medium of
expression category, the skin’s useful and functional
nature, further supports why the skin is uncopyrightable.
A. Permanency
Permanency requires sufficient, not absolute,
permanence to provide copyright protection to a work

49 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 5; William
T. McGrath, Copyright Concerns Come with ‘Hangover’,
CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL. (June 17, 2011),
http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Law-Day/2012/04/28/LDmcgrathforum-2012.aspx.
50 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 588 (internal quotations
omitted).
51 Congress did not intend for the human flesh to serve as a
canvas that would embody legally protected authorship.
Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 10.
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of authorship.52 The human body lacks copyright
protection in a variety of areas – hair, nails, and cuticles – because of its constant evolution and
growth.53 In this Section, I will argue why the human skin does not meet the standard of sufficient
permanence because of the skin’s regenerative nature, making it an inadequate medium of expression.
Many scholars in intellectual property believe
that the human skin automatically meets the permanency requirement, deeming the skin a “tangible
medium of expression,”54 but if one examines the
anatomy of the flesh, immediate questions of doubt
arise concerning the skins true permanent nature.
The human skin constantly changes with age,
sun exposure, inhalation of toxins, and shedding of
dead skin cells on a daily basis.55 The entire human
body consists of 10 trillion cells, with 1.6 trillion of
those cells belonging to the human skin.56 On an
hourly basis, humans shed 30,000 to 40,000 skin
cells, and in a twenty-four hour period, the flesh
sheds almost one million skin cells.57 Such rapid,
52 See Liederman, supra note 31, at 298-99. The dictionary
defines sufficient as “adequate for the purpose” or “enough to
meet a need or purpose.” Sufficient, DICTONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sufficient?s=t (last
visited Feb. 1, 2014).
53 Michael M. Ratoza, More of The Hangover, U.S. IP L. (May
30, 2011, 9:46 AM), http://www.us-ip-law.com/2011/05/more-ofhangover.html.
54 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28; Perzanowski,
supra note 15, at 525; Dave Fagundes, Can You Copyright a
Nose Job?, PRAWFS BLAWG (May 28, 2011),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/can-youcopyright-a-nose-job.html.
55 See Skin, supra note 2.
56 Grabianowski, supra note 3.
57 Id. Human skin’s shedding process affects tattoos daily
because it causes bright and colorful works to fade over time.
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consistent, and extensive loss of skin cells cannot logically categorize the skin as sufficiently permanent,
as it constantly evolves, leaving its past remnants
scattered in the dust, literally.
Another area of the body58 that unlike the
flesh is notably uncopyrightable because it lacks
permanency due to its constant growth is hair. The
human head holds between 90,000 and 140,000 hair
follicles.59 These follicles grow 0.44 millimeters per
day, amounting to about one half of an inch each
month, and only six inches per year.60 Depending on
the pigment of a hair follicle, an individual will shed
between 30 to 50 single strands of hair per day,61 a
far lower amount than the skin, shedding almost one
million cells per day. Although the hair’s growth
rate is slow, hair stylists cannot claim copyright protection for specific couture hair designs or fashionable new haircuts because the of hair follicle’s constant growth and lack of permanence.62 With the
hair’s slow growth and minimal shedding process, it
is hard to imagine why the hair is not sufficiently
permanent enough to qualify as a “tangible medium
of expression,” but the human skin’s extensive shedding and adaptation to the environment, which is far
greater than the hair’s growth, still allows skin to
qualify as sufficiently permanent for body art or tat58 Human nails do not meet sufficient permanency because of
the nails rapid growth, functional nature, and upkeep of the
fingers cuticles. See id.; Ratoza, supra note 53.
59 How Quickly Does Hair Grow?, TLC (Apr. 1, 2000),
http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/style/question251.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, , 2014).
60 Id.
61 Cinya Burton, Does Your Hair Shed Too Much?,
BEAUTYLISH (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.beautylish.com/a/vcvrn/hair-shedding.
62 Ratoza, supra note 53.

151

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

Slaves to Copyright

toos.
B. Transitory Duration
Transitory duration has no bright line standard specifying the exact amount of time that a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work” must reside in a
material object to satisfy the fixation requirement. 63
Instead, courts look to the economic value held in a
reproduction.64 A layperson’s human skin, painted
with tattoo ink or restructured to boost one’s selfesteem, clearly does not hold any economic value
once the individual walks out of the author’s office.
In this Section, I will argue that human skin does
not hold economic value under the functionality
standard because many individuals do not alter their
skin for any purpose other than to please themselves.
Warner Brothers reproduced Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo in advertisement posters for The Hangover
Part II in an effort to promote65 the movie’s comedic
value and get moviegoers to pay their eight dollars 66
to see the flick on the silver screen. Warner Brothers’ incentive to reproduce Tyson’s facial tattoo on
the movie’s character, Stu Price’s face was undoubtedly to generate revenue to boost the film’s economic
success at the box office, which it did, allowing the
film to gross $138 million in the United States
Liederman, supra note 31, at 304.
See id.
65 See Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief,
supra note 8, at 5, 7.
66 Average Movie-Ticket Price Edges Up to a Record $7.93 for
2011, L.A. Times Blog (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2012/0
2/average-movie-ticket-price-2011.html. An average movie
ticket cost $8.00 in 2011 when The Hangover Part II was
released. Today, in 2014, movie tickets across the United
States probably range from $8.00 to $20.00.
63
64
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alone.67 Warner Brothers’ reproduction of Tyson’s
tattoo to achieve economic heights does not compare
to the reasons a layperson gets a tattoo. Individuals
do not walk into a tattoo parlor to get “inked” in an
effort to economically exploit the tattoo artist’s work,
but rather to get a piece of artwork on their skin that
either represents a lost loved one, signifies a military
brotherhood, embraces one’s faith or culture, symbolizes a life-changing event, or just for the love of art;
the list goes on.68 The personal reasons an individual
decides to get “inked” and the very nature of a tattoo
do not logically demonstrate that reproduction of the
product, in this case the tattoo, was for economic
value.69
In Carell v. Shubery Organizations,70 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded copyright protection for
the makeup designs of the Broadway sensation, Cats,
to the play’s makeup artist, Candace Anne Carell.
The court granted copyright protection because
Carell’s makeup designs were fixed to the faces of the
Cats actors.71 However, the constant reproduction of
67 Nikki Finke, Biggest Memorial Weekend B.O. Ever!,
DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (May 30, 2011),
http://www.deadline.com/2011/05/hangover-part-2-opens-with9m-10m-thursday-midnight-screenings-on-its-way-to-125m/.
68 Michael R. Mantell, The Psychology of Tattoos: You Think
It, They’ll Ink It: Why People Get Tattoos, SAN DIEGO MAG. (Aug.
2009), http://www.sandiegomagazine.com/San-DiegoMagazine/August-2009/The-Psychology-of-Tattoos/; Why Do
People Get Tattoos?, TATTOOED ENGINEER (May 26, 2011),
http://www.thetattooedengineer.com/2011/05/26/why-do-peopleget-tattoos/.
69 See Liederman, supra note 31, at 304.
70 Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
71 Id. at 247. Infra Part IV.B.2.
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Carell’s makeup designs in Cats held pure economic
value; had the actors not donned the makeup designs
that transformed each of them into human cats, the
show would not have grossed a record $380 million in
sales.72 Although the economic value resides in the
transformative makeup designs for this theatrical
Broadway play, performed on one of the most famous
stages in the country, an individual does not apply
makeup on a daily basis or opt to get plastic surgery
for its economic value. Individuals want, and get,
plastic surgery to increase their self-esteem, improve
unwanted imperfections, or make them happier in
their lives.73
If transitory duration’s functional
standard dictates that the reproduction of a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work” must hold economic
value to pass the fixation requirement, then a layperson’s reasoning, stated above, for surgically altering or decorating his or her skin does not qualify for
copyright protection under transitory duration, further deeming the human flesh as an intangible medium of expression.
C. Functionality of the Human Flesh
In the 21st Century, individuals around the
world utilize and transform their skin for cultural
traditions or plain aesthetics, through body art,
unique body piercings, tattoos, skin stretching, body
modifications, and plastic surgery. However, human
skin does not only serve as a surface for creative dec72 Jessee McKinley, ‘Cats,’ Broadway’s Longevity Champ, to
Close, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/20/us/cats-broadway-slongevity-champ-to-close.html.
73 Daniel J. DeNoon, Who Gets Plastic Surgery and Why,
WEBMB (Aug. 20, 2005), http://www.webmd.com/healthybeauty/news/20050830/who-gets-plastic-surgery-why.
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oration and sculptural purpose, but also serves as a
useful article having more purpose than just as a
material object meant to hold an author’s work.74
The Copyright Act defines a useful article as
“an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information,”75 meaning that
when a material object has at least one other purpose
than as a surface for an author’s original work, it
constitutes a useful article.76
In the recent The Hangover Part II case, David
Nimmer gave a deposition for Warner Brothers.77 He
discussed a “spectrum of non-expressive utility” that
helps determine the level of usefulness a material
object can hold, in relation to the human head, which
functionally is comparable to human flesh.78 The
spectrum’s first level provides an example of a surface holding the least amount of functionality – a
painting – which holds no purpose other than to depict the painting. 79 The second level is a material
substrate that does have functionality, along with
aesthetic purpose – the belt buckle.80 At the spectrum’s final level resides Mike Tyson’s head, providing minor aesthetic purposes due to Tyson’s celebrity
status, that are clearly outweighed by the immensely
important functions that the head holds because it
harbors the brain.81
Human skin falls on Nimmer’s final level of
See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 10.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
76 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 8.
77 See id.
78 Id. at 10.
79 Id. at 9.
80 Id.
81 Id.
74
75
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the “spectrum of non-expressive utility,” having minimal aesthetic purposes, paling in comparison to the
skin’s functions.82 The human skin consists of layers
of cells, glands, and nerves, functioning as our connection to the world and an outer layer of protection
against the atmosphere’s elements and microbes. 83
The skin has six primary functions that logically
demonstrate why flesh falls on the final level of
Nimmer’s spectrum: (1) heat regulation, fluctuating
the temperature of the body depending on the environment it’s in; (2) absorption, that limits the
amount of foreign substances that enter the body; (3)
secretion by the sebaceous glands, which produces oil
that helps maintain the skin’s health; (4) protection
provided by fat cells that keep an individual’s internal organs safe from trauma and acts as a barrier,
preventing against invasion by harmful bacteria; (5)
excretion of waste materials through perspiration;
and (6) sensation that allows, through nerve endings,
for individuals to experience atmospheric temperature, touch, pain, and pleasure.84
The human skin serves as much more than
just a useful article; without the skin and its various
functions the human body would literally evaporate.85 The amount of life preserving functions that
the human skin produces clearly indicates that Congress lacked any intention of labeling human flesh as
an article; therefore, demonstrating why aside from
82
83

Id. at 10.
See Skin Problems, supra note 2; see also Skin, supra note

2.
84The Functions of Human Skin, PCA SKIN,
http://www2.pcaskin.com/functions_of_human_skin.aspx (last
visited Feb. 1, 2014).
85 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 9; see
also Skin, supra note 2.
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the “tangible medium of expression,” the skin is not
copyrightable.86
III. LEGAL CONFIDENCE IN ONE’S SKIN:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE HUMAN BODY
After the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery on December 6,
1865,87 the days that human beings were the property of others ended, or so we think. Today, although
the definitional term of slavery88 does not currently
exist in this country, there is confusion surrounding

86 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 10.
Nimmer explains further that it is necessary to look outside the
“tangible medium of expression” when looking to see if the
copyrighted work is afforded copyright protection. Copyright
protection for “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural [works] that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Id. at
11. Nimmer’s theory of separability is that the copyright
protection is only afforded to works that are “physically
separable” from the medium. Nimmer demonstrates this
concept with the tattoo on Mike Tyson’s face, reasoning that the
tribal tattoo is not “physically separable” from the heavyweight
champion’s face because the tattoo became part of his body.
The only copy of the tribal tattoo resides around Tyson’s left
eye, imprinted in his face; Whitmill never drew the tattoo on
paper, but rather drew the tattoo directly on Tyson’s face. Id.
at 8, 11.
87 Primary Documents in American History: 13th Amendment
of the Constitution, LIBR. OF CONG.,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.htm
l (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
88 Slavery is defined as “a civil relationship whereby one
person has absolute power over another and controls his life,
liberty, and fortune.” Slavery, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/slavery?s=ts (last visited
Feb. 1, 2014).
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the law of the body. 89 The uncertainty of the laws
categorizes the human body as either property, quasi-property, or merely a subject of constitutional privacy rights.90 However, both property and privacy
rights – in the context of the human body – protect
two of the same interests: “the right to possess one’s
own body and the right to exclude others from it.”91
Although these interests are similar, the main difference resides in the transferability of rights to others,
which draws a thin line between an individual selling her body to a third party and self-ownership.
This presents a problem, not only during life, but after death as well, specifically when dividing rights
between close family and the interests of strangers
that hold copyright interest in another’s skin.92
This Part will discuss these two similar privacy and property interests in the human body, and
their relationship to a copyright holder’s property
rights, demonstrating why many scholars suggest
that an individual’s personal rights in her own body
supersede copyright law.93
A. Classifying the Body as Property
Traditionally, property rights consist of a
“bundle of rights” (also conceptualized as a “bundle of
sticks”) owned by the person relative to the particu-

89 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body,
80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 363 (2000).
90 Id. at 363.
91 Id. at 366-67.
92 Id. at 369.
93 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28 (stating that this
logic applies to tattoos and plastic surgery).
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lar object.94 These rights include:
the right to possess one’s property, the
right to use it, the right to exclude others,
the right to transfer ownership by gift or
by sale, the right to dispose of one’s property after death, and the right not to have
one’s property expropriated by the government without payment or compensation.95

The United States Supreme Court consistently
holds that the most essential “stick” in the “bundle of
rights” is an individual’s right to exclude others.96
Further, “property rights are body rights that protect
the choice to transfer.”97 Its importance is relevant
when discussing copyright protection in relation to
an individual’s property rights in her own body. 98
Traditionally, property law does not recognize the
human body as concrete property; therefore looking
at the Framers’ intent behind the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution, coupled with the
philosophical opinion by John Locke, will help establish a framework for establishing an individual’s
rights in her body.99
The Framers of the United States Constitution
94 Rao, supra note 89, at 389. Each “right” or “stick” in the
bundle represents a particular property right held by an
individual.
95 Id. at 370.
96 Id. at 424.
97 Id. at 367 n.16.
98 See id. at 367.
99 Paul Filon, Who Owns You? Property Right in the Human
Body, SPRIEGEL & ASSOC. (Feb. 15, 2010),
http://gotopatentlawfirm.com/2010/02/15/who-owns-youproperty-rights-in-the-human-body/.
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never intended property’s “bundle of rights” to include property rights or interests in the human
body.100 This intention is prevalent in the language
of the Fourth101 and Fifth Amendments,102 which indicate people are improper mediums in which to hold
any property interests.103 Compared to the Framers’
intent, a copyright holder’s proprietary control over
his or her work, constitutionally, could not extend to
works in human flesh because individuals are protected by privacy not property interests in their
body.104
One of the great philosophers, John Locke,105
expands on the Framers’ intent that an individual
cannot hold property interest in another’s body, with
one of the first influential theories on the subject
matter. Locke’s theory explicitly states that the human body is a form of property controlled by its owner, endowing that individual with all ownership of
property rights that reside in human skin.106 His be100 Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personality:
Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX L. REV. 209,
220 (1990).
101 Infra Part III.B.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property.”).
103 Bray, supra note 100, at 220-21 (people and property are
two distinct categories).
104 Id. at 221.
105 John Locke is known for being one of the greatest
European philosophers in the 17th Century. Locke graduated
from University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, England and
was a prestigious medical researcher. His most famous and
widely recognized work is The Second Treatise of Government,
published in Two Treatises of Government. William Uzgalis,
John Locke, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta, ed. 2012), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/locke/.
106 Rao, supra note 89, at 367.
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lief is that an individual “literally owns one’s [own]
limbs.”107 His widely recognized theory, coupled with
the Framers’ intent, solidifies that the only individual capable, under the law, of owning property rights
in the human body is the person whom possesses its
physical being. Furthermore, the United States government codified this argument by passing the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits individuals from
owning another individual as property.108
With all the above evidence, an author’s property rights in a work are seemingly protected by copyright law, specifically when an author creates a
“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work” using the human skin as her canvas. Logically, this right cannot
trump the fundamental rights of the Constitution
that allows individuals to exclude others from holding a proprietary interest in the body.
B. Classifying the Body as a Privacy Interest
Like property rights, privacy rights encompass
a “cluster of personal interests.”109 However, the
United States Constitution protects an individual’s
privacy rights, rather than the basic rules of property
under the Fourth Amendment,110 which states that
American citizens have the right “to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”111 Privacy
consists of two fundamental rights: (1) personal privacy, also known as bodily integrity, and (2) relation-

107 Id. at 367 n.19 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 965 (1982)) (internal
quotations omitted).
108 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1. Infra Part IV.
109 Rao, supra note 89, at 389.
110 Id. at 387.
111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Bray, supra note 100, at 220.
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ship privacy.112 This Section will focus on the first
principal, the personal right to privacy that provides
an individual the right to restrict third parties from
intruding or physically altering the individual’s human body.113
“[P]rivacy envisions the body as an integral
Part of the person”114 entitling the human body to
protection because it is a physical embodiment of the
person.115 Professor Daniel Ortiz,116 explains that
constitutional privacy rights establish “a sphere of
individual dominion,” disallowing interference of
others without consent and creating a “dominion over
oneself. It defines a sphere of self-control, a sphere
of decision-making authority about oneself, from
which one can presumptively exclude others.”117
Such complete control over one’s body collides
head on with permitting human skin to stand as a
“tangible medium of expression.”118 The collision of
rights presents itself if a court orders an injunction 119
forcing an individual sporting a copyright holder’s
body art, tattoo, or piercing, to – or not to – remove

Rao, supra note 89, at 388.
Id. at 389.
114 Id. at 444.
115 Id. at 445.
116 Professor Daniel Ortiz received his Juris Doctor from Yale
Law School in 1983. He currently teaches constitutional law
and legal theory at Virginia Law School. Daniel R. Ortiz, U.
VA. SCHOOL OF L.,
http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/Faculty.nsf/FHPbI/119647
7 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
117 Rao, supra note 89, at 428.
118 See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on
the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and
Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 121-22 (2003).
119 Infra Part IV.A.
112
113
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the author’s work.120 Copyright owners hold moral
rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”),
which protects the integrity of their work from destruction, alterations, and distortions.121 However,
any injunction favoring the copyright holder in respect to another’s bodily integrity would create a
“substantial bodily intrusion” under the Fourth
Amendment.122
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates why
such a standard is applicable in Winston v. Lee.123
The court ruled that ordering a bullet lodged in the
defendant’s chest be surgically removed from his
body, for evidentiary purposes, despite the accused’s
objections, constituted an “extensive intrusion” on
the defendant’s fundamental interests of personal
privacy and bodily integrity interests. 124 The Supreme Court’s holding brings to light the lack of differences between an injunction ordering surgical removal of a tattoo through laser surgery and one ordering the surgical removal of a bullet from a person’s body. To allow a copyright holder to obtain a
remedy ordering surgical removals of this nature not
only gives the copyright holder a right to control another person by invading on their privacy rights, it
also provides the author with more rights than those
laid out in the 1976 Copyright Act.125 Therefore, a
copyright holder’s property rights in a work imprinted on another’s skin should never supersede an individual’s fundamental privacy rights to resist third
Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 121.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
122 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 123.
123 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Rao, supra note 89, at
396.
124 Lee, 470 U.S. at 753; Rao, supra note 89, at 396.
125 See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 121.
120
121
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party invasions or physical alterations of their body.
IV. MODERN SLAVERY THROUGH THE 1976
COPYRIGHT ACT
The Thirteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution states, “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.”126
Copyright is a constant balancing act; its largest challenge centers around the author’s right to
control her property versus the amount of access that
is in the public’s interest.127 The balance of these interests presents a huge problem under the Thirteenth Amendment, particularly when enforcing the
control an author holds over their work in another’s
skin under section 106,128 and the court’s ability to
issue injunctive relief for infringements of an author’s work under section 106A,129 also known as
VARA.130 The consequences of enforcing these rights
would defy the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition
of servitude, rehashing slavery and putting courts in
the position of “21st Century judicial slave masters.”131 The Section below will examine the disastrous effect, while showing why Congress should relax the fixation requirement.
A. Virtual Slave Masters
Today, unlike 200 years ago, the human race
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Bogden, supra note 16, at 187.
128 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). Infra Part IV.A.
129 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). Infra Part IV.B.
130 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
131 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 4, 11.
126
127
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believes slavery to be repugnant and even difficult to
fathom how human beings were once considered
property of another individual.132 Although the public has current distaste for the slavery that occurred
200 years ago, the possibility of modern day slave
masters, today, is very real in the intellectual property arena. Modern intellectual property apologists
say that, “the work themselves are not property, but
the right to use them are.”133 This quote, in short,
exemplifies the dangers of allowing copyright’s fixation requirement to label human skin as a valid
“tangible medium of expression.” Such dangers lie
within the exclusive rights granted to an author after
the fixation requirement is satisfied, which allows
the copyright holder to control the uses of her
work.134 As noted, hereinabove, section 106 grants
the copyright owner exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce
the copyrighted work; (2) to prepare derivative works
(known as adaptation rights); (3) to publish the copyrighted work by distribution; (4) to perform the copyrighted work; (5) to publicly display the copyrighted
work; and (6) to perform the copyrighted work publicly through digital audio transmission. 135 These
rights give the creator complete control of over what
is done with their work.
Copyright protection affords a copyright holder
property rights in that particular work. If the author
owns a work it gives that owner the right to control
that property to the extent of the exclusive rights
132 Nina Paley, Redefining Property: Lessons from American
History, QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG (2009),
http://questioncopyright.org/redefining_property (last visited
Nov. 3, 2012).
133 Id.
134 See Hardy, supra note 20, at 859.
135 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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granted in section 106. 136 However, I believe that if
the author’s work resides in another individual’s
human skin, it could permit the copyright holder to
control the daily activities of any human being that
bears an author’s intellectual property. The lack of
boundaries set forth in the Copyright Act could result in authors ordering individuals to refrain from
appearing on television or stopping people from getting their pictures taken,137 bringing into play the potential for plastic surgeons, professional piercers, or
tattoo artists to become modern day slave masters,
dictating the literal moves that an individual can
make on a daily basis.
The Hangover Part II case presented a close
example of this dilemma because Tyson, prior to getting his facial tattoo, signed a general tattoo release
agreement with his tattoo artist, Whitmill. The release agreement stated, “I [Mike Tyson,] understand
that all artwork, sketches, and drawings related to
my tattoo and any photographs of my tattoo are
property of Paradox-Studio of Dermagraphics.”138
This release limits Tyson’s ability to display his face
in public;139 and based on this language, Whitmill
holds property rights in any photographs taken of
Tyson’s face. Although minimal, this language still
See Hardy, supra note 20, at 858.
See Can You Copyright the Human Body?: Transcript, ON
THE MEDIA (June 3, 2011),
http://www.onthemedia.org/2011/jun/03/can-you-copyrighthuman-body/transcript/.
138 Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, supra
note 8, at Exhibit 3 (Tattoo Release Form). Whitmill ultimately
sued only Warner Brothers for violating his exclusive rights
through using, reproducing, creating a derivative work, and
putting the tribal tattoo on public display in its advertising. Id.
at 6-7.
139 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 529.
136
137
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gives Whitmill the authority to prevent magazines
from publishing pictures taken of Tyson and even
may require magazines to compensate him for the
use of a photograph of the heavyweight champion.
This dilemma is comparable to a 19th Century
slave code – “no slave shall be allowed to work for
pay”140 – that has the realistic capability of creeping
its way into copyright law. In Whitmill’s authoritative position as the copyright owner of Tyson’s facial
tattoo, it allows him to control Tyson’s career moves
and receive compensation for Tyson’s labor. This
control of property rights in any author’s work, not
just Whitmill, has the capability to negatively influence a person’s livelihood,141 dictating the class
standard and means that an individual bearing an
author’s copyrighted work can live. Such control
mirrors the 19th Century slave master’s control over
a person, allowing the copyright author to reap all
the benefits of an individual’s labor while financially
crippling the individual bearing the author’s work.142
Rasheed Wallace, an NBA player, appeared in
a Nike commercial where he explained the meaning
behind the tattoos that reside on both of his arms.143
The commercial zoomed in on the player’s Egyptian
inspired tattoo of his family, recreating it through
140 See CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA: THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A CHRONOLOGY 27-28 (1998).
141 “Publicity enables a person to profit from their public
persona by selling or otherwise exploiting commercially
intangible body assets.” Rao, supra note 89, at n.30.
142 David Nimmer “worried that the derivative work right
could give Whitmill some say over other tattoos Tyson might
choose to apply to his face.” Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 529;
see Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12.
143 Robjv1, Rasheed Wallace NBA Finals Nike Commercial,
YOUTUBE (June 26, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqmRu34PXrU.
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computerized simulation.144 Wallace’s tattoo artist
Matthew Reed saw the commercial and sued Wallace145 for contributory infringement based on the
basketball star claiming ownership rights in his tattooed skin.146 Reed asserted his reproduction and
public display rights against Wallace for making a
career decision to appear in the Nike commercial,
which for a professional athlete is normal publicity.147
Reed’s attempt to control Wallace’s tattooed
forearm, demonstrates the dangers of a copyright
holder becoming a modern day slave master when
owning property interest in another’s skin. Reed’s
charge of contributory infringement against Wallace
shows how Reed attempted to reinforce his proprietary ownership and dictate the ways that Wallace
can use his own arms in advertisements. Reed’s
slave master tendencies, like Whitmill’s with Tyson’s
facial tattoo, have the capability to affect Wallace’s
likelihood of sustaining future publicity and income,
comparable to the slave code in the 19th Century that
banned slaves from receiving compensation for their
labor.
The problem does not stop with the original
author of a copyright from holding the capability to
prevent an individual bearing their work of author144 See Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. CV 05 198 2005 WL 1182840
(D. Or. Feb. 10, 2005); see also Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos
and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and
Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313,
316 (2006).
145 Reed also sued Nike, Inc. and the advertising agency that
came up with the commercial’s concept. Harkins, supra note
144, at 316.
146 See id. at 317.
147 See id. at 316.
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ship in public, but copyrights, like all property, can
constantly be sold to non-authors. Consequently,
strangers, unknown to the individual bearing any
work of authorship on the human skin, could appear
and limit the individual from using her body in a way
that constitutionally endowed to her. 148
Looking at copyright’s largest challenge of
balancing interests, permitting Congress to believe
that human skin as a viable medium of expression is
acceptable does not balance a copyright owner’s interest against the interests of the public, but deems
the author’s property rights more important than the
freedom of the American people. Ignorance of this
potential problem could lead to copyright holders becoming modern day slave masters, controlling every
move of individuals bearing their work on their skin.
B. Slave to the Court: Enforcing
Copyright Remedies
The problematic reality of courts favoring a
copyright holder’s work in another’s skin, whether
that be body art, tattoos, body modification, plastic
surgery, or body piercings, resides in the court’s remedial enforcement, specifically injunctive relief, of
an author’s moral rights.149 Section 106A, known as
VARA, provides copyright owners, of visual works,
morals rights protecting the integrity and attribution
of their work of authorship from, “(A) any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation,”150 and “(B) any destruction of a work
of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly
Fagundes, supra note 54.
Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 119.
150 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
148
149

169

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

Slaves to Copyright

negligent destruction of that work is a violation of
that right.”151
The list of legal concerns is extensive and invades an individual’s basic constitutional rights.
First, an author’s copyright protection in another’s
skin could result in a court preventing the individual, to whom the body belongs, from obtaining another
plastic surgeon or tattoo artist to modify the poor
workmanship of the original author as that would
violate the copyright holder’s adaptation rights.152
Courts could prevent individuals from going
out in public or force one to cover up an area on the
body containing the copyright holder’s work; this
presents a real dilemma if the individual is a celebrity because such an order could prevent that person
from appearing on television, magazine covers, or
films.153 Further, courts have the power to order the
individual bearing the copyright holder’s work to retain or remove a tattoo, causing the individual to forever wear an unwanted piece of work or undergo laser removal surgery, possibly leaving permanent
remnants of the tattoo on the bearer’s body through
scarring.154 The arguments below show why a court
should not order the above remedies and deem human flesh as an intangible medium of expression,
avoiding the American court system from being la-

17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2012).
See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 120.
153 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 12; see
also Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 120.
154 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 12.
Courts wanting to avoid being labeled slave masters and
violating an individual’s constitutional rights may opt to avoid
injunctive relief by ordering relief in the form of monetary
damages. See also Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 122.
151
152
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beled as a “21st Century judicial slave master.” 155
1. Market Recognition
It is evident that human flesh serves an aesthetic purpose,156 as a means for individual expression, and a basis for survival. The 1976 Copyright
Act does not make mention of whether skin is a “tangible medium of expression” or generally copyrightable,157 but the market of those individuals that adorn
human flesh with colors and individualism hold a
uniform consensus on the subject.158 I will demonstrate why Congress should declare skin as an intangible medium of expression based on the tattoo and
piercing159 industry’s aversion to copyright ownership
155 This remedy problem does not just arise with the courts,
but also with third parties. Under VARA a copyright holder’s
property rights in another’s skin does not just involve
individuals bearing the author’s work, but, in context of tattoos,
can implicate third party doctors hired to remove unwanted
artworks. See Timothy C. Bradley, The Copyright Implications
of Tattoos: Why Getting Inked Can Get You into Court, 29 ENT.
& SPORTS L. 1, 2 (2011), available at
http://www.coatsandbennett.com/images/pdf/the-copyrightimplications-of-tattoos.pdf. For example, Mike Tyson hires a
doctor to perform laser tattoo removal on his face because he
wants to rid himself of his infamous facial tattoo. Once Tyson’s
doctor starts to laser off Tyson’s tattoo, he becomes susceptible
to liability under VARA for destruction of another copyright
holder’s work. Id. at 2-3; Fagundes, supra note 54.
156 See Bradley, supra note 155, at 2.
157 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 15.
158 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 532.
159 Marisa Kakoulas, The Tattoo Copyright Controversy, BME
ZINE.COM (Dec. 8, 2003), http://news.bme.com/2003/12/08/thetattoo-copyright-controversy-guest-column/ (Professional
piercer, Martin William McPherson comments on courts issuing
injunctions for copyright infringement of tattoos stating that it,
“[s]ounds dangerously like State control over our bodies, . . .
Isn’t that what many of us are fighting against? Aren’t we
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in a client’s skin.
Tattoo artists uniformly acknowledge that after finishing a client’s tattoo, complete control over
that tattoo shifts to the client’s “bundle of sticks.” 160
Artists in the tattoo industry recognize the individuality and constitutional freedoms that clients possess
in their bodies, which is why the inking industry
throws its section 106 exclusive rights out the window, and embraces ownership rights that specifically
favor their clients. Tattoo artists do not care to have
a “piece of the pie” after their clients walk out the
door of their tattoo shop. Typical tattoo artists do
not file copyright infringement lawsuits when a client reproduces their tattoo for commercial purposes,
uploads a picture of their new ink to a social media
website to show the world, walks around in public
with their inked skin on display,161 or sends a photograph of their permanent, meaningful, artwork to a
magazine for publication.162
(some of us) trying to claim our bodies as our own?” (internal
quotations omitted)).
160 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 532.
161 “[A] tattoo artist cannot reasonably expect to control all
public displays of his or her work.” Bradley, supra note 155, at
2. The tattoo artist, Matthew Reed, tattooed Rasheed Wallace,
an NBA player. Reed later sued for copyright infringement,
however, prior to this suit, he “expected that the tattoo would
be publically displayed on Wallace’s arm and conceded that
such exposure would be considered common in the tattoo
industry.” Harkins, supra note 144, at 316.
162 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 537 (rehashing a tattoo
artist’s positive and not legally entangling story when one of his
clients wanted to put the image of his tattoo on the front cover
of his upcoming compact disc). Contra tattoo artists are not of a
consensus that a client can take the tattoo design and use the
tattoo as work for a clothing line disconnected to from the body.
One tattoo artist said: “if [a client] wanted to then take [the
tattoo design] and give it to a graphic artist and have him turn
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When asked the question of whether a tattoo
artist had any control over a client’s tattoo, the response of a female tattoo artist captured the essence
of my arguments set forth in Part III:
It’s not mine anymore. You own that, you
own your body. I don’t own that anymore. I
own the image, because I have [the drawing] taped up on my wall and I took a picture of it. That’s as far as my ownership
goes. [Claiming control over the client’s use
of tattoo is] ridiculous. That goes against
everything that tattooing is. A tattoo is an
affirmation that is your body . . . that you
own your own self, because you’ll put whatever you want on your own body. For
somebody else [(the tattoo artist)] to say,
“Oh no, I own part of that. That’s my arm.”
No, it’s not your . . . arm, it’s my [(the tattoo
bearer’s)] . . . arm. Screw you.”163

Tattoo artists encourage clients to incorporate
future work into present tattoos or destroy and replace original tattoos executed badly by an artist,
disregarding their moral rights in section 106A. 164
The tattoo industry does not seek permission from
the original tattoo artist of a new client, to make corrections or incorporations to an unacceptable piece of
ink, as is necessary in formal copyright law to create
it into an image [for a commercial use], then I’d feel like I
should get some kind of compensation for it. But if it was just a
photo of the tattoo, even if it’s the centerpiece [of an
advertisement], I’m OK with that.” Id. at 538.
163 Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 536 (alterations in
original). Tattoo artists looked for new clients to gain prior
client’s permission when the new client wants an identical
custom tattoo already “inked” on a prior client. Id. at 539.
164 See id. at 25.
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a derivative work.165 This industry norm further
demonstrates that professionals in the field of body
art believe that any property rights in a client’s tattooed limbs reside exclusively in the client’s “bundle
of rights.” Although the tattoo industry’s response to
ownership of the client’s artwork covered limb legally, in the copyright world, is viewed as the copyright
author informally waiving166 her section 106 and
106A rights, it still demonstrates that the industry
acknowledges formal copyright law, but will not adhere to it. Congress should recognize this countrywide lack of adherence and deem an individual’s skin
as an intangible medium of expression belonging to
the individual whom it literally protects.
2. Lack of Recognition
Did Congress really want copyright law to cover human skin?167 The Copyright Act as of 1976 did
not list tattoos as a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work” capable of gaining copyright registration. 168
The Act’s lack of guidance in providing copyright protection to tattoos can lead to the inference that Congress never intended for human skin to pass as a valid “tangible medium of expression” because of the potential slavery implications.169 In 1955, when Congress first decided to revise the 1909 Copyright Act,
See id. at 26.
For an author to effectively waive his or her rights the
waiver must be: (1) “reflected in a written instrument signed by
the artist,” (2) “expressly agreeing to the waiver, and” (3)
“specifically identifying the work and uses of the work to which
the waiver applies.” MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[D] (2012)
167 Can You Copyright the Human Body?, supra note 137.
168 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 15.
169 See id. at 16.
165
166
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Congress compiled seventeen volumes of legislative
materials, and not one volume contained a single reference to human skin.170
The judicial system has never had the privilege to decide a case dealing with human skin’s copyrightability.171 The courts came close in the 2000
case, Carell v. Shubery Organization, Inc.,172 holding
in a motion to dismiss that the plaintiff’s makeup designs for the actors in the Broadway play Cats “contain[ed] the requisite degree of originality, and are
fixed in a tangible form on the faces of the Cats actors.”173 However, on this matter the parties settled
outside of court.174 Two more cases, Whitmill v.
Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. and Reed v. Nike, Inc.,175 held the capability of putting meat on this
legal issue, but both parties in these cases settled
outside of court, just as in Carell. The judge hinted
in Whitmill that tattoos and human skin can receive
copyright protection, but this statement holds no
weight until it appears in an opinion by a judge establishing legal precedent.176
The lack of intent and evidence by Congress to
label human skin as a “tangible medium of expression” in the 1976 Copyright Act, in addition to the
passing of the Thirteenth Amendment, demonstrates
Congress’ avoidance of the issue based on the disasSee id.
This statement is true for both before and after the passing
of the 1976 Copyright Act.. Id. at 17.
172 Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc.,104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
173 Id. at 247.
174 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 29.
175 Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. CV 05 198 2005 WL 1182840 (D. Or.
Feb. 10, 2005).
176 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 29.
170
171
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trous consequences that such a label could create.
Congress needs to recognize its lack of recognition,
along with the tattoo industry’s recognition that skin
belongs to the individual that possesses and resides
in it. Congress must label human skin an unacceptable medium for copyrights in order to avoid the
courts from indemnifying people bearing tattoos,
piercings, or undergoing plastic surgery into copyright-based slavery for the life of the tattoo artist,
piercer, or plastic surgeon, plus seventy years after
the death of the creator.177
CONCLUSION
Congress’ lack of recognition and the judiciary’s inability to establish legal precedent surrounding the copyrightability of human flesh conjures up
the opinions of many scholars in the intellectual
property field to speak out about the disastrous consequences of branding human skin as a “tangible
medium of expression.” Based on the arguments
throughout this Article, Congress must produce legislation amending the 1976 Copyright Act to explicitly categorize skin as an intangible medium of expression in an effort to avoid the fatality of courts establishing “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works” in
skin as copyrightable, allowing judges to act as “21st
Century judicial slave masters.”

177 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (codifying that the life of the author
plus seventy years provision only applies only to works created
on or after January 1, 1978).

176

PACE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
PACE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT
LAW FORUM
Volume 4

Winter 2014

Issue 1

Article
Shutting Down the Pharmacy on
Wheels: Will Lance Armstrong’s
Admission Impact the Practice of
Doping in Professional Cycling?
Kristina Fretwell*

* Kristina Fretwell received her J.D., summa cum laude, from
California Western School of Law in December 2013. During
law school she was a member of the Sports and Entertainment
Law Society and served as a senior editor for the California
Western Law Review/International Law Journal. She
previously received her Bachelor of Arts, cum laude, in Political
Science with a split minor in Philosophy and History from the
University of Arizona in May 2001. Ms. Fretwell would like to
thank her husband, Bob Fretwell, for introducing her to the
sport of cycling and serving as an inspiration for this piece.

177

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

Pharmacy on Wheels

Abstract
Lance Armstrong was one of the sport’s greatest heroes and his doping admission shook the American public to its core. Although professional cyclists
are sanctioned for violating anti-doping rules on an
almost regular basis, the investigation and lifetime
ban of Lance Armstrong highlighted the serious
problems facing the sport. Increased efforts to police
drug use in cycling appear to be ineffective; however,
as Armstrong’s situation may reveal, private lawsuits have the potential to serve as a new and additional deterrent to cheating in the future.
The aftermath of Armstrong’s admission has
led to bickering of the major regulatory agencies,
leading the general public to question whether the
sport will ever be clean. This Article explores the
impact Armstrong’s doping admission might have on
the sport of professional cycling in the future, as well
as the history of doping in cycling.
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INTRODUCTION
After a doping scandal rocked the 1998 Tour
de France, a leading expert on gene doping and drug
testing commented that “[t]he Tour debacle has finally made it acceptable to say in public and without
provocation what many have known for a long time,
namely, that long-distance cycling has been the most
consistently drug-soaked sport of the twentieth century.”1
Although the regulatory landscape has
changed dramatically since Hoberman uttered this
statement fifteen years ago, doping continues to envelop the sport of professional cycling today. In fact,
since 1995, only four winners of the Tour de France,
cycling’s most famous race, have not become embroiled in controversies involving performanceenhancing drugs.2
1 John Hoberman, A Pharmacy on Wheels – The Tour De
France Doping Scandal, MESO-RX (Nov. 15, 1998),
http://thinksteroids.com/articles/festina-tour-de-france-dopingscandal/.
2 See Ian Austen, 2010 Tour de France Winner Found Guilty
of Doping, N.Y, TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/sports/cycling/albertocontador-found-guilty-of-doping.html?_r=0. Since 1995, Carlos
Sastre, Cadel Evans, Bradley Wiggins, and Chris Froome are
the only Tour de France winners who have not tested positive,
admitted to the use of, or were sanctioned for the use of
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In 2012 alone, the United States Anti-Doping
Agency sanctioned seventeen American cyclists for
the use of performance-enhancing substances.3 One
of the sanctioned cyclists was Lance Armstrong, the
only individual to have won seven Tour de France
titles in the history of the sport.4 Shortly after being
banned from professional cycling for life, Armstrong
admitted using performance-enhancing substances
throughout his entire professional career.5 Not only
did his admission highlight the crisis facing the
sport, it caused tension among the major regulatory
bodies in the world, including the International Cycling Union and the World Anti-Doping Agency, as
they grappled with the aftermath. 6
Although the international community has attempted to rid cycling of drug use through the enactment of new drug testing techniques and strictliability enforcement of anti-doping rules,7 the presperformance-enhancing drugs. See Alan McLean et. al., Top
Finishers of the Tour de France Tainted by Doping, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/08/24/sports/topfinishers-of-the-tour-de-france-tainted-by-doping.html; Daniel
Benson, No Positive Doping Tests at 2013 Tour de France,
CYCLINGNEWS (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/no-positive-doping-tests-at2013-tour-de-france.
3 Sanctions, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY,
http://www.usada.org/sanctions/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
4 Id.; see also Tour de France Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 6, 2013,
4:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/world/europe/tour-defrance-fast-facts/.
5 Lance Armstrong, Biography, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL,
http://www.biography.com/print/profile/lance-armstrong9188901 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
6 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
7 See generally World Anti-Doping Code, WORLD ANTI-DOPING
AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-
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sure to break records and win races continues to entice athletes to engage in sophisticated doping programs. Despite efforts to police the sport, athletes
continue to use performance-enhancing substances in
alarming numbers, threatening cycling’s credibility
as a competitive sport. 8 Further, many athletes that
have been suspended for anti-doping violations in the
past continue to compete today, undermining the image that the international community is truly working to rid the sport of cheating.9
Shortly after he admitted using performanceenhancing substances throughout his career, Armstrong was sued by insurance companies and former
sponsors.10 Additionally, the United States Department of Justice joined a whistleblower lawsuit
against Armstrong for defrauding the federal government.11 This Article explores the history of doping in cycling, as well as the impact of Armstrong’s
admission on the sport. Although increased efforts to
police drug use in cycling appear to be ineffective, as
Armstrong’s situation may reveal, private lawsuits
have the potential to serve as a new and additional
deterrent against cheating in the future.

Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/The-Code/ (last
updated May 2011).
8 See Sanctions, supra note 3.
9 See discussion infra Part III.
10 Michael O’Keeffe, Lance Armstrong Faces Another Lawsuit
as Acceptance Insurance Coming After the Disgraced Cyclist for
$3M Claiming Fraud & Breach of Contract, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Mar. 2, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/iteam/disgraced-lance-faces-lawsuit-fraud-article-1.1277096.
11 Juliet Macur, Armstrong Facing Two More Lawsuits, N.Y,
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/sports/cycling/lancearmstrong-is-facing-another-lawsuit.html.
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I. THE HISTORY OF MODERN DOPING
The use of performance enhancing substances
is not a new phenomenon. The history of modern
doping can be traced back to the early nineteenth
century when cyclists and other endurance athletes
began using substances such as caffeine, cocaine,
strychnine, and alcohol to complete competitive endeavors.12 Athletes in ancient Greece were known to
have used special diets and herb concoctions to gain
a competitive edge while participating in the Olympic Games.13 The first death attributed to doping occurred in the sport of cycling in 1896, when English
cyclist Arthur Linton died due to ephedrine intake
during a race from Boudreaux to Paris.14 By the early 1920’s, doping was prevalent in international
sport; however it wasn’t until 1928 that the International Association of Athletics Foundations first
banned the use of stimulating substances.15 The restrictions were largely ineffective, though, because
doping tests were not performed.16 In 1960, the
death of Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen during competition at the Olympic Games increased the
pressure on sports authorities to institute drug test12 See A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING
AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA/History/ABrief-History-of-Anti-Doping/ (last updated June 2010); see also
Hoberman, supra note 1.
13 Id.; History of Doping, TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN,
http://www.doping-prevention.de/doping-in-general/history-ofdoping.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
14 History of Doping, supra note 13; Paul Cartmell, Lance
Armstrong Ban Part of Long History of Doping in Cycling,
YAHOO SPORTS (Aug. 24, 2012, 5:47 PM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/lance-armstrong-ban-part-longhistory-doping-cycling-214700698.html.
15 A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 12.
16 Id.
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ing.17
In 1966, the International Cycling Union
(UCI) and the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) introduced doping tests in their
respective World Championships, and the next year
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) established its Medical Commission and its first list of
prohibited substances.18
Despite these developments, another cyclist, Tom Simpson, died in 1967
during the Tour de France, due to the use of amphetamines and alcohol.19 International Sport Federations continued to implement more stringent antidoping measures throughout the following years;
however, as doping procedures became more sophisticated, sports agencies struggled to find reliable
testing methods.20
In 1998, the doping crisis in professional cycling reached new heights. Three days before the
start of the Tour de France, one of the top teams in
the world, Festina, was expelled after a team car was
found to contain large quantities of doping products,
including the banned blood-booster erythropoietin
(EPO) and human growth hormone.21 In response,
the IOC convened the First World Conference on AnId.
Id.
19 Id. See also Tom Simpson Biography, CYCLING INFO,
http://cyclinginfo.co.uk/cyclists/british/tom-simpson-biography/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
20 See A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 12.
21 See Robyn J. Rosen, Breaking the Cycle: Balancing the
Eradication of Doping From International Sport While
Upholding the Rights of the Accused Athlete, 25 ENT, & SPORTS
LAW. 3, 4 (2007); see also Festina Affair Casts Shadow on Tour
de France, DNA (July 3, 2008),
http://www.dnaindia.com/sport/report_festina-affair-castsshadow-on-tour-de-france_1175462.
17
18
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ti-Doping in February 1999, and established the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) on November
10, 1999.22
A. The World Anti-Doping Agency
WADA is an independent international body,
whose mission is to “promote health, fairness and
equality for athletes worldwide by working to ensure
harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping
programs at the international level . . .”23 To provide
a framework for harmonized anti-doping policies,
rules, and regulations, WADA adopted the World Anti-Doping Code (the “Code”) in January 2004.24 The
Code works in conjunction with five International
Standards that govern technical and operational areas, and is comprised of the Prohibited List, Testing,
Laboratories, Therapeutic Use Exemptions, and Protection of Privacy and Personal Information.25 The
Code takes a strict liability approach to doping violations: riders need not intend to enhance their own
performance, or even ingest a banned substance, to
receive sanctions.26
More than fifty nations, including the United
See A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 12.
Sir Craig Reedie, President’s Welcome Message, WORLD
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/AboutWADA/Presidents-Welcome-Message/ (last updated Jan. 2014).
24 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 7.
25 International Standards, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY,
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-DopingProgram/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/InternationalStandards/ (last updated Oct. 2009).
26 See WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE §§ 2.1.1 cmt., 2.2.2 cmt.,
4.2.2 cmt. (World Anti-Doping Agency 2009), available at
http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_AntiDoping_Program/WADP-The-Code/WADA_AntiDoping_CODE_2009_EN.pdf.
22
23
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States, and 500 sports organizations, have signed the
Code and adopted the rules and regulations established by WADA.27 In 2004, cycling was the final
Olympic sport to adopt the Code.28 Code signatories
must ensure that their own rules and policies are in
compliance with the anti-doping principles articulated by the Code. 29
B. Implementation of the Biological Passport
Traditional anti-doping efforts focused on direct detection of prohibited substances through the
use of urine and blood tests.30 As doping methods
became more sophisticated, use of traditional analytical tests did not always detect the use of substances
on an intermittent or low-dose basis, new substances,
or modifications of prohibited substances.31 WADA
began researching different methods of detection after a dozen athletes were suspended from the 2006
Olympic Games for heightened hemoglobin levels. 32
Rosen, supra note 21, at 5.
Id.
29 Id.
30Questions & Answers on Athlete Biological Passport, WORLD
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wadaama.org/en/Resources/Q-and-A/Athlete-Biological-Passport/
(last updated Sept. 2011) (expand “What modules compose the
Athlete Biological Passport (ABP)?”).
31 See id. (expand “Does the ABP replace traditional doping
control?”).
32 Juliet Macur, Cycling Union Takes Leap in Fight Against
Doping, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/sports/othersports/24cyclin
g.html?_r=2&. Ahead of the 2007 Tour de France, Ivan Basso
received a two-year suspension after confessing to attempted
doping and team Astana fired German rider Matthias Kessler
after his “B” sample confirmed a positive doping test from April
of that same year. Doping Incidents Ahead of and During 2007
Tour de France, USA TODAY (July 28, 2007),
27
28
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After a series of doping scandals nearly overtook the
2007 Tour de France, WADA, in conjunction with the
UCI, held a two-day summit to discuss a new biological passport program.33 The new program gathers
information from riders through a series of blood
tests to provide baseline levels for certain biological
markers.34 Variations in those levels would then be
assessed for potential blood manipulation.35 The
UCI became the first International Sport Federation
to introduce the biological passport program in
2008.36
C. Disciplinary Process
As cycling’s International Federation, the organization that administers and promotes the sport,
the International Cycling Union (UCI), has testing
jurisdiction over all athletes who participate in its

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/cycling/2007-07-283813791501_x.htm. During the 2007 Tour, Patrik Sinkewitz
dropped out after testing positive for high levels of testosterone;
Alexandre Vinokourov, along with team Astana, was forced out
of the race after Vinokourov tested positive for a banned blood
transfusion after his 13th stage time trial victory; Italian rider
Cristian Moreni tested positive for testosterone and withdrew
from the race, along with his entire Cofidis team; and the Dutch
Rabobank team removed overall leader Michael Rasmussen for
lying about his whereabouts before the Tour. Id.
33 Macur, Cycling Union Takes Leap in Fight Against Doping,
supra note 32.
34 Id.; see Information on the Biological Passport, UNION
CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/ENews/ENewsDetails.asp?MenuId=
&id=NTQzOA.
35 See Macur, Cycling Union Takes Leap in Fight Against
Doping, supra note 32; see also Information on the Biological
Passport, supra note 34.
36 Information on the Biological Passport, supra note 34.
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events.37 Additionally, as the national anti-doping
organization for the Olympic Movement in the United States, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) has
testing jurisdiction over all riders who are present in
the U.S. or are members of sports organizations in
the country.38 If the UCI determines through its
drug-testing program that a rider has committed an
anti-doping violation, the UCI notifies the rider’s National Federation and requests that it initiate disciplinary proceedings.39 Notification is also sent to the
rider, the rider’s team, and WADA.40
If USADA decides to charge an athlete with an
anti-doping rule violation, the athlete can accept
USADA’s recommended sanction or take the case to
a hearing before arbitrators who are members of the
American Arbitration Association and the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (“AAA/CAS arbitrators”). 41 The
hearing panel is required to hear the case under the
UCI’s Anti-Doping rules42 and must allow the UCI to
provide its opinion and demand that a sanction be
imposed.43 Further, each party must have the right
to be represented by a “qualified lawyer.”44
The decision by the AAA/CAS arbitrators can
See World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 7.
Id.
39 UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 14, art. 234
(Int’l Cycling Union 2012), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=NDc3MDk&Lan
gId=1.
40 Id. art. 206.
41 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY ATHLETE HANDBOOK 30 (effective
Jan. 1, 2013 – Dec. 31, 2013), available at
http://www.usada.org/uploads/athletehandbook.pdf.
42 UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 14, art. 345.
43 Id. art. 332.
44 Id. art. 267.
37
38
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be appealed by either party, WADA, or the UCI, to
the Court of Arbitration for Sport,45 however the decision by CAS is final and binding on all parties, and
is not subject to further review. 46 USADA aims to
provide a disciplinary process that is “fair to athletes” and “provides for a full evidentiary hearing before experienced, internationally recognized arbitrators.”47
II. CONTINUED DOPING SCANDALS
Despite the adoption of the World Anti-Doping
Code and the implementation of the Biological Passport program, doping scandals have continued to proliferate professional cycling. For instance, in 2011,
thirty-three riders were sanctioned by the UCI for
anti-doping rule violations.48 Notably, many of the
athletes implicated in previous doping scandals continue to compete today. Some of the most significant
doping scandals that have occurred since the implementation of WADA are detailed below.
A. Operación Puerto
After Jesus Manzano, a former professional
cyclist, admitted to blood doping and use of performance enhancing substances in 2003 while a member of the Kelme cycling team, a large scale investiId. art. 329.
Id. art. 346.
47 Adjudication, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY,
http://www.usada.org/adjudication/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
48 Consequences Imposed on License-Holders as Result of an
Anti-Doping Violation Under the UCI Anti-Doping Rules, INT’L
CYCLING UNION,
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TU3Mjg&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=Nzk5OTY&Lan
gId=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
45
46
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gation in 2006 lead to the implication of two team
doctors for trafficking medicinal drugs and services
as part of a sophisticated doping program administered to elite athletes for several years.49 During the
investigation, police recovered bags of blood and
plasma,50 refrigerators full of drugs,51 administration
schedules for some of the athletes being doped by the
doctors,52 calendars of when athletes planned to
compete during the year,53 and clinical trials in
which blood parameters of riders were measured.54
Additionally, investigators found documents implicating riders being doped by the doctors that corresponded with the prior doping suspension of those
athletes, including Roberto Heras55 and Isidoro Nozal,56 whom were both suspended in 2005, and Tyler
Hamilton57 and Santiago Perez,58 whom were suspended in 2004.
As a result of the investigation, several other
elite riders were also implicated as participants in
the doping program, including Jan Ullrich,59 Oscar
Sevilla,60 Jorg Jaksche,61 Michele Scarponi,62 Allan
49 See Appendix M to USADA’s Reasoned Decision: Overview
of Evidence in the Operación Puerto Doping Investigation, U.S.
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 1, 1-2 (2006),
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/Operacion+Puerto+Overv
iew.pdf.
50 Id. at 2.
51 Id. at 3.
52 Id. at 4.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 5-6.
56 Id. at 6-7.
57 Id. at 7-9.
58 Id. at 9.
59 Id. at 10.
60 Id. at 10-11.
61 Id. at 11-12.
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Davis,63 Alberto Contador,64 Ivan Basso,65 Santiago
Botero,66 Francisco Mancebo Perez,67 and Alejandro
Valverde.68 To date, only six of the fifty-six riders
implicated in the investigation have been suspended
for their participation in Operación Puerto, one of
whom had his suspension overturned on appeal, and
several riders, including Alberto Contador, were
cleared of links to the doping scandal. 69
B. Floyd Landis
Floyd Landis began riding professionally in
2002 with the U.S. Postal Service Team.70 In 2006,
he won the Tour de France, securing his ultimate
victory during Stage 17 of the race, when he “beat
the field by nearly six minutes.” 71 Landis later tested positive for synthetic testosterone, was stripped of
his title, and banned from cycling for two years. 72
Landis exhausted his options under the World Anti-

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
64 Id at 13-14.
65 Id. at 14.
66 Id. at 14-16.
67 Id. at 16-17.
68 Id. at 17.
69 See Matt Slater, Spain’s Operacion Puerto to Inflict More
Embarrassment on Cycling, BBC (Jan. 30, 2013 ),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/cycling/21259759. See also Tim
Line of Operacion Puerto, CYCLING NEWS (April 30, 2013, 11:41
PM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/features/time-line-ofoperacion-puerto.
70 Floyd Landis, Biography, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL,
http://www.biography.com/print/profile/floyd-landis-201313 (
last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
71 Id.
72 Id.
62
63
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Doping Code and appealed the case to CAS.73 In an
unprecedented decision, CAS ordered Landis to pay
$100,000 to USADA “as a contribution toward its
costs in the CAS arbitration” because there was “no
evidence of misconduct on the part [of] USADA in
prosecuting the case.”74 The panel concluded, “On
the contrary, . . . if there was any litigation misconduct, it may be ascribed to the applicant.”75
Landis continued to deny using performanceenhancing substances until 2010, when he admitted
to doping throughout his entire career, including
during his 2006 Tour de France victory.76 After his
admission, Landis was hit with various lawsuits, including one related to donations he received to support his fight against the doping allegations. 77 Landis was eventually ordered to repay all donations received – nearly $480,000.78
In 2010, Landis filed a whistleblower suit
against his former teammate, Lance Armstrong,
claiming that Armstrong defrauded the federal government by accepting sponsorship money to fund a
U.S. Postal Service team fueled by performanceenhancing drugs.79 Though the suit is under judicial
73 Floyd Landis Loses CAS Appeal, VELONEWS (July 4, 2008
5:29 PM),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2008/06/news/road/floyd-landisloses-cas-appeal_79029.
74 Id.
75 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
76 Floyd Landis, Biography, supra note 70.
77 Frederick Dreier, Floyd Landis Calls Pro Cycling
‘Organized Crime,’ USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013 4:46 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2013/02/13/floydlandis-pro-cycling-is-organized-crime/1916805/.
78 Id.
79 Liz Clarke, Floyd Landis Whistleblower Suit Targets More
than Lance Armstrong, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2013),
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seal, Landis shared many of his allegations in news
interviews with journalists and conversations with
Travis Tygart, the head of USADA, and Jeff Novitzky, an official of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) tasked with investigating steroid use in
sports.80 Much of the information Landis provided to
USADA and the FDA became a part of the USADA
document used to strip Armstrong of his seven Tour
de France titles in 2012.81
C. Danilo Di Luca
Danilo Di Luca, an Italian cyclist, was accused
of doping for many years and was suspended for
three months during the off-season in 2007-2008 for
his involvement in an Italian doping case.82 In 2009,
Di Luca tested positive for Continuous Erythropoiesis Receptor Activator (CERA), a form of EPO, twice
during the Giro d’Italia and was suspended for two
years by the Italian Olympic Committee’s antidoping court.83 His ban was reduced to nine months
after he admitted using performance-enhancing substances and revealed his doping techniques to Italian
police.84 Di Luca made a comeback in 2011 and rode
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0117/sports/36409945_1_tour-de-france-titles-whistleblower-suitfloyd-landis.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Di Luca Set to Ride for Free with One Year Katusha Deal,
CYCLING NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011, 9:44 AM),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/di-luca-set-to-ride-for-freewith-one-year-katusha-deal.
83 Id.
84 Stephen Farrand, Di Luca Confesses to Doping Mistakes,
CYCLING NEWS (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:19 PM),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/di-luca-confesses-to-dopingmistakes.
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with Russian team Katusha in 2011 and team Acqua
& Sapone in 2012.85 Shortly after signing an agreement to ride for Vini Fatini-Selle Italia, Di Luca,
once again, tested positive for EPO, five days before
the 2013 Giro d’Italia.86 Di Luca was subsequently
banned from cycling for life.87
D. Alberto Contador
Alberto Contador, a three-time Tour de France
Champion, tested positive for clenbuterol, a muscle
building and weight-loss drug, during the 2010
Tour.88 Contador claimed the positive test was the
result of eating tainted meat, however he was suspended by the UCI, pending an investigation. 89 Subsequently, the Spanish Cycling Federation cleared
Contador of any wrongdoing, but both WADA and
the UCI appealed the decision to CAS.90 CAS determined that Contador’s claim of having eaten tainted
meat was not substantiated.91 As a result, Contador
was ultimately suspended for two years and stripped
of his 2010 Tour victory, in addition to his twelve
85 Id.; Di Luca Confirms Acqua & Sapone for 2012, CYCLING
NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:50 AM),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/di-luca-confirms-acqua-andsapone-for-2012.
86 Barry Ryan and Stephen Farrand, Danilo Di Luca Positive
for EPO, CYCLING NEWS (May 24, 2013, 10:57 AM),
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/danilo-di-luca-positive-forepo.
87 Danilo Di Luca, Ex-Giro d’Italia Winner, Gets Life Ban for
Third Doping Offence, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013, 11:12 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2013/dec/05/giro-danilo-diluca-life-ban.
88 Austen, supra note 2.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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other titles.92 As noted above, Contador was also implicated in the Operación Puerto doping scandal in
2006, but was later cleared of any involvement. 93 After serving his suspension, Contador rejoined his
former team, Saxo Bank, in 2012.94
E. Frank Schleck
Frank Schleck, who finished third in the 2011
Tour de France, was forced to drop out of the 2012
race five stages from the end for testing positive for
the diuretic Xipamide.95 Schleck maintained that he
unintentionally consumed a contaminated product,
however the Luxembourg Anti-Doping Agency suspended him from the sport for one year. 96 While the
council could have suspended Schleck for two years
under the UCI’s strict liability anti-doping provisions, the council only imposed a twelve-month suspension, noting that Schleck unintentionally consumed the substance.97 Schleck, WADA, or the UCI
had the option to appeal the Luxembourg AntiDoping Agency’s decision, however, no appeal was
filed and Schleck’s suspension ended on July 13,
2013.98 Schleck returned to cycling in January 2014,

Id.
Id.
94 Contador Returns with Saxo Bank, CYCLING NEWS (June 8,
2012, 1:44 PM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/contadorreturns-with-saxo-bank.
95 Frank Schleck Given 1-Year Doping Ban, USA TODAY (Jan.
30, 2013, 5:34 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2013/01/30/frankschleck-given-1-year-doping-sentence/1877333/.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.; Frank Schleck Set for July 14 Return to Racing,
CYCLING NEWS (April 4, 2013, 3:59 PM),
92
93
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competing in the Tour Down Under in Australia.99
F. Lance Armstrong
Lance Armstrong, one of the sport’s most infamous riders, won seven consecutive Tour de France
titles after battling advanced testicular cancer.100
Armstrong was faced with numerous doping allegations throughout his career, but in 2012, USADA
brought formal charges against him.101 Just as he
had earlier allegations, Armstrong vehemently denied that he ever used performance-enhancing substances at any time during his professional cycling
career.102
On August 23, 2012, Armstrong announced that he would not continue to fight the
USADA charges and the next day, USADA stripped
all seven of Armstrong’s Tour titles, in addition to
other honors he had received from 1999 to 2005, and
banned him from cycling for life.103 In October 2012,
USADA released the evidence it had gathered
against Armstrong, including testimony from several
of Armstrong’s former teammates who claimed he
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/frank-schleck-set-for-july-14return-to-racing.
99 Frank Schleck Arrives for Tour Down Under and Denies He
is a Drug Cheat, ABC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014, 12:07 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-13/schleck-27turnspage27-on-drug-ban/5197140.
100 Lance Armstrong, Biography, supra note 5. By the time he
was diagnosed, Armstrong’s cancer was in an advanced stage
and had spread to his abdomen, lungs, lymph nodes, and brain.
He was given a 65-85 percent chance of survival, which dropped
to 40 percent after the tumors in his brain were discovered.
The surgeries and chemotherapy were successful and he was
declared cancer free in February 1997. Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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had not only used drugs, but was the ringleader for
the team’s doping efforts.104 Though Armstrong disputed USADA’s findings when they were released, he
eventually admitted in January 2013, during an appearance on The Oprah Winfrey Show, that he used
performance-enhancing substances throughout his
career.105
After his admission, the U.S. Department of
Justice decided to join the whistleblower lawsuit that
Floyd Landis filed against Armstrong in 2010, contending he defrauded the government.106 If Armstrong loses, he may be forced to pay the government
up to $90 million in damages.107 Since his admission,
he has also been hit with several other private lawsuits for the return of prize money, bonuses, and a
settlement for a false libel claim from the Times of
London.108
III. THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL CYCLING
While there have been multiple doping scandals in professional cycling since the establishment
104 Id. Six of the seven riders who provided testimony against
Armstrong received six month suspensions for their
participation in the doping program. Sanctions, U.S. ANTIDOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/sanctions/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2013) (listing David Zabriskie, George Hincapie,
Michael Barry, Tom Danielson, Levi Leipheimer, and Christian
Vande Velde as recipients of a six month suspension, beginning
on October 10, 2012).
105 Lance Armstrong, Biography, supra note 5.
106 Macur, Armstrong Facing Two More Lawsuits, supra note
11.
107 Id.
108 Michael O’Keeffe, Lance Armstrong Faces Another Lawsuit
as Acceptance Insurance Coming After the Disgraced Cyclist for
$3M Claiming Fraud & Breach of Contract, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Mar. 2, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/iteam/disgraced-lance-faces-lawsuit-fraud-article-1.1277096.
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of WADA in 2004, the Lance Armstrong admission is
arguably the most high profile revelation of the drug
problem embroiling the sport. The following is an
examination of the response from the cycling industry and an analysis of the potential impact Armstrong’s admission will have on the future of cycling.
A. Reaction from the International
Cycling Union
Shortly after his doping admission, the UCI,
cycling’s International Federation, announced that it
welcomed Armstrong’s confession as a step in repairing the damage done to cycling and restoring confidence in the sport.109 Additionally, the President of
UCI, Pat McQuaid, said they would embrace Armstrong’s participation in a truth and reconciliation
process, something Armstrong suggested during his
admission on The Oprah Winfrey Show.110
Despite this somewhat positive reaction,
McQuaid did little to reassure the public that cycling
could emerge from its drug-marred past.
The
USADA investigation contained allegations from
Armstrong’s former teammates that the UCI had
covered up Armstrong’s positive drug test from the
Tour of Switzerland in 2001 in exchange for a donation of $100,000. 111 While McQuaid denied ever cov109 Julien Pretot, UCI Welcomes Armstrong’s Truth
Commission Offer, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2013, 3:46 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-cyclingarmstrong-uci-idUSBRE90H0BY20130118.
110 Id.
111 Robin Scott-Elliot, Cycling: UCI Rejects any Blame for
‘Greatest Crisis’ over Lance Armstrong, Texan Stripped of Tour
Titles but McQuaid Claims Sport May Never Escape Influence of
Doping, INDEP. (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/others/cycling-uci-
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ering up positive drug tests in exchange for money,
he “refused to rule out accepting future donations
from riders to help combat doping, despite the clear
conflict of interest.”112 Further, while McQuaid
maintains that he is and has always been committed
to combating doping in the sport, when asked if he
thought cycling would ever be free from doping, he
responded, “That’s a very difficult question to answer. I’d probably, to be honest with you, would say
no.”113
In December 2012, the UCI set up an independent commission to address allegations in the
USADA report “concerning the complicity of the UCI
and its officials in doping” and “the manner in which
the UCI has conducted its anti-doping program.” 114
The UCI set up the commission, however, without
consulting WADA or USADA, and ultimately, WADA
decided not to take part at all. 115 In January 2013,
the UCI disbanded the commission since “WADA and
USADA refused to cooperate with the inquiry.”116
Further, McQuaid said the UCI would move forward
rejects-any-blame-for-greatest-crisis-over-lance-armstrong8221930.html.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 UCI Disbands Independent Review Commission to Pursue
Truth and Reconciliation, VELONEWS (Jan. 29, 2013, 7:41 AM),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2013/01/news/uci-disbandsindependent-review-commission_272944 (quoting WADA’s
press release) [hereinafter UCI Independent Review
Commission]; Neal Rogers, WADA chief contests UCI statements
on review commission, VELONEWS (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://velonews.competitor.com/2013/01/news/wada-chiefcontests-uci-statements-on-review-commission_271761.
115 Rogers, supra note 114.
116 UCI Independent Review Commission, supra note 114
(quoting the UCI press release) (internal quotations omitted).
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with a proposed program to give amnesty to riders
who admit to doping offenses, even though such a
program would breach the Code.117 While the UCI
renewed calls for establishing a truth and reconciliation commission in February 2013, WADA reiterated
the process would have to be “under the management
and control of the original independent commission”.118 John Fahey, the President of WADA said
that:
Only cycling can heal the problems cycling
has, they’re independent, they run their
own sport, the same as any other sport in
the world. If the members are prepared to
continue to allow this lurching from one crisis to another then I guess we are going to
continue to read about turmoil in that sport
for some time yet. I would hope that within
the root and file members of cycling there is
recognition that it can’t continue this way
without there being some dire consequences
down the track.119

Despite the serious problems plaguing the
UCI’s response to the current doping crisis, the UCI
announced a stakeholder consultation exercise to
take place February 21, 2013 through March 15,
2013 to gather stakeholder input on the future of cycling.120 As part of this effort, the UCI is conducting
Id.
John Mehaffey, UCI Renews Call for Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, REUTERS, (Feb. 12, 2013, 8:42 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-doping-wadacycling-idUSBRE91B0V720130212.
119 Id.
120 Press Release: UCI Announces Stakeholder Consultation
Details, INT’L CYCLING UNION (Feb. 12, 2013),
117
118
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a stakeholder survey and the results will be used to
“help the UCI decide on changes and measures needed to improve the organisation, functioning and image of cycling.”121
Although it appears the UCI is taking a step
in the right direction by conducting the stakeholder
consultation exercise, its public reaction to the Armstrong admission and subsequent squabbling with
WADA and USADA certainly does not send a positive message to the general public or the cycling
community. Until it makes some serious efforts to
repair the image of the sport, including working with
WADA and USADA to enact policy changes, it is
doubtful that athletes will make a concerted effort to
stop the widespread use of performance-enhancing
substances in professional cycling.
B. Reaction from the United States
Anti-Doping Agency
Shortly after Armstrong’s admission, USADA
called on Armstrong to testify, under oath, about the
full extent of his doping activities.122 Under WADA
rules, if Armstrong were to cooperate with antidoping officials, he would be eligible to have his life-

http://www.uci.ch/Modules/ENews/ENewsDetails.asp?id=OTA1
Ng&MenuId=MTI2Mjc.
121 Press Release: Stakeholder Consultations – Globalisation in
the Spotlight, INT’L CYCLING UNION (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/ENews/ENewsDetails2011.asp?id=O
TEwNw&MenuId=MTI2Mjc&LangId=1&BackLink=%2Ftempla
tes%2FUCI%2FUCI7%2Flayout.asp%3FMenuId%3DMTI2Mjc
%26LangId%3D1.
122 Brent Schrotenboer, Lance Armstrong Says No Again to
USADA, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:36 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2013/02/20/lancearmstrong-usada-deadline-again/1931793/.
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time suspension reduced to eight years.123 Fearful of
criminal and civil liability, Armstrong refused
USADA’s offer.124 Armstrong’s attorney, Tim Herman, released a statement indicating that Armstrong
is still willing to cooperate and provide full details
about his doping activities, but he would prefer to do
so through an independent international tribunal rather than USADA.125 Because cycling is an “almost
exclusively European sport,” Armstrong’s attorney
stated “Lance will not participate in USADA’s efforts
to selectively conduct American prosecutions that only demonize selected individuals while failing to address the 95% of the sport over which USADA has no
jurisdiction.”126 USADA CEO, Travis Tygart, expressed disappointment with Armstrong’s decision
but stated that USADA is “moving forward with our
investigation without him and we will continue to
work closely with WADA and other appropriate and
responsible international authorities to fulfill our
promise to clean athletes to protect their right to
compete on a drug free playing field.”127
Although USADA only has jurisdiction over
American cyclists, its efforts to combat doping
amongst its own athletes must be commended.
While much of the sport is European in nature, the
U.S. can serve as a model for a cleaner, and healthier, sport. Armstrong is arguably one of the greatest
cycling heroes of all time and his sanctions have the
potential to serve as an example for the future of the
Id.
Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 USADA CEO Travis T. Tygart’s Response to Lance
Armstrong’s Decision, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Feb. 20,
2013), http://www.usada.org/media/statement2202013.
123
124
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sport. There is no doubt that Armstrong is a talented cyclist, however, young riders must learn that
cheating cannot and should not be tolerated.
C. Reaction from Teams and Their Sponsors
Professional cycling teams and team sponsors
have been virtually silent in regard to the Armstrong
admission; however, an examination of changes in
team contracting practices or treatment of riders
with doping allegations may offer an insight into
their reactions. Unfortunately, all of the teams and
sponsors contacted for this Article did not respond to
repeated requests for current rider requirements,
sample contracts, or treatment of riders with doping
allegations.128 Instead, this analysis will focus on
sample contracts and general information made
available by the UCI about rider requirements.
Through their Cycling Regulations, the UCI
governs all world cycling races, including the
Olympic Games.129 In addition, the UCI directly
manages all UCI Pro Teams and Professional

128 In the course of my research for this Article, I contacted
the following teams: BMC Racing; Slipstream Sports (Team
Garmin-Sharpe); Velocio Sports (Team Specialized-Lululemon);
Team Astana; and Team Leopard Trek. Additionally, I
contacted the following team sponsors: Cervélo; Trek; Giant;
and Garmin. The only response I received was from Cervélo,
whom commented they were unable to share sample contracts
due to confidentiality reasons, and that I should contact one of
the teams they sponsor directly for rider requirements.
129 See generally UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: PRELIMINARY
PROVISIONS art. 1 (Int’l Cycling Union 2010), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=34039&LangId=
1.
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Continental Teams.130 To participate in world races,
teams must sign joint agreements that govern the
working condition of riders with the UCI, and all
riders
must
adhere
to
UCI’s
anti-doping
131
regulations.
It should be noted that while
contracts between individual riders and teams must
contain certain provisions, riders are permitted to
negotiate their own individual contracts with each
team.132 Additionally, while the anti-doping regulations provide for rider eligibility after anti-doping
violations, they do not contain provisions regarding a
rider’s individual contract with his or her team after
such an incident.133 As noted above, it appears that

130 See UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ROAD RACING pt. 2 (Int’l
Cycling Union 2013), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=34028&LangId=
1. UCI Pro Teams are teams of at least twenty-three riders
licensed to participate in UCI World Tour events. Id. at 92.
Professional Continental Teams are teams of at least sixteen
riders licensed to participate in road races open to Professional
Continental Teams. Id. at 135.
131 See UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: JOINT AGREEMENT (Int’l
Cycling Union 2013), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=ODEzNzM&La
ngId=1. See also UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt.
14 art. 2 (Int’l Cycling Union 2012), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=NDc3MDk&Lan
gId=1.
132 See generally UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: PRELIMINARY
PROVISIONS (Int’l Cycling Union 2010), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=34039&LangId=.
133 See UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 14 (Int’l
Cycling Union 2012), available at
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
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many teams sever their contracts with individual
riders suspended for doping allegations; however,
most riders either re-join their old team or sign a
contract with a new team to continue competing in
world races.
Presumably, if anti-doping clauses were included in team and sponsor contracts, athletes who
use performance-enhancing substances could be held
liable for breach of contract or other financial sanctions. In fact, shortly after his admission, an insurance company that paid Armstrong’s bonuses for
winning races, as well as former sponsors sued Armstrong for unjust enrichment and breach of contract,134 indicating that some contracts may in fact
contain anti-doping clauses. Together with the whistleblower lawsuit against Armstrong for defrauding
the federal government, he faces financial sanctions
in excess of $106 million, an amount that may seriously threaten his fortune.135
Further, if sponsors or teams were not as willing to re-sign athletes with previous doping suspensions, it could act as a deterrent in the future. A zero-tolerance policy, while harsh, can send a powerful
message to other cyclists who are currently participating, or thinking about engaging, in doping programs.

TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=NDc3MDk&Lan
gId=1.
134 Macur, Armstrong Facing Two More Lawsuits, supra note
11; see also Andrew Rafferty, Justice Department: Lance Armstrong was ‘Unjustly Enriched,’ NBC News (April 23, 2013, 5:49
PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/23/17883573justice-department-lance-armstrong-was-unjustly-enriched?lite.
135 Id.

204

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

Pharmacy on Wheels

D. Reaction From Current and Former
Cyclists and Spectators
To gauge the public perception of cycling after
the Armstrong admission, eight current and former
cyclists and spectators of the sport took part in a
survey for this Article.136 About half of the respondents felt disappointed by Armstrong’s admission,
with one commenting that drug use in cycling is “out
of control”137 and another stating that it “tarnished
the legitimacy of cycling as a sport; a sort of ‘who is it
going to be tomorrow?’ sensation.”138 Despite these
feelings, half of the individuals surveyed think that
cycling can be a clean sport, albeit with better enforcement and increased penalties. The overall consensus, however, is that the UCI is not working hard
enough to prevent doping in cycling. All respondents
agree that pressure to use performance enhancing
substances is great for professional athletes; although, that same pressure does not exist on an amateur level, since amateur cyclists are not paid and
are thus not under the same intense pressure to succeed. Further, the overwhelming consensus of survey respondents felt the practice of allowing athletes
that have been sanctioned for doping violations in
the past to continue to compete affects the perception
that the sport is fair. Nearly all of the individuals
surveyed believe that the lawsuits Armstrong is facing can be a good deterrent for doping in the future,
with one stating that “it’s good to know there will literally be no long-term benefit from cheating”139 and
another commenting about the visibility of a cyclist
Results of survey on file with the author.
Interview with Josh Silva (Mar. 27, 2011).
138 Interview with Charles Kao (Mar. 23, 2011).
139 Interview with Kevin Wilde (Mar. 25, 2011).
136
137
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and the risk of losing endorsement deals. 140
While the survey results are not surprising,
they do reveal skepticism about the legitimacy of cycling. Sadly, the Armstrong admission only highlighted the problems facing the sport and the lax attitude of the UCI’s enforcement efforts. Fortunately,
it does not appear that the public has lost faith in the
ability of the sport to become drug free, but to do so,
governmental entities and the private business
community must come together to make cheating
unattractive from all angles.
CONCLUSION
The history of cycling reveals a sordid past of
drug use and persistent cheating by many of the
sport’s elite athletes. The desire to win and push the
boundaries of human ability to achieve impossible
athletic endeavors is causing riders to seek out new
and better ways to cheat the system. Continued doping scandals in cycling contributed, in large part, to
the creation of an independent body dedicated to
eradicating the use of performance-enhancing substances in all forms of international sport. Unfortunately, despite the creation of WADA and increased
efforts to ensure a fair playing field, doping scandals
continue to tarnish the image of professional cycling
today.
While professional cyclists are sanctioned for
violating anti-doping rules on an almost regular basis, the investigation and lifetime ban of Lance Armstrong, America’s greatest cycling legend, highlighted the serious problems facing the sport. The aftermath of Armstrong’s admission has led to bickering
amongst the sport’s regulatory entities, leading the
140

Interview with Josh Silva, supra note 137.
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general public to question whether the sport will ever
recover from the events that have marred its past.
The next few years will reveal whether cycling’s regulatory groups can come together and enact a comprehensive plan to finally clean up one of
the most “drug-soaked” sports in the history of the
modern world. However, it will take something more
than increased sanctions and improved testing techniques. Private organizations that participate in the
industry must also contribute to cleaning up the
sport.
Professional teams should enact zerotolerance policies and refuse to sign riders with a
history of drug abuse.
Additionally, team sponsors should include
stern anti-doping clauses in their contracts, so that
riders will face large financial penalties for cheating.
Perhaps cyclists will think twice about using performance-enhancing substances if their financial futures are put in serious jeopardy. The outcome of the
many private lawsuits facing Lance Armstrong may
prove to the cycling community that financial sanctions are a powerful deterrent. Maybe then, the industry will finally come together and work to shut
down the “pharmacy on wheels.”
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Abstract
The Saint Louis Art Museum, known as
SLAM, acquired the mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer in 1998.
Eight years later, the Egyptian Supreme Council of
Antiquities called for its return on the grounds that
it had been stolen from the Egyptian Museum in
Cairo. SLAM refused. In 2011, the case went before
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to determine the ownership of the
mask. Perhaps to the surprise of many, the court decided that the mask belongs in Saint Louis.
This Article will explain how this case was
properly decided, albeit on a legal technicality. It
will also discuss the law surrounding different kinds
of repatriation claims, and how foreign patrimony
laws apply within the United States legal system.
Finally, it will discuss the ramifications of the KaNefer-Nefer decision. Given that the black market
for art is estimated to be the third largest in the
world, behind drug trafficking and arms dealing,
proper understanding of the United States laws in
the field of art law is important.
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INTRODUCTION
Collectors and museums have favored Egyptian antiquities since the time of the ancient Greeks.1
In the fifth century BC, the Greek historian Herodotus visited Egypt and sang its praises in his work,
The Histories.2 The Roman Army took so many
Egyptian obelisks during the Classical period that
today more obelisks stand in Rome than in Egypt. 3
In the eighteenth century, Napoleon’s Army collected
many objects from Egypt, including the famous Rosetta Stone.4 Europeans were so enthralled by Egyptian motifs that they decorated entire rooms in an
1 See William Kelly Simpson, Preface to W. STEVENSON SMITH,
THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF ANCIENT EGYPT, at vii-viii
(1998) (discussing the scholars, museums, and excavations
devoted to ancient Egypt in the last decades of the twentieth
century); John Marincola, Introduction to HERODOTUS, THE
HISTORIES, at xiv (Aubrey de Sélincourt, trans., Penguin Books
1996) (450-420 BC) (discussing Greek culture’s fascination with
Egypt).
2 Marincola, supra note 1, at xiv.
3 Stolen Treasures, SUPREME COUNCIL OF ANTIQUITIES,
http://www.sca-egypt.org/eng/RST_MISS_MP.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2014).
4 MARJORIE CAYGILL, THE BRITISH MUSEUM: A-Z COMPANION
272 (1999). When the British defeated the Napoleonic armies,
the French ceded the stone to King George III in the Treaty of
Alexandria (1801). King George placed it in the British
Museum, where it has remained ever since. Id.
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Egyptian style and collectors sought Egyptian artifacts.5
Smuggling artifacts out of Egypt occurs even
today, and looting has increased since the Egyptian
Revolution in February 2011. 6 Because of this history of looting, the Supreme Council of Antiquities in
Egypt has called for European and American museums to return many objects to Egypt. 7 Recognizing
the importance of protecting cultural heritage, the
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1993 calling for the restitution of cultural
treasures to their countries of origin.8
Archaeological looting, a form of art theft and
a major cause of unprovenanced9 antiquities, is a se5 See T.G.H. James, Formation and Growth of the Egyptian
Collections of the British Museum, in EDNA R. RUSSMAN,
ETERNAL EGYPT: MASTERWORKS OF ANCIENT ART FROM THE
BRITISH MUSEUM 49 (2001) (discussing the interest in Egyptian
artifacts and Egypt); KRISTINA HERRMANN FIORE, GUIDE TO THE
GALLERIA BORGHESE 52 (2008) (discussing the Egyptian Room
at the Galleria Borghese and other Egyptian-themed rooms in
Rome).
6 See Carol Redmount, El-Hibeh: Archaeological Site Looted,
AMERICAN RESEARCH CENTER IN EGYPT (Mar. 2012),
http://www.arce.org/news/2012/03/u76/El-Hibeh-ArchaeologicalSite-Looted.
7 The Supreme Council of Antiquities issued a general
statement asking people to report any information about
possibly looted artifacts. They have also approached various
museums and collectors about specific artifacts in those
collections. See Stolen Treasures, supra note 3.
8 1 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTIE O. KING, MICHAEL D.
MURRAY, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW B-6 (2d ed. Supp. 2005).
9 Provenance is an art historical term defined as “[t]he record
of all known previous ownerships and locations of a work of art
(as given in a catalogue raisonné).” EDWARD KUCIE-SMITH, THE
THAMES AND HUDSON DICTIONARY OF ART TERMS 154 (1984).
Thus, an “unprovenanced” work is one in which the information
about previous ownerships and locations is unknown.
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rious problem.10 The black market for art has been
ranked the third highest in volume, just under drug
trafficking and the arms trade.11 More recently, the
International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR)
and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimated that it is
the second most valuable illicit business.12 While in
many cases, art theft has ties to organized crime, 13 in
some cases thieves take advantage of the relatively
unregulated art market to sell to collectors and auction houses.14 The result is that many unprovenanced artifacts end up in museums.15 Some studies
of auction house catalogues indicate that 85 to 90% of
antiquities on the market have no associated provenance. 16 Other studies of private collections on loan
to prominent museums indicate that only 10% of the
antiquities had provenance.17 Thus, the repatriation
of antiquities has significant ramifications for museums, as many of their objects may be affected.
With these facts in mind, any collector who is
10 Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of
Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums
to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 446 (2003).
11 Onimi Erekosima & Brian Koosed, Intellectual Property
Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 809, 849 (2004).
12 1 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTY O. KING & MICHAEL D.
MURRAY, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW C-3 (2d ed. Supp. 2005).
IFAR reports that narcotics trafficking is the first. Marion P.
Forsyth, International Cultural Property Trusts: One Response
to the Burden of Proof Challenges in Stolen Antiquities
Litigation, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 197 (2007).
13 1 DUBOFF, KING & MURRAY, supra note 12, at C-4.
14 Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 446.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 447.
17 Derek Fincham, Towards A Rigorous Standard for the Good
Faith Acquisition of Antiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
145, 154 (2010).
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presented with an Egyptian artifact for sale should
be diligent in determining its provenance before acquiring it. It may not only be stolen from a collection, the artifact might also have been taken illegally
from its country of origin.18
In one such ongoing case, the Saint Louis Art
Museum (SLAM) acquired the Ka-Nefer-Nefer19
mummy mask in 1998.20 Eight years later, around
2006, the Egyptian government requested the mask’s
return and SLAM refused.21
SLAM then took the preemptive step of filing
for declaratory judgment on February 15, 2011.22

18 See 2 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTIE O. KING & MICHAEL D.
MURRAY, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW U-10 (2d ed. Supp. 2006).
19 The transliteration of the Egyptian hieroglyphs for this
name reads, “k3 nfr nfr.” In English, the syllables would be ka,
nefer, and nefer. “Ka” means “spirit” or “soul,” and “nefer”
means “beautiful” or “good.” The name thus means, “doubly
beautiful soul” (translation by the author). The name can be
written in English in numerous ways, with different
capitalization and hyphenation. The following are some
examples: Ka-nefer-nefer (as on both museums’ websites), Ka
Nefer Nefer (as in various pleadings in the case), and Ka-NeferNefer (as in the case name and opinion). To avoid confusion,
the name has been standardized throughout this article to KaNefer-Nefer.
20 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 5, Art Museum
Subdist. of the Metro. Zoological Park & Museum Dist. of the
City of St. Louis & the Cnty. of St. Louis v. United States, No.
4:11CV0091, 2011 WL 903377, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012),
ECF No. 1(stating that the museum bought the artifact from
Phoenix Ancient Art, S.A. of Geneva, Switzerland).
21 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 3, United States v. KaNefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV00504, 2011 WL 10714760, *2 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 1.
22 Art Museum Subdist. of the Metro. Zoological Park &
Museum Dist. of the City of St. Louis & the Cnty. of St. Louis v.
United States, No. 4:11CV291 HEA, 2012 WL 1107736, at *1.
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri stayed the declaratory judgment action, “pending the outcome of the civil forfeiture action in United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer.”23
In response, the United States government
filed for civil forfeiture on March 16, 2011. 24 However, the District Court granted SLAM’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 25 Consequently, the U.S. government filed a notice of appeal
on June 29, 2012 and the Eighth Circuit heard oral
arguments on January 13, 2014.26
This Article will address the legal issues involved in deciding this case. Part I will address the
law pertinent to civil forfeiture, and it will explain
how the courts have used this remedy with respect to
stolen art. It will also explore the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 23142315, and the Egyptian patrimony laws, No. 215 and
No. 117. Part II will give a detailed analysis of the
record of the case and the procedural history as it
stands. Part III will analyze whether the court
properly dismissed the case and whether the proposed amended complaint would have survived a motion to dismiss. The final Part will conclude the Article with the recommendation that SLAM is legally
entitled to the mask, and makes a recommendation
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) [hereinafter SLAM Declaratory
Judgment case].
23 Id. at *3.
24 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 1.
25 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504
HEA, 2012 WL 1094652, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons.
denied, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June
1, 2012).
26 Notice of Appeal at 1, United States v. Mask of Ka-NeferNefer, No. 4:11CV0504 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 55;
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/webcal/jan14stl.pdf, 6
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for better ways to write a complaint of this nature.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
This Article will primarily address the U.S.
government’s civil forfeiture action. The action is
brought under the Customs Duties statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1595a.27
Generally, cases citing this law as grounds for
forfeiture allege another violation of law concomitant
with it.28 Some examples have included the NSPA,
18 U.S.C. § 545, and the patrimony laws of various
foreign nations.29 This section will examine these
statutes, and the Egyptian patrimony laws that are
applicable to the Ka-Nefer-Nefer case.
A. Civil Forfeiture: 19 U.S.C. § 1595a
Forfeiture is a procedure that allows the United States government to seize items that exist in violation of the law.30 Forfeiture can be punitive or remedial.31 When the government proceeds against an
27 See 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, Proof of a Claim
Involving Stolen Art Antiquities § 19 (2004) (noting, for
example, that the Cultural Property Implementation Act is a
customs law because it is in Title 19 “Customs Duties,” not in
Title 18, “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.”).
28 See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d
131, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545);
United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 19,
1778, No. 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 1999) (alleging a violation of the CPIA); United States
v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(alleging a violation of the NSPA).
29 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315
(2012); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012) (titled “Smuggling goods into the
United States”); United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing
Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
30 United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1993).
31 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998).
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individual in a criminal proceeding, the forfeiture is
punitive.32 However, if the government sues the actual property, as in a civil case, the forfeiture is not
intended as punishment of an individual for an actual offense.33 Rather, when the government seizes an
artifact in violation of a customs statute and launches a proceeding against the object itself, the court
considers the action remedial.34
In a civil forfeiture case, the government files
a verified complaint against the property (in rem)
under the notion that the property itself is the
“wrongdoer”.35 The owner then files an official claim
to the property with the court.36 Thus, a typical civil
forfeiture suit will involve three parties: the government, the in rem property, and the claimant.
A statute allowing for this procedure is 19
U.S.C. § 1595a.37 This customs statute states in
part, “[m]erchandise which is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United States contrary to
law shall be seized and forfeited if it is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced.”38
While examining this law, the Second Circuit stated
that the statute only requires, “that the property in
question be introduced into the United States illegally, unlawfully, or in a manner conflicting with estab32 Id. The Bajakajian case is an example of a punitive
forfeiture; there the government proceeded against the
individual criminally and then obtained forfeiture of the object
(in this case, currency) to punish the convicted.
33 Id. at 331.
34 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2011);
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 140
(2d Cir. 1999).
35 Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 46.
36 FED. R. CIV. P. G(5)(a)(i).
37 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (2012).
38 Id.
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lished law.”39 Thus, the government can seize cultural property in a civil forfeiture action if someone
imports that cultural property contrary to a law. 40
One question of significant importance is what
burden of proof is necessary for the government to
seize the object.41 Traditionally, the government only needed to show probable cause to seize property in
a forfeiture.42 The burden of proof is established by
19 U.S.C. § 1615, which states, “the burden of proof
shall lie upon such claimant.”43 However, the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA)
heightened the burden on the government to a preponderance of the evidence.44 Nevertheless, as late
as 2003, courts have stated that the lesser standard
of probable cause was sufficient in civil forfeiture
proceedings under a customs statute, and the burden
remained upon the claimant.45 Furthermore, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to determine probable cause.46
The Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and
Maritime or Asset Forfeiture Actions determine the
Davis, 648 F.3d at 89.
19 U.S.C. § 1595a.
41 United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting the concern with the constitutional safeguards for
innocent purchasers, given the ease with which the government
can seize property).
42 Jennifer A. Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal
Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.,
1199, 1232 (2005).
43 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2012).
44 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)
(2012); Kreder, supra note 42, at 1231.
45 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(noting 18 U.S.C. § 983(i) specifically excludes actions under
Title 19).
46 Id. at 1378.
39
40
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particularity with which the complaint must plead
probable cause.47 For an in rem action, the government must state “circumstances . . . with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will be able,
without moving for a more definite statement, to
commence an investigation of the facts and to frame
a responsive pleading.”48 For an asset forfeiture, the
government must “state sufficiently detailed facts to
support a reasonable belief that the government will
be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.”49
There are two possible defenses to this
statute.50
The statute of limitations for civil
forfeiture actions under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a is
provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1621.51 This section states
that barring any concealment, no one can bring an
action five years after the offense was committed, or
more than two years after the property was
discovered.52 Another defense that claimants often
use in cultural heritage cases is the doctrine of
laches.53 This doctrine bars a claim if the plaintiff
47 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504
HEA, 2012 WL 1094658, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons.
denied, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June
1, 2012).
48 FED. R. CIV. P. E(2)(a).
49 FED. R. CIV. P. G(2)(f).
50 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at
442-3.
51 19 U.S.C. § 1621. “No suit or action to recover any duty
under section 1592(d), 1593a(d) of this title, or any pecuniary
penalty or forfeiture of property accruing under the customs
laws shall be instituted unless such suit or action is commenced
within five years after the time when the alleged offense was
discovered, or in the case of forfeiture, within 2 years after the
time when the involvement of the property in the alleged
offense was discovered, whichever was later”
52 Id.
53 Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 442-3.
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unreasonably delayed in bringing the claim and the
defendant suffers prejudice as a result of this delay. 54
The government has successfully seized objects of cultural property under § 1595a in two prominent cases.55 In the first case, the Southern District
of Florida held that the forfeiture of a moon rock was
valid because it was stolen from Honduras and imported into the United States.56 Honduran law required an act of Congress to authorize the alienation
of the moon rock, and because they found no legislation to this effect, the court held that the rock was
subject to forfeiture.57
In the second case, the government successfully seized a manuscript that had been stolen from the
National Archives in Mexico and imported into the

Id.
United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2003); United
States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 19, 1778,
No. 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 1999).
56 Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1369. The complaint stated
that the Consul General of Honduras had “identified the
defendant property as patrimony of the Republic of Honduras
and has stated that pursuant to Honduran law the defendant
property could not be legally sold, or conveyed nor removed
from Honduras unless expressly authorized by action of the
National Congress.” Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in rem at
9, Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (No. 01-0116 CIV
JORDAN), 2001 WL 34841870, at *4, ECF No. 1. A court
appointed expert on Honduran law determined that the
Honduran government owned the moon rock when President
Nixon donated it in 1973. Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
Honduras has had several regime changes since 1973, but the
court deemed this immaterial under Honduran law; the moon
rock was the patrimony of the state. Id. at 1373.
57 Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1375-76 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
54
55
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United States. 58 In that case, the Southern District
of New York determined that the government made
its showing of probable cause because Archives documented the manuscript as part of its collection and
19 U.S.C. § 2607 makes it a crime to import an item
belonging to the inventory of a foreign museum after
the effective date of that chapter.59
58 Original Manuscript, No. 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL
97894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1999). The National Archives in
Mexico City documented the manuscript as belonging to its
collection in 1993. Id. The manuscript was purchased at a flea
market for approximately $300. Id. It was imported into the
United States, where it was sold in a hotel room for $16,000.
Id. at *2. Later, a dealer in rare manuscripts saw the
manuscript when Sotheby’s had it for auction and notified the
Mexican National Archives that the manuscript might belong to
them. Id. at *2. The National Archives confirmed it was
missing from its collection and requested its return from the
United States. Id. at *2. The court also found that the
claimant was not an innocent owner given the suspicious
nature of the transaction. Id. at *7. Therefore, the manuscript
was subject to forfeiture. Id. at *1.
59 Id. at *6. In 1970, United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held the Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 1
DUBOFF, KING & MURRAY, supra note 8, at B-82. The
convention called for the signatory nations to prohibit the
importation an object of cultural heritage that was stolen from
another signatory country. Id. at B-82. The United States
adopted the Convention in 1983. Id. at B-83. The resulting
statute became known as the Cultural Property
Implementation Act, or the CPIA, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601
et seq. Id.. A relevant part of the Act reads:
No article of cultural property documented as
appertaining to the inventory of a museum or
religious or secular public monument or similar
institution in any State Party which is stolen
from such institution after the effective date of
this chapter, or after the date of entry into force
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B. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315: National Stolen
Property Act
Congress signed the National Stolen Property
Act (NSPA) into legislation in 1934 in order to expand the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act to include
stolen property other than automobiles. 60 The Act
prevents the transportation of property valued over
$5,000 across state lines.61 The NSPA was amended
in 1986 to include transportation over the United
States border and added the word “possession” to
eliminate the defense that the property was no longer in interstate commerce and that the federal government could not prosecute it under the Commerce
Clause.62 The passage of the NSPA pertinent to the
recovery of stolen art reads:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals,
stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any
goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or
money of the value of $5,000 or more, or
pledges or accepts as security for a loan any
goods, wares, or merchandise, or securities,
of the value of $500 or more, which have
crossed a State or United States boundary
after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or
taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
of the Convention for the State Party, whichever
date is later, may be imported into the United
States.
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2012).
60 Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places:
Unprovenanced Antiquities and the National Stolen Property
Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123, 133 (2010).
61 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
62 Urice, supra note 60, at 134.
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not more than ten years, or both.63

In the text itself, the NSPA does not actually
define what the term “stolen” means for purposes of
the Act. The Ninth Circuit held in Hollinshead that
the violation of a country’s patrimony law can mean
stolen.64 The Fifth Circuit held in McClain that
works of art imported in violation of a country’s patrimony law constitutes “stolen” property under the
NSPA.65 In McClain, the court convicted five individuals of stealing Pre-Columbian artifacts from
Mexico and trying to sell them in the United States
to an undercover FBI agent. 66 After tracing the history of laws in Mexico concerning cultural property,
the court noted that Mexico did not enact legislation
claiming ownership of cultural property until 1972. 67
The court held “a declaration of national ownership
is necessary before illegal exportation of an article
can be considered theft, and the exported article considered ‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the National
Stolen Property Act.”68 This holding became known
as the McClain Doctrine.69
However, the Second Circuit has held that in
addition to enacting a patrimony law, the country of
origin must enforce that law within its borders before
an object can be considered stolen if it is brought into
18 U.S.C. § 2315.
United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.
1974).
65 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir.
1977).
66 Id. at 991-92
67 Id. at 1000.
68 Id. at 1000-01 (citing Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154).
69 Adam Goldberg, Comment, Reaffirming McClain: The
National Stolen Property Act and the Abiding Trade in Looted
Cultural Objects, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1031, 1042 (2006).
63
64
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the United States.70 The court concluded, “the NSPA
applies to property that is stolen from a foreign government, where that government asserts actual ownership of the property pursuant to a valid patrimony
law.”71 The court further noted that there were “no
exceptions” for private ownership for antiquities discovered in Egypt after the effective date of the relevant patrimony law, Egyptian Law No. 117 of 1983. 72
In an earlier opinion, the Second Circuit established that the law allegedly violating NSPA must
claim ownership, not merely regulate the items. 73 In
Long Cove Seafood, the court found that individuals
who took clams in violation of an environmental law
across state borders were not guilty under the NSPA
because the environmental law only intended to regulate the clams. 74 New York did not assert a possessory interest in the clams, as evidenced by the fact
the government did not assert a violation of the state
larceny statute.75 Equally important, New York did
not assume liability for any attacks by the wild animals regulated under the relevant environmental
laws, whereas possessors of animals in New York
were liable for attacks.76 Thus, the environmental
law did not sufficiently describe state ownership of
the clams for the court to consider them “stolen” under the NSPA.77
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id.
72 Id. at 406. In Schultz, two individuals looted Egyptian
antiquities from archaeological sites and sold them as part of
the fictitious “Thomas Alcock Collection.” Id. at 396.
73 United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 165
(2d Cir. 1978).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
70
71
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The government has used the NSPA in connection with the civil forfeiture statute in several
situations. The government first asserted a claim of
civil forfeiture against a work of art under the NSPA
in 1999, but the court ultimately decided the case on
other grounds.78 In cases where the NSPA has been
the reason for forfeiture, the record clearly identified
a particular thief. In Portrait of Wally, the Second
Circuit determined that the government met its burden of showing probable cause for forfeiture because
it had several letters indicating that a Nazi official
had taken a painting without providing compensation to the owner.79 In another decision by the Sec78 Ian M. Goldrich, Comments, Balancing the Need for
Repatriation of Illegally Removed Cultural Property with the
Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT
Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 118, 121 (1999). In Antique Platter, the claimant
purchased an Italian artifact from Sicily in 1991 for $1.2
million. United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d
131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999). On the customs form, the claimant
listed the Phiale’s country of origin as Switzerland and the
purchase price as $250,000. Id. The Italian patrimony law
stated that all archaeological items belonged to Italy unless the
owner could prove private ownership before 1902. Id. at 134.
The Italian government contacted the United States and
requested the Phiale’s repatriation. Id. The government filed
an in rem civil forfeiture action, asserting both a customs
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 545 and the NPSA. Id. False
statements are forbidden on customs forms. 18 U.S.C. § 545.
The court determined that claimant’s importation of the Phiale
violated 18 U.S.C. § 545 because of the claimant misrepresented
both the price and the country of origin on the customs form.
Antique Platter, 184 F.3d at 134. The court chose not to address
the NSPA allegation. Id.
79 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 256
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). The court also stated that the purchaser did
not do a good faith provenance search when he relied solely on
the seller’s word even though he knew a Jewish woman claimed
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ond Circuit, a witness testified to seeing the thief
carry the painting out of the museum. 80
C. Egyptian Patrimony Laws No. 215 and No. 117
The Republic of Egypt enacted Law No. 215 in
81
1951.
Article 4 provided that all immovable or
movable antiquities or ancient land belonged to the
Republic of Egypt, unless it belonged to a wakf (religious entity) or was private property under the law. 82
Article 22 outlined the exceptions under which a person may privately own an antiquity.83 These exceptions included (1) antiquities found prior to the institution of Law No. 215, in antiquities markets or private collections; (2) antiquities given to the finder by
the Egyptian government; (3) antiquities the Egyptian government sold; (4) antiquities imported by a
stranger; (5) immovable antiquities; and (6) antiquities sold by museums.84
Egyptian Patrimony Law No. 117 replaced
the portrait belonged to her family. Id. at 267. The court also
insisted that it was not enough that the painting was stolen
when it entered the country, but that the government must
show that the museum in question knew it was stolen when it
was imported. Id. at 269. The court also rejected the notion
that laches could apply to a civil forfeiture action. Id. at 275.
80 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2011). In
Davis, the government brought a civil forfeiture action under 19
U.S.C. § 1595a and the NSPA when Sotheby’s attempted to
auction the Pissarro painting, Le Marche, after it had been
stolen from a French museum in 1981. Id. at 87. This case
determined that “stolen” meant the object was stolen at the
time of importation to the US. Id. at 91. The court also
established that there is no innocent owner defense. Id. at 95.
81 Law No. 215 of 1951 (Law on the Protection of Antiquities),
31 October 1951, p. 1 (Egypt).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 5.
84 Id. at 5.
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Law No. 215 in 1983. 85 Law No. 3 amended Law No.
117 in 2010. 86 Article 24 of Law No. 117 expressly
provides that anyone who finds an antiquity in Egypt
must turn it over to authorities within 48 hours as it
belongs to the Egyptian government, and Law No. 3
did not amend this provision.87 The sale of antiquities is forbidden by Article 8; as amended by Law No.
3, it also allows the board of directors the ability to
restitute artifacts for compensation.88 Article 35
claims ownership of any find made during an archaeological expedition made by foreigners, and removes the 1983 provision that the Egyptian government may give excavators some of their finds. 89
Egyptian authorities will fine anyone who smuggles
an artifact out of Egypt between 100,000 and
1,000,000 Egyptian Pounds, and that the object will
be forfeited to the Egyptian authorities, pursuant to
Article 41.90
85 Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of Antiquities),
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 11 August 1983, p. 4, (Egypt).
86 Law No. 117 of 1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010
(Promulgating the Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February
2010, p. 8 (Egypt).
87 Law No. 117 of 1983 (Promulgating the Antiquities
Protection Law), 11 August 1983, p. 17, (Egypt); Law No. 117 of
1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010 (Promulgating the
Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February 2010, p. 22 (Egypt).
88 Law No. 117 of 1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010
(Promulgating the Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February
2010, p. 15 (Egypt).
89 Id. at p. 28; Law No. 117 of 1983 (Promulgating the
Antiquities Protection Law), 11 August 1983, p. 24-25, (Egypt).
90 Law No. 117 of 1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010
(Promulgating the Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February
2010, p. 32 (Egypt). This is a substantial increase from the
1983 amounts, which set the fine between 5,000 and 50,000
Egyptian pounds. Law No. 117 of 1983 (Promulgating the
Antiquities Protection Law), 11 August 1983, p. 29 (Egypt).
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II. UNITED STATES V. KA-NEFER-NEFER
In 1952, an expedition of the Egyptian Antiquities Service working inside the funerary enclosure
of Third Dynasty Pharaoh Sekhemket excavated the
Nineteenth Dynasty mat burial of the noblewoman
Ka-Nefer-Nefer.91

Fig 1. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer92 and Profile93
Her mummy mask is made of linen, wood, plaster,
resin, and it is painted, gilded, and inlaid with
glass.94 It depicts the face and upper torso of a woman, and it measures approximately 21 and 1/16 inch-

Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 2.
The Mask of Kanefernefer, SUPREME COUNCIL OF
ANTIQUITIES, http://www.scaegypt.org/eng/RST_005Kanefernefer.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2014).
93 Photograph of the profile of the Mummy Mask of the Lady
Ka-nefer-nefer, SAINT LOUIS ART MUSEUM,
http://www.slam.org/eMuseum/media/full/191998_2.jpg (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014).
94 Id.
91
92
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es by 14 and 9/16 inches by 9 and 3/4 inches.95
The provenance of the mask after its excavation is in dispute.96 The Government alleged in its
verified complaint that Egyptian Antiquities Service
stored the mask at Saqqara until 1959, when it
shipped the mask to the Egyptian Museum in Cairo
for an exhibition in Tokyo that never reached fruition.97 In 1962, the Egyptian Museum shipped the
mask back to Saqqara in box number fifty-four.98
The Egyptian Museum performed an inventory in
1973, at which time museum authorities discovered
that the mask was no longer in box fifty-four.99 The
Egyptian Museum has no record of a sale or transfer
for the mask during the period from 1966 to 1973. 100
On the other hand, the Saint Louis Art Museum alleged that the mask was part of the Kaloterna
private collection in the 1960s, when a Croatian collector in Switzerland acquired it.101 The complaint
stated that in 1995 this collector sold the mask to
Phoenix Ancient Art, 102 and stated that SLAM purchased the mask from Phoenix in 1998 for approximately $499,000. 103
Id. at 1-2.
Compare Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21,
at 2-3; with Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note
20, at 5.
97 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 2.
98 Id. at 3.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5.
102 Id.
103 Notice of Verified Claim of Interest, Exhibit A at 1; Art
Museum Subdist. of the Metro. Zoological Park & Museum Dist.
of the City of St. Louis & the Cnty. of St. Louis v. United States,
No. 4:11CV0091, 2011 WL 903377, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 8-1
95
96
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Around 2006, the Egyptian Supreme Council
of Antiquities discovered the location of the mask
and called for its return.104 The museum denied
these requests.105 In December 2010, the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
Missouri requested a meeting regarding the mask. 106
The parties met in January 2011, and the United
States stated its intention to seize the mask.107
As a result of this meeting, each party instituted a suit against the other. Part A will examine
the declaratory judgment action by SLAM. Part B
will explore the civil forfeiture action by the United
States government. Part C will review the aftermath
of the cases, specifically, the government’s motion to
reconsider or amend.
A. Declaratory Judgment
SLAM filed for declaratory judgment against
the government for the mask on February 15,
2011.108 SLAM stated that it conducted a “monthslong” provenance search, in which it contacted Mohammed Saleh of the Egyptian Museum, the Art
Loss Register, INTERPOL, the International Federation of Art Research, the Missouri Highway Patrol,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 109 SLAM
acknowledged receipt of several emails from Ton
Cremers, of the Museum Security Network, beginning in December 2005, alleging the mask was sto104 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504
HEA 2012 WL 1094658, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF
No. 11.
105 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 3.
106 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 9.
107 Id. at 9-10.
108 Id. at 2.
109 Id. at 5-6.
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len.110 Cremers had sent these emails to United
States government officials, including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI.111
Dr. Zahi Hawass, at that time the Director of
the Supreme Council of Antiquities, contacted SLAM
via email several times and provided inconsistent
and inaccurate information asking for the return of
the mask.112 SLAM stated it was willing to return
the mask if it was provided verifiable proof that the
mask was stolen.113 SLAM concluded that the United States had actual or constructive knowledge of the
location of the mask and its questionable provenance
for more than five years.114 Consequently, the statute of limitations for forfeiture had passed. 115
In addition, because Egyptian Law No. 215 allowed private ownership of antiquities, SLAM did
not import the mask into the United States in violation of this law and the mask should belong to it. 116
Therefore, the museum requested declaratory judgment in its favor.117 SLAM argued that the declaratory judgment would settle the dispute between the
relevant parties, because the only other valid potential claimant was the Republic of Egypt. 118
The government responded by filing a motion
to dismiss the complaint or stay the action for deId. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
112 Id. at 9.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 10.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 11.
117 Id.
118 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 2, SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No.
4:11CV00291, 2011 WL 1258264, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 14.
110
111
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claratory judgment on March 16, 2011. 119 The government stated that Title 19 and the Supplemental
Rules established a procedure in civil forfeiture that
would be superior to a declaratory judgment because
it would be a final judgment for all possible parties.120 Further, the government argued that the civil forfeiture proceeding was more effective for this
dispute, because the parties were the same in both
the declaratory judgment action and the civil forfeiture.121 Should the government succeed in showing
probable cause and win the forfeiture action, the
mask would become the property of the United
States, and the government would have the ability to
decide whether to return the mask to Egypt, regardless of whether Egypt participated as a claimant in
the civil forfeiture action.122 Thus, the court should
stay the declaratory judgment action because it was
unnecessarily duplicitous and hindered judicial economy.123

119 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings at 1,
SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV00291, 2011 WL
999458, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 8.
120 Id. at 3. The Museum’s primary basis for opposing the
motion to stay was that it would open the mask up to frivolous
claims from other parties and potentially expose the Museum to
large litigation costs. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 7, supra note 118.
121 Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Their Motion to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings at 2,
SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV00291 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 16.
122 Id.
123 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss or Stay Proceedings at 6, SLAM Declaratory Judgment
case, No. 4:11CV00291 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 9.
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B. Civil Forfeiture
On the same day the government filed its response to the declaratory judgment complaint, it initiated an action for the civil forfeiture of the mask. 124
The complaint alleged that because the mask was
missing from its box and there was no bill of sale or
transfer in the records of the Egyptian Museum, the
mask had been stolen and was subject to forfeiture
under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c).125 In addition, the government sought an ex parte order restraining SLAM
from moving the property. 126 The court granted the
restraining order.127
A claimant in a civil forfeiture action must file
a claim within 60 days of publication and then the
claimant must file an answer or motion under Rule
12 within 21 days.128 Pursuant to this requirement,
SLAM filed a claim of interest in the mask on April
20, 2011, in which it asserted that it had purchased
the mask in good faith for $499,000 from Phoenix
Ancient Art in Geneva, Switzerland after months of
provenance research.129
Shortly thereafter, on May 5, 2011, SLAM
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 1.
Id. at 4.
126 Ex Parte Application of the United States to Restrain
Defendant Prop. at 2, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer,
No. 4:11CV00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 3.
127 Order Restraining Defendant Prop. at 2, United States v.
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No.5.
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 12; Declaration of Publication at 2; United
States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV 504 HEA (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 9.
129 St. Louis Art Museum’s Verified Claim of Interest in the
Defendant Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer at 3, United States v. Mask
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No.8.
124
125
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filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.130 SLAM argued
that the term “missing” does not mean “stolen,” and
that the complaint therefore could not withstand the
motion to dismiss.131 The museum further argued
that the government did not allege when, where,
how, or by whom the mask was stolen. 132 Consequently, the court should grant the motion to dismiss
because the complaint did not provide details with
sufficient particularity to satisfy Supplemental Rule
G(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.133 Furthermore, SLAM argued that the only Egyptian patrimony law the United States recognizes is Law No.
117, and because this law was enacted in 1983, it
would not have been in effect at the time the mask
left Egypt.134
Moreover, SLAM argued that the statute of
limitations had passed. 135 The Egyptian authorities
knew the mask was missing as of 1973 and did nothing to recover it.136 At the very latest, Egyptian authorities should have known the mask was in Saint
Louis in 1998, when SLAM sent letters to the Director of the Egyptian Museum.137 However, it was not
until February 14, 2006 that Zahi Hawass contacted
SLAM to ask for the return of the mask.138 The gov130 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint at 1, United States v.
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar.
31, 2012), ECF No. 11.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 3.
133 Id.at 4
134 Id. at 6-7.
135 Id. at 8.
136 Id. at 10.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 13.
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ernment could have been aware of the mask’s importation in 1998.139 At the latest, the government
would have had reason to discover the location of the
mask and file forfeiture proceedings in February
2006 when it received emails from Ton Cremers, but
the government did not file until March 2011. 140
Therefore, the five-year statute of limitations had
passed.141 For the same reasons just listed, the museum argued that the doctrine of laches should bar
the claim.142
The government argued in response to SLAM’s
motion that it was required only to show probable
cause in its pleading.143 Further, 19 U.S.C. § 1615
shifted the burden to SLAM to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the mask was not stolen
property.144 Because the mask was documented in
Cairo in 1966, was missing in 1973, and no record
indicates that it was sold, the government argued
there is probable cause to believe that it was stolen
and therefore imported in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1595a.145 The government argued that matters of
foreign law should be proven at trial and so the court
should not consider SLAM’s allegations regarding
Egyptian Law No. 117 until that time. 146 Moreover,
the government urged the court to reject the motion
because the statute of limitations and the defense of
Id. at 14.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 15.
143 United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant St.
Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, United States v.
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar.
31, 2012), ECF No. 18.
144 Id. at 1.
145 Id. at 4.
146 Id. at 5.
139
140
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laches were outside of the scope of a motion to dismiss.147
The government also moved to strike SLAM’s
claim for lack of standing.148 It argued that SLAM
did not establish a colorable claim under Egyptian
law, because that law “provides that antiquities like
the Mask are property of the Republic of Egypt[.]” 149
Therefore, SLAM did not have colorable claim of
ownership to the mask.150 The Government asserted
that because none of the exceptions for private ownership under Egyptian Law No. 215 were possible,
the mask would be contraband like a narcotic, and
the museum should not be able to claim the mask. 151
SLAM countered by claiming that because the
mask was in its exclusive possession and control for
thirteen years, it had standing to claim the mask. 152
SLAM argued that its standing was based not just on
possession, but also upon the fact that it paid value
for the mask and would suffer injury if the mask

Id. at 6.
United States’ Motion to Strike Claim by St. Louis Art
Museum for Lack of Standing at 1, United States v. Mask of
Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012),
ECF No. 20.
149 United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant St.
Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 143, at 1.
150 United States’ Motion to Strike Claim by St. Louis Art
Museum for Lack of Standing, supra note 148, at 2.
151 United States’ Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Strike Claim by St. Louis Art Museum for Lack of Standing at
4, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 21.
152 Claimant St. Louis Art Museum’s Memorandum in
Opposition to the United States’ Motion to Strike the St. Louis
Art Museum’s Verified Claim to the Mask at 4, United States v.
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar.
31, 2012), ECF No. 24.
147
148
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were forfeited.153
The court issued its opinion on the declaratory
judgment action, the motion to strike and the civil
forfeiture action on the same day.154 The court decided to stay the declaratory judgment because no
parties would suffer prejudice.155 In addition, the
court agreed with the government that civil forfeiture was procedurally superior because there was a
specific statutory scheme for dealing with the matter.156 The court also denied the government’s motion to strike.157 Because the mask had been in continuous and open possession of the museum for thirteen years, the court determined that SLAM had
standing.158
However, the court granted the motion to dismiss the civil forfeiture action.159 Supplemental Rule
153 Claimant St. Louis Art Museum’s Sur-Reply to the United
States’ Reply to the Museum’s Memorandum in Opposition to
the Motion to Strike the Museum’s Claim for Lack of Standing
at 4, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 30.
154 SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV291 HEA,
2012 WL 1107736, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012); United
States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012
WL 1094658, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons. denied, No.
4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June 1, 2012)
(granting SLAM’s motion to dismiss the verified complaint);
United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA,
2012 WL 1094652, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (denying the
government’s motion to strike the claim by SLAM for lack of
standing).
155 SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV291 HEA,
2012 WL 1107736, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012).
156 Id. at *2.
157 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504HEA, 2012 WL 1094652, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012).
158 Id.
159 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504
HEA, 2012 WL 1094658, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons.
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G(2) governs civil forfeiture actions,160 and it requires that the complaint must plead the facts with
particularity.161 The court was not persuaded that
the government would be able to meet its burden of
proof at trial because the pleading only stated that
the mask was “missing” and did not allege any facts
indicating the time, place, or manner in which the
mask was stolen.162 Further, the court noted that 19
U.S.C. § 1595a specified that the merchandise be introduced into the country “contrary to law,” and the
government failed to note which law was violated.163
C. Motion to Reconsider or Amend
the Complaint
On April 6, 2012, the government filed a motion to seek leave to file a motion to reconsider and to
amend the complaint. 164 The government stated that
the order dismissed the complaint, but did not appear to dismiss the underlying action and was therefore not a final judgment.165 On April 9, 2012, the
court granted the motion to file a motion to reconsider by May 7, 2012 but was silent as to when or if the
government could file an amended complaint.166
denied, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June
1, 2012).
160 Id. at *2.
161 Id. at *1.
162 Id. at *3.
163 Id. at *3.
164 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to Seek Leave to File Amended
Complaint Prior to Entry of Judgment at 1, United States v.
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 35.
165 Id.
166 Docket Text Order at 1, United States v. Ka-Nefer-Nefer,
No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 36.
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As a result, the government filed a motion to
reconsider or file an amended complaint, 167 arguing
that it need only demonstrate probable cause and
that claimant had the burden of proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence to show lawful importation.168 It stated that probable cause should be more
than mere suspicion, but it did not need to be a prima facie case.169 The motion noted that courts have
construed “stolen” within the context of 19 U.S.C. §
1595a liberally in other cases, such that the government only needed show that the mask belonged at
one time to someone other than the current owner; it
did not need to show the time and manner of the
theft or the identity of the thief.170 In addition, the
plain language of the statute simply states, “stolen”
and does not require a predicate law.171 Therefore,
the Opinion is incorrect by asserting that “introduced
contrary to law” and “stolen” are separate elements
to be satisfied.172
The court entered the following information into the docket:
“ORDERED: PLAINTIFF GRANTED UNTIL 5-7-12 TO FILE
WHAT IT SUGGESTS IS A MOTION TO RECONSIDER HEA.
(Response to Court due by 5/7/2012.). Signed by Honorable
Henry E. Autrey on 04/09/12.”
167 Motion of the United States to Reconsider Order and Op.
Dismissing its Verified Complaint at 2, United States v. Mask
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 37.
168 Memorandum of the United States in Support of its Motion
to Reconsider Order and Op. Dismissing Verified Complaint at
2, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 38.
169 Id. at 3.
170 Id. at 5.
171 Id. at 7.
172 Id. at 7. The museum countered that the government
should have alleged that a law was broken in addition to the
forfeiture statute and the government did not allege the
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The court denied the motion to reconsider because there was not so severe a mistake as to establish manifest error.173 Further, the court granted the
government’s motion to extend time to file an appeal,
but it was silent on whether the order was final.174
On June 8, 2012, the government filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint.175 It argued
that when a court grants a motion to dismiss, the
dismissal is generally without prejudice and the
plaintiff usually has an opportunity to amend the
complaint.176 The government attached a proposed
amended complaint that added information about
how provenance can be laundered.177 It also added
that because the Republic of Egypt did not authorize
“any person to remove the Mask from box number
Egyptian patrimony law that would be in effect. Claimant St.
Louis Art Museum’s Memorandum in Opposition to the
Government’s Motion to Reconsider Order and Opinion
Dismissing Verified Complaint at 15, United States v. Mask of
Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 40.
173 Op., Memorandum, and Order at 3, United States v. Mask
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 48.
174 Id.
175 Motion of the United States for Leave to File First
Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 1, United States
v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 49.
176 Id. at 2
177 First Amended Verified Complaint at 3, United States v.
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. June
8, 2012), ECF No. 49-1 (“Laundering the provenance of an
artifact involves creating a fictitious history of the artifact’s
ownership through the fabrication of documents or other
accounts that misstate of the place or time of origin or discovery
or falsely describe the transactions leading to its present
ownership.”) (on file with the author and the Pace Intellectual
Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum).
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fifty-four at Saqqara” there was probable cause to believe the mask was “stolen by an unidentified individual . . . between 1966 and 1973.” 178
The government also added information to the
complaint about the necessary Egyptian law. 179 The
government stated that Egyptian Law No. 215 defines the mask as an antiquity, and the mask does
not fall into any of the exceptions for private ownership carved out by that law.180 The amended complaint also discussed the individuals who sold the
mask to SLAM, pointing out that Egyptian authorities convicted the sellers in 2004 for smuggling artifacts out of Egypt.181
Finally, the complaint alleged that SLAM
made inquiries in form only and did not provide any
real information about how or when the mask was
excavated to those it asked. 182 The complaint pointed out that SLAM did not investigate the “unknown
dealer” who held the mask in Brussels only one year
after its excavation. 183 While SLAM heard from the
Art Loss Register that the mask was not reported
stolen, it was also informed that the Art Loss Register was not a complete list of stolen artifacts. 184
SLAM did not receive answers to its inquiries from
the Missouri Highway Patrol, the International Federation of Art Research (IFAR), or INTERPOL. 185
SLAM did not provide important provenance or ask
for verification of provenance from the Director of the
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
180 Id. at 5-6.
181 Id. at 7.
182 Id. at 9.
183 Id. at 8.
184 Id. at 9.
185 Id. at 10.
178
179
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Egyptian Museum.186 Because SLAM was aware of
the Egyptian law controlling exports and did not perform their due diligence, clearly evidenced by the
above, it was “willfully blind” to the true owner of the
mask: Egypt. 187 In 2006, when the Supreme Council
of Antiquities sent letters to the museum asking for
the return of the mask, SLAM should have known
that the provenance provided by Phoenix Ancient Art
was incorrect.188
The government also alleged that SLAM violated several laws, including 19 U.S.C. § 1595a; 18
U.S.C. §§ 545, 2314 and 2315; Egyptian Law No. 215;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.080; and N.Y. Penal Law §§
165.52 and 165.55.189 The government included an
affidavit signed by a customs official that everything
contained within the complaint was true.190
The government also argued that the court decided the case following the burden of proof presented in an intervening case. 191 Therefore, the court
should permit the government to amend its complaint because it drafted the complaint before the
publication of the case.192
SLAM countered that the Order issued April
9, 2012 effectively made the Opinion final and urged

Id.
Id. at 11.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 13.
190 Verification at 1, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer,
No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 49-5.
191 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2011).
192 Memorandum in Support of the United States Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture
at 1, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 50.
186
187
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the court to strike the government’s motion.193 Because the court denied the motion to reconsider on
April 9, 2012, SLAM argued that the government did
not have recourse under Rules 59(e), 60(b)(1),
60(b)(6) and 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.194 Rule 59(e) only extends the deadline
for filing notice of appeal, not for filing an amendment to a complaint.195
For those reasons, the court denied the motion
to amend the complaint and denied SLAM’s motion
to strike as moot. 196 The court merely stated, “[f]or
the reasons outlined in the Court’s March 31, 2012
Order of Dismissal, and for the reasons offered in its
Order denying reconsideration, the Court denies the
Government’s requested leave raised in its motion
submitted on June 8, 2012 .”197 Undeterred by the
result, the government boldly filed a Notice of Appeal
on June 29, 2012 with the Eighth Circuit.198 The
government’s brief was filed on June 24, 2013. 199
193 Claimant Saint Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Strike the
Motion of the United States for Leave to File First Amended
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 2, United States v. Mask of
Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 51.
194 Id. at 4.
195 Claimant St. Louis Art Museum’s Memorandum in
Support of its Motion to Strike the United States’ Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture
at 6, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 52.
196 Op., Memorandum and Order at 2, United States v. Mask
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31,
2012), ECF No. 54.
197 Id.
198 Notice of Appeal, supra note 26.
199 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, United States v. Mask of KaNefer-Nefer, No. 12-2578, 2013 WL 343390 (8th Cir. June 24,
2013).
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III. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze the Mask of KaNefer-Nefer case in light of the law provided in Part
II. Part A will first examine whether the district
court correctly decided that the original complaint
failed to show probable cause. Part B will examine
whether the proposed amended complaint would
survive to trial. At trial, there is a possibility that
the action could fail due to the statute of limitations.
A. The Original Complaint
The court properly dismissed the civil forfeiture on the pleadings. In its complaint, the government failed to show probable cause that the mask
was stolen. Further, the government also did not allege that SLAM or any other party violated a law,
either a larceny statute or a patrimony law, to satisfy
the “stolen” requirement of 19 U.S.C. § 1595a. 200
The government must plead facts with enough
particularity that the claimant may commence an
investigation without asking for a more definite
statement.201 SLAM might be able to ascertain from
the complaint that it should investigate the provenance of the mask between 1966 and 1973. 202 That is
not “particular”; it would require researching the entire provenance of the mask. For example, in Portrait of Wally, the government was able to allege a
time, place, and manner of the theft.203
See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21.
FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(2)(a).
202 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 3.
203 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232,
256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). While the Davis case postdates the
government’s pleading, it also alleged a specific thief and the
time, place, and manner of the theft. United States v. Davis,
648 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2011).
200
201
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The pleading must also support a reasonable
belief that the government can support its claim at
trial.204 The government merely alleged that by
1973, the mask was missing from its box and there
was no bill of sale.205 There is no allegation that the
Egyptian Museum considered the mask stolen, or
that it filed a report to that effect. 206 It simply states
that officials noticed it was missing. 207 Perhaps the
Egyptian authorities thought another curator had
misplaced it or relocated it. Perhaps what is missing
is the bill of sale. In a 2006 interview, Zahi Hawass,
then Director of the Supreme Council of Antiquities,
stated that the Egyptian Museum did not have much
documentation for the mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer because it kept poor records in that era.208 Without
any other facts, it is just as probable that someone
misplaced the bill of sale as it is that someone stole
the mask. While the government may use circumstantial evidence to support probable cause,209 probable cause needs to be more than a mere suspicion.210
The original complaint demonstrates only a suspicion
that the mask was stolen.
Certainly, the court found probable cause in
an Original Manuscript when an object was missing
FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G(2)(f).
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 4.
206 Id. at 3.
207 Id.
208 Egypt Demands Return of Mummy Mask, NBC NEWS (May
2, 2006),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12598537/ns/technology_and_scienc
e-science/t/egypt-demands-return-mummy-mask/.
209 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
210 Memorandum of the United States in Support of its Motion
to Reconsider Order and Op. Dismissing Verified Compliant,
supra note 167, at 3.
204
205
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from a museum.211 However, the court decided that
probable cause existed because the circumstances
surrounding the purchase were extremely suspicious.212 The government does not allege in the original complaint anything other than that SLAM acquired and currently possesses the mask; there is no
allegation that it acted in bad faith during the purchase. 213
In addition, the pleading did not assert a law
predicate to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a. 214 The Government
claims that the Davis case changed this pleading requirement from the model used in Lucite Ball.215
However, this is not entirely true. It is true that the
government’s complaint did not allege a violation of a
United States law.216 However, the complaint in Lucite Ball did clearly indicate that the moon rock was
taken in violation of the Honduran patrimony law,
and this violation was why the importation was illegal under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a.217 Thus, even using the
standard that the government says was in existence
at the time of the pleading, the government’s pleading fails.
Therefore, the court properly decided that the
pleading was not sufficient. It does not show probable cause, either that the mask was actually stolen or
211 United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November
19, 1778, 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 1999).
212 Id. at *7.
213 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 3-4.
214 Id. at 3.
215 Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture,
supra note 192, at 1.
216 See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21.
217 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in rem, supra note 56, at
9.

246

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

Don’t Get SLAMmed into Nefer Nefer Land

that SLAM acquired it in bad faith. It does not plead
the circumstances with sufficient “particularity” to
support the notion it could succeed at trial. Finally,
the complaint does not assert a law under which the
mask could be considered “stolen.”218
B. The Proposed Amended Complaint
The proposed amended complaint does cure
these defects. First, it lists a number of laws predicate to § 1595a, such as §§ 545, 2314, and 2315 of Title 18; Egyptian Law No. 215; Mo. Rev. Stat. §
570.080; and N.Y. Penal Law §§ 165.52 and
165.55.219 In addition, it alleges an actual theft, 220
and it alleges a matter of foreign law.221 Finally, it
casts doubt on the good faith purchase of the museum.222
The following subsections will analyze
whether these allegations support a finding of probable cause.
1. Common Law Theft
Common law doctrine insists that a thief can-

218 The term “stolen” is also ambiguous under the NSPA. The
court noted in Long Cove, “It would be anomalous that while a
violator of the Environmental Conservation Law would not be
subject to prosecution in New York for larceny, he should be
held to have stolen property within the meaning of the NSPA.”
United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 165 (2d
Cir. 1978). One could draw a similar analogy here; in order for
something to be considered stolen, a law of some sort must have
been broken.
219 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 13.
220 Id. at 4.
221 Id. at 5.
222 Id. at 10 (stating “[a]s such, the Museum either knew or
was willfully blind to the fact that Phoenix’s purported
provenance was fictional at the time the Mask was imported”).
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not pass good title. 223 Under common law, “stolen”
has been defined as
acquired or possessed as a result of a
wrongful or dishonest act or taking whereby
a person willfully obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to another,
without or beyond any permission given,
and with the intent to deprive the owner of
the benefit of ownership, whether temporarily or permanently.224

If the government could show probable cause
that the mask was stolen according to common law,
the forfeiture would be warranted. The amended
complaint still does not provide a manner of theft or
a timeframe shorter than 1966 to 1973. 225 It does
suggest that an unidentified thief stole the mask. 226
However, a time, place, or manner, or any facts about
how the theft could have occurred are still lacking
from the complaint.227 Simply alleging an “unidentified individual” does not strengthen the original
complaint’s assertion that because the mask was
missing and no bill of sale exists, the mask must be
stolen. On the other hand, if the government could
demonstrate a time that an unidentified individual
broke into the Egyptian Museum, this would
strengthen the argument.228 This statement alone
223 Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts,
and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J. 17, 21 (1993).
224 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of a Claim Involving
Stolen Art or Antiquities § 2 (2004).
225 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 4.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Zahi Hawass stated that he believed the mask was stolen
from a storage facility in the 1980s; however, the government
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does not provide probable cause that the mask was
stolen according to common law.
However, the amended complaint reveals that
Egypt convicted the sellers of the mask, the
Aboutaam brothers, in 2004 for smuggling artifacts
out of Egypt.229 A confession from the sellers that
they stole the mask, while improbable, would go a
long way to establishing probable cause to seize the
mask. If the Aboutaam brothers confessed to stealing the mask, then the museum would not have title
per the common law doctrine or under the NSPA,
and the mask should be forfeited. The amended
complaint does not allege a confession.230 Thus, the
complaint does not show probable cause on the allegation of a common law theft.231
never made this allegation in the complaint. Jeff Douglas, St.
Louis Museum Won’t Return Egyptian Mask, WASHINGTON POST
(May 12, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/12/AR2006051201046.html.
Hawass also stated that the last known provenance in Egypt
was documented in 1959, which is contrary to the government’s
complaint that it was documented in 1966. Note that a 1980s
theft would allow a proceeding under the CPIA.
229 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 7.
230 Id. at 4.
231 In addition, there is one way that the museum could
receive good title even if the mask was stolen – the mask must
be stolen when it enters the country. United States v. Portrait
of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The
museum purchased the mask in Switzerland. Bill of Sale at 1,
United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 8-2. “Under Swiss law, a
purchaser of stolen property acquires title superior to that of
the original owner only if he purchases the property in good
faith.” Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400
(S.D. Ind. 1989) aff’d sub nom. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917
F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). Swiss law presumes that a purchaser
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2. Egyptian Law No. 215 – Violation of National
Patrimony Law
However, it is not necessary to prove a common law theft if the Egyptian patrimony law sufficiently criminalized the alienation of antiquities such
that all sales were illegal.232 Unfortunately, the law
does not do this.
SLAM points out that Law No. 117 of 1983 is
the only patrimony law the United States recognizes
out of Egypt.233 It is true that it is the first patrimony law the United States recognized out of Egypt and
that it replaced Law No. 215. That does not indicate
that the United States would not recognize Law No.
215. The court in McClain reviewed all laws since
the 1890s relating to Mexican patrimony to find the
one that claimed ownership.234 The court in Lucite
Ball upheld Honduran law in spite of several regime

acts in good faith. Id. Therefore, the burden to show that the
buyer did not act in good faith is on the claimant. Id. Thus, it
is possible that the sellers transferred good title to the museum
even if the mask had been stolen from Egypt, if the museum
acted in good faith.
232 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 406 (2d Cir.
2003). In Schultz, the defendant was convicted for selling
antiquities in violation of the Egyptian patrimony law in spite
of the fact that he had not “stolen” the antiquities from a person
or entity in Egypt. The court determined that the patrimony
law clearly indicated all objects that were found in Egypt after
the law was enacted belonged to the government, and could not
be sold to another party. Thus, if the government could prove
that the mask belonged to Egypt in an unqualified manner,
proof of a break in would not be necessary.
233 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint, supra note 130, at 6.
234 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 997 (5th Cir.
1977).
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changes.235 The mere fact that the United States has
not officially recognized Law No. 215 as a patrimony
law does not mean it would not do so if it were presented with a case dating from the time Law No. 215
was in effect.
The difference between the application of Law
No. 117 in Schultz and Law No. 215 in the Ka-NeferNefer case is not the text of the law. Law No. 215
does claim ownership of antiquities found in
Egypt.236 Like Law No. 117, it also allows privately
owned objects in certain circumstances.237 The problem is that Schultz and his associates dug antiquities
out of the ground and sold them. 238 The Egyptian
government under Law No. 117 owns all artifacts
found in the ground in Egypt, without exception. 239
Thus, there is no way Schultz could have taken the
objects out of Egypt without violating the law.
On the other hand, in the Ka-Nefer-Nefer case,
the artifact was already out of the ground and the
Egyptian Museum owned it. Under Law No. 215, the
235 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
236 Law No. 215 of 1951 (Sur la Protection de Antiquitiés), Al
Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah or Journal official du gouvernement
égyptien, 31 October 1951, p. 1 (Egypt). Please note that this
law is only available in French. It was translated by the author
and summarized by both parties in the following court
documents. See Saint Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss
the Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint at 7, United
States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11-CV-00504 (HEA)
(E.D. Mo. May 4, 2011), ECF No. 11 (on file with the author and
the Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law
Forum); First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture,
supra note 177, at 5.
237 Id. at 5.
238 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 2003).
239 Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of Antiques),
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 August 1983, p. 17 (Egypt).
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Egyptian government, the operator of the Egyptian
Museum, is at liberty to sell antiquities. 240 Thus,
there are ways to take the mask out of Egypt without
automatically violating the patrimony law, unlike
the situation in Schultz.
Regardless of this distinction, the government
was correct in asserting that the trial court should
properly decide matters of foreign law. 241 Other
courts have determined that merely alleging a matter of foreign law was sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss.242
3. Lack of Good Faith
If the government cannot show probable cause
that a common law theft occurred, then it must show
that SLAM did not act in good faith. Scienter is a
necessary component of §§ 545, 2314, and 2315 of Title 18; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.080; and N.Y. Penal Law
§§ 165.52 and 165.55. 243 Therefore, the government
would need to show that SLAM either knew or was
willfully blind to the fact that the mask was stolen
from Egypt at the time of sale in order to forfeit the

240 Law No. 215 of 1951 (Sur la Protection de Antiquitiés), Al
Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah or Journal official du gouvernement
égyptien, 31 October 1951, p. 5 (Egypt).
241 United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant St.
Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 143, at 5.
242 United States v. Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 845 F. Supp.
544, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Therefore, alleging in a pleading that
property is stolen under a foreign law is a sufficient pleading
without providing the specifics of the foreign law.”).
243 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315; 18
U.S.C. § 545; MO. REV. STAT. § 570.080; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
165.52, .55. All of these statutes require that the possessor
knowingly possess, receive, or transport the stolen object.
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mask under any of these statutes.244
The government has been able to show probable cause in other cases because the circumstances
surrounding the purchases were questionable. 245
There are a number of actions the court has considered evidence of bad faith. These include a failure to
research the item,246 failure to research the sellers or
the original owner,247 paying an extremely low
price,248 paying in cash,249 concluding the transaction
very hastily,250 or conducting the transaction in an
unusual place or at an unusual time.251
First, the nature of the item for sale – an antiquity from a country known for being looted – suggests that a potential purchaser should proceed with
caution.252 By providing ten paragraphs on illicit
trading of antiquities, the amended complaint indi244 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232,
269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
245 United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November
19, 1778, 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 1999); Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, Inc. v. O’Brien, 761
F. Supp. 1222, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Autocephalous GreekOrthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1402 (S.D. Ind. 1989) aff’d sub nom.
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
246 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1401.
247 Id.; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224;
Original Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894, at *7.
248 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1401; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224.
249 Original Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894 at *7.
250 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1402.
251 Original Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894, at *7.
252 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1401.
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cates the need for due diligence in researching provenance.253 The complaint demonstrates all the ways
in which SLAM could have conducted a more thorough provenance search.254 It is clear that it did a
provenance search, as it sent requests to the Art Loss
Register, INTERPOL, the International Federation
of Art Research, the Missouri Highway Patrol, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.255 However, the
amended complaint notes that SLAM did not hear
back from most of these sources, which does not indicate a thorough search.256
Nevertheless, SLAM did contact the Director
of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo and provide a description and photos of the mask.257 To the untrained eye, many Egyptian artifacts look the same.
However, to someone schooled in Egyptian art, the
differences between objects are clear. The director of
the Egyptian Museum in Cairo should be versed well
enough in Egyptian artifacts to distinguish one artifact from another. One would think that when presented with a description and pictures of an object,
the director of such a museum would be able to determine if the object was one that was missing from
its collection. Certainly, the Egyptian Museum’s collection is vast,258 but if the mask was stolen and the
Egyptian government truly wanted it back, the direcFirst Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 8-9.
Id. at 9-10.
255 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5253
254

6.
256
257

First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 10.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5-

6.
258 The Egyptian Museum, SUPREME COUNCIL OF ANTIQUITIES,
http://www.sca-egypt.org/eng/MUS_Egyptian_Museum.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014)).
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tor would conceivably have a list of some sort to compare objects against when presented with the type of
documentation the Saint Louis Art Museum provided.259 Thus, one can hardly fault the museum for continuing with the sale after the Director of the Egyptian Museum did not object, and after the Art Loss
Register reported the mask was not on its list.
However, the courts have noted that it is important to take into consideration the sophistication
of the buyer.260 In Schultz, the court observed that
Schultz was an expert in the field of Egyptian Antiquities and should know of Egyptian Law No. 117. 261
SLAM is also a sophisticated buyer and should know
the difficulties of the art market, including the looting that occurs in Egypt. It should have researched
the matter very thoroughly.
Second, the courts have noted that when buying art it is necessary to check the authority of the
seller to sell the object or to research the original
owner.262 The amended complaint notes that Egyptian authorities convicted both sellers in 2004 for
smuggling artifacts out of Egypt.263 It also notes that
SLAM failed to contact the previous owners of the
mask to determine whether it could be sold. 264
The former director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York has expressed disbelief that
259 The Supreme Council of Antiquities currently provides
such a list, in some cases with photographs, of antiquities
whose return it is seeking. See SUPREME COUNCIL OF
ANTIQUITIES, supra note 7.
260 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003).
261 Id.
262 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1401; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224; Original
Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894, at *7.
263 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 7-8.
264 Id. at 9.
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anyone would purchase an artifact from the
Aboutaam brothers because they were notoriously
untrustworthy characters.265 Art historians in the
United States have questioned the Aboutaam brothers’ story of provenance, stating that it is extremely
unlikely the Egyptian government would have given
an object to one of its own excavators.266 The conviction of the sellers and their notoriously circumspect
reputation casts doubt on the legitimacy of the provenance for the mask, and consequently lends itself to
establishing probable cause to investigate the purchase further.
Third, courts have noted that if the price of the
object is too low, it should alert the buyers as to the
possible illegality of the sale.267 The complaint does
not allege that the price paid by the museum was
unreasonably low.268 SLAM paid nearly a half million dollars for the mask;269 this seems entirely rea-

265 See Tristan McKinnon, Antiquities Wishlist Part One: The
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, LOOTING HISTORY (June 1, 2010, 1:27
PM), http://looting-history.blogspot.com/2010/06/antiquitieswish-list-part-one-mask-of.html.
266 Id. However, Egyptian Law No. 215 is somewhat
ambiguous on this possibility. Note that Art. 22 of No. 215
allows the government to give an artifact to its finder; but Law
No. 117 specifies foreign expeditions as the ones who can
receive a gift from the Egyptian government, and no provision
is made for Egyptian finders. See Law No. 215 of 1951 (Sur la
Protection de Antiquitiés), Al Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah or Journal
official du gouvernement égyptien, 31 October 1951, art. 22
(Egypt); Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of
Antiques), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 August 1983 (Egypt).
267 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1401; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224.
268 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 6-7.
269 St. Louis Art Museum’s Verified Claim of Interest in the
Defendant Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, supra note 129, at 2.
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sonable.270 Therefore, this price alone does not lend
itself to finding probable cause.
Fourth, the haste with which the parties complete a transaction can raise suspicions.271 For example, in Autocephalous, the transaction took place
over three days.272 The amended complaint does not
allege that the transaction was hasty. 273 In fact,
SLAM conducted a months-long provenance search
before it decided to purchase the object.274 The
transaction was in no way hasty or surreptitious.
The transaction time does not weigh in favor of finding probable cause.
Finally, the time or place of the transaction
can raise suspicions.275 In Original Manuscript, the
transaction took place in a hotel room at night for
cash.276 In contrast, SLAM prepared a contract and
conducted itself in a businesslike manner.277Thus, it
paid a reasonable price, took a reasonable time to
conduct the transaction, and conducted the transaction in a reasonable manner. SLAM’s conduct does
not rise to the level of bad faith exhibited in other
cases.
On the other hand, the amended complaint
does suggest that SLAM’s research was substantially
lacking. It failed to investigate the previous owners,
270 See generally, LEONARD DUBOFF & CHRISTY KING, ART LAW
38 (2006) (discussing the rise of prices for art).
271 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at
1402.
272 Id.
273 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 10.
274 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5.
275 United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November
19, 1778, 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 1999).
276 Id.
277 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 7.
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and it also failed to follow up with any of its inquiries.278 These failures do suggest probable cause to
investigate the purchase further, and to further determine the industry practice at the time of the purchase.
However, unless the government is able to argue that the statute of limitations should be tolled
from the beginning of the declaratory judgment action, the civil forfeiture could fail due to an affirmative defense. The statute of limitations established
for civil forfeiture by 19 U.S.C. § 1621 is five years, or
two years from the point of discovery.279 SLAM
properly noted that its importation of the mask in
1998 should have alerted United States authorities
to its presence.280 At the latest, the February 14,
2006 letter of Zahi Hawass should have alerted the
government to the possibility that the mask was stolen.281 In spite of that, the government waited until
March 16, 2011 to file a complaint for civil forfeiture.282 This is five years and one month beyond the
point discovery, and too late to file a claim. Because
SLAM had the mask on display for thirteen years,
the government cannot argue that the museum concealed the mask and that the statute of limitations
should be tolled.283

First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 9-10.
19 U.S.C. § 1621.
280 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 10.
281 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint, supra note 130, at 13.
282 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 1.
283 19 U.S.C. § 1621. The statute of limitations states that it
will run “except that . . . any concealment or absence of the
property, shall not be reckoned within the 5-year period of
limitation.” Id.
278
279
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SLAM also asserted a defense of laches. 284
However, the Southern District of New York has determined that the doctrine of laches does not apply to
a civil forfeiture case.285 The same court determined
that the doctrine of laches was outside the scope of a
motion to dismiss.286 Because laches is so fact-based,
the court typically decides whether it is applicable,
and it is therefore not appropriate for a pre-trial motion.287
CONCLUSION
The court properly dismissed the original
complaint. It failed to show any probable cause that
the mask was stolen from Egypt and it did not cite a
predicate law to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a. The proposed
amended complaint added a number of predicate
laws. It also shows probable cause by noting that the
antiquities trade is questionable, the sellers of the
mask were notoriously circumspect, and under Egyptian patrimony law, Egypt may have been the owner
of the mask.
Therefore, if the government wants to survive
a motion to dismiss in a case like this one, it must
show probable cause. It can do this in a number of
ways. It can identify a thief or a break in. It can allege that the patrimony laws of a foreign country
prohibit the ownership of the kind of object in question. Failing these, the government must be able to
show that the circumstances surrounding the trans284 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint, supra note 130, at 14.
285 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
286 Id.
287 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of a Claim Involving
Stolen Art and Antiquities § 32 (2004).
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action clearly indicate bad faith on the buyer’s part.
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Abstract
Most law review articles are very serious, and
with good reason. They discuss important, worldchanging matters like the role and magnitude of executive power, the limits of Constitutional rights, the
boundaries of international law, and the vagaries of
civil procedure. This Article has no such worldchanging or reverent pretentions; it instead takes a
light-hearted view of a fairly marginal legal topic:
arm wrestling. To provide a spine for the discussion,
the Article leans heavily on the 1980s movie Over the
Top – a movie about arm wrestling, trucking, and
child custody - to provide examples of arm wrestling
content with legal implications. As the Article develops background on the topic, it discusses types of tort
liabilities likely to apply to arm wrestling, the functional import of waivers in the arm wrestling context, and the possible liabilities of third parties who
host or organize arm wrestling bouts. A later part of
the Article confronts an employer’s possible liabilities
for employees’ arm wrestling while on the job. Some
discussion is even devoted to the possibility of arm
wrestling against a machine. Yet lest the Article’s
use of occasionally silly pronouncements and irreverent movie references mislead, the content is intended
to be legally sound.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article begins near a story’s end, under
blinding spotlights in a Las Vegas arena, where two
men are about to lock in struggle in front of thousands of boisterous spectators. From a distance, the
match would seem unfair – pitting a 300-pound five
time world champion against an unknown, roughly
100 pounds lighter. The differences between the
competitors do not end there. The larger man,
named Bull Hurley, is brash and arrogant, generously heaping obscenities and threats on his smaller opponent, as his eyes blaze and arena lights dance and
pool on the sweat coating his shaved head. The
smaller man, Lincoln Hawk, is more reserved and
methodical in his comportment. He utters no taunt,
makes no face at his opponent; he simply rotates the
bill of his trucker cap 180 degrees away from his
forehead, as he always does before such bouts.
Yet for all the disparities in size and confidence confronting Hawk, the smaller man does not
back down in the face of his challenge. As the struggle approaches, Hurley plants his right elbow on the
table between the two competitors and fires off another harangue. Hawk, still not baited by his opponent’s taunts, places his right elbow on the table only
at the urging of the referee. Once each competitor
has positioned his arm, the two men lock right
hands, and prepare for battle. When the signal is
given, each man begins exerting as much force as he
can in an attempt to pin his opponent’s right wrist to
the table. These men are arm wrestling1 - not just for
1 In the unpublished opinion of Jamison v. Arm World
Promotions, No. F058008, 2010 WL 3307462, at *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 24, 2010), the court defined arm wrestling as “a
competitive endeavor in which two opponents exert pressure
against each other’s hands to determine which competitor has
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pride, but for the title of world’s greatest arm wrestler.
The match initially does not proceed well for
Hawk. Hurley is able to use his Christmas ham arm
to wrench Hawk’s hand into a highly disadvantageous position, close to the table’s surface and an attendant defeat. Yet at his son’s excited exhortation,
Hawk musters enough strength to escape the threat
and reestablish equilibrium with Hurley nearer to
their starting point. With the threat of defeat not yet
averted, Hawk catches a break in the match, as his
hand slips free from Hurley’s grasp. This stoppage
sends Hurley into a frothy rage, as the match must
be restarted in the original starting position. Given
Hawk’s proximity to defeat prior to the hand slip,
Hurley may believe Hawk intentionally loosened his
grip.2 As the competitors retake their positions, their
demeanors remain as they have throughout the contest – with an over-charged Hurley bouncing taunts
into the blank face of Hawk. The primary differences
in their second attempt at the world title are the
presence of an arm wrestling strap to secure their
hands, and – in addition to the insults hurled at
Hawk’s face – a sucker punch delivered by Hurley as
the opponents’ hands are tied.
When the second attempt at the world championship match begins, a bloodied Hawk strains
against Hurley as the match oscillates between surges in each opponent’s favor. And just as things seem
greater arm strength. Each competitor must keep their elbow
on the table, with the goal of forcing their opponent’s hand to
touch the table.”
2 Which would qualify as a foul under the rules of arm
wrestling. See ARMWRESTLING RULES & REGULATIONS, Art. XII,
§ B, r. 21 (Am. Armsport Ass’n Rules 2012), available at
http://www.armsport.com/rules.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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most dire for Hawk, his hand perilously approaching
the point of defeat, Hawk is able to readjust his grip,
bringing his fingers directly over the top of Hurley’s.
The wild claims of Hurley that have peppered the
match to this point are converted to a banshee’s wail,
as Hawk begins an improbable comeback.
And… the narrative must end there, for its
continuation would spoil the end of the movie, Over
the Top.3 That movie features Sylvester Stallone in
the role of Lincoln Hawk testing his fictional arm
wrestling prowess against Hurley, portrayed by the
late Rick Zumwalt, an actual five time world arm
wrestling champion. Prior to the world championship match, the film chronicles Hawk’s life as a
trucker, and his attempt to reconnect with his estranged son over the course of a cross-country haul.
During that trip, the film clarifies that when Hawk
is not on the road (and even at times when he is on
it), he enjoys working out and engaging in impromptu arm wrestling matches at various truck stops.
(And when Hawk is not doing that, he is vaguely invested in a battle for custody of his son against the
boy’s maternal grandfather.)
This Article begins with a description of a scene from Over the Top – not just because it is a great
movie4 – but because this Article is on the topic of
arm wrestling as it intersects with the law. Over the
Top serves a worthwhile purpose in support of this
topic as the only big-budget Hollywood film to focus
on arm wrestling. And as the story in Over the Top
unfolds, a number of scenes, including the one just
described – provide legally salient material that
speaks to how arm wrestlers might encounter the
3
4

OVER THE TOP (Warner Brothers 1987).
A point some might dispute.
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law.
One example of such material comes in the
form of the injury that an arm wrestler might sustain during a match. For all the glory and accolades
that may follow from an arm wrestling victory, the
sport is not without risk of serious bodily harm. 5 As
participants wrench their arms to try to pin an opponent’s wrist, this rotational force applies potentially
significant shearing and torque loads to the upper
arm. Human arms are not always able to withstand
such forces; as a consequence demonstrated amply by
most of the case law discussed below, arm wrestling
participants place themselves at risk of serious spiral
fractures to the humerus. Indeed, Over the Top does
not sugarcoat this reality, as the film dedicates several frames to an injury occurring in the lead-up to
the Hurley-Hawk tournament final. With such risk
of serious injury come potential costs arising out of
both short-term medical treatment and long-term
consequences associated with imperfectly healed injuries. From such injuries follows the question of
who should bear the cost as between the victim, the
victim’s opponent, or even a third party. In most real-life scenarios, it is just such a third party that will
face this legal risk – where an arm wrestling injury
occurs on the job or at an arm wrestling tournament,
for example, the injured party may seek compensation against an employer or tournament organizer.
In its quest to provide guidance and background on the legal implications of arm wrestling in
cases such as these, this Article reviews the legal
5 Jamison, 2010 WL 3307462, at *2 (“A known risk of arm
wrestling is that a competitor’s arm might break under the
strain of competition. Broken arms occur despite rules that
govern arm wrestling in the attempt to limit injuries.”).
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risks attendant on arm wrestling from a few different perspectives. Part I of the Article discusses the
legal implications of arm wrestling as a general matter. This discussion includes an overview and extrapolation of general sports tort law to the arm wrestling table specifically. Primarily included in the discussion are the torts that apply to the risk of injuries
sustained during a match and the possibility of mitigating such risk by resort to waivers. Part II delves
into the richest source of case law on arm wrestling –
the occurrence of arm wrestling in the employment
setting, and the associated repercussions for workers’
compensation liability. Part III discusses yet another specific case of potential legal risk arising from
arm wrestling – the match pitting an arm wrestler
against a machine.
I. ARM WRESTLING AND TORT LIABILITY GENERALLY
Little is known about the invention or early
history of arm wrestling. This is presumably the
case due to the sport’s age, as arm wrestling requires
no more than two people with arms and machismo,
things that have never been in short supply in human history. Yet for the probably lengthy tradition
surrounding the sport of arm wrestling, there is very
little case law on the topic at all, and what case law
does exist involves suits against third parties that
organize, host, or employ the competitors. In other
words, my search of case law has not uncovered a
single published opinion arising out of a suit brought
by an injured arm wrestler against an opponent. Yet
the legal duties or liabilities between one arm wrestler and another represent a fundamental locus of
conflict, the projection of the primordial fight into the
less physical judicial forum, on which further discussion of the liabilities of non-participants may be con267
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structed.
In view of the limited case law on the topic,
the likely treatment of arm wrestling by courts must
be predicted based on courts’ treatment of torts in
other athletic contexts. When torts arise between
participants in the athletic context, they are typically
brought under one of three theories, presented in order of decreasing level of intent: intentional tort such
as assault or battery, reckless misconduct, or negligence.6 These causes of action are not available in
all jurisdictions in the context of athletic competition.
As one commentator noted, “early sports cases limited recovery to intentional torts: recovery on a negligence theory was ‘out of the question.’”7 This parsimonious traditional view of tort law has relaxed
over time. Most jurisdictions now also permit recovery for reckless misconduct, and some go so far as to
permit negligence claims in the context of athletics. 8
Ultimately, then, an arm wrestler’s ability to seek
relief for damages will depend on a combination of
the harm claimed and whether the jurisdiction in
question recognizes that type of harm in the athletics
context. Yet as each of the three primary sources of
tort liability will all apply to arm wrestling torts in
some jurisdictions, each merits further individual
discussion.
Regardless of the jurisdiction, commission of
an intentional tort will give rise to liability for the
6 See Glenn R. Grell, Case Note, Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), 84 DICK. L. REV.
753, 758-60 (1980).
7 Id. at 760.
8 See, e.g., Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 501
N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993) (finding negligence “sufficiently
flexible” to be used in a case involving an injury sustained
during a recreational soccer match).
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arm wrestling tortfeasor. An arm wrestler could
conceivably commit an intentional infliction of emotional distress against another participant, or falsely
imprison that participant, but such torts would seem
highly unlikely. Taunting from one arm wrestler to
another might call into question the strength, size, or
value of a competitor, but it is unlikely to be so “extreme and outrageous” as to qualify as an intentional
infliction of emotional distress.9 Nor, for that matter,
is an arm wrestler likely to confine an opponent in
any meaningful way during a match such that the
opponent would be falsely imprisoned. Rather, the
most likely intentional tort to occur during an arm
wrestling match is the tort of battery. Battery traditionally requires offensive bodily contact that the defendant intended to cause.10 Beyond the gripping of
hands required for an arm wrestling match, the sport
of arm wrestling does not require any other contact
between the competitors. Contact beyond the handon-hand grip satisfying the definition of battery during a match would be actionable as such.
The final scene in Over the Top offers a clear
example of just such a battery committed during an
arm wrestling match. Just as Bull Hurley and Lincoln Hawk re-engage for a second attempt at their
world championship match, Hurley unexpectedly
forces both his and Hawk’s hand into Hawk’s face.11
This contact leads to light, almost stylized bleeding
from Hawk’s nose, an indication of some degree of
injury.12 This satisfies all elements of the tort – first,
the bodily contact between the interlocked hands and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
See, e.g., Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 444
(2d Cir. 1976).
11 OVER THE TOP (Warner Brothers 1987).
12 Id.
9

10
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Hawk’s face is offensive, certainly inasmuch as it injures Hawk. Additionally, Hurley intends to bring
about the contact by forcing the competitors’ fists into Hawk’s face. This intent may be inferred from a
number of sources. Hurley’s incessant taunting and
raging arrogance is suggestive of someone who might
intentionally harm another, a suggestion only reinforced by Hawk’s slip in grip which Hurley likely
viewed as depriving him of victory. But the strongest
indicator of Hurley’s intent is the sheer improbability
that such contact would ever occur outside of an intent to cause it. At the time of the offensive contact,
the competitors’ arms were at rest in preparation for
the match, so no significant force of any kind should
have been exerted at that moment. And even if the
competitors were to exert a force, arm wrestling dictates that lateral force be applied between the competitors. A force of that magnitude exerted directly
at an opponent under these circumstances would only occur intentionally. In view of this, Hurley could
have been found liable for a battery.
Lest the probative value of another’s
arrogance or taunting in arm wrestling be
overstated, Over the Top also teaches that the
expression of an intent to cause serious harm is not
always fulfilled in any obvious way. Throughout the
film, the number of serious threats lofted at a
competitor before a match is fairly striking. When
an overcharged character named Smasher challenges
Hawk to an impromptu arm wrestling match at some
greasy spoon/truck stop, Smasher explicitly brags to
Hawk, “I’ve got a thousand [dollars] that says I can
tear your arm off.”13 Hawk accepts the challenge,
but lest he have failed to appreciate the brutish
13

Id.
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nature of his opponent, Smasher loudly proclaims, “I
wanna show this guy something . . . break his arm
off.”14 Yet once the arm wrestling between the two
begins, Smasher does nothing unusual, least of all
attempt to separate Hawk’s arm from his torso. The
two just arm wrestle.
That isn’t the only occasion of threatened violence at an arm wrestling table. In a documentarystyle interview spliced into the tournament final
footage, Bull Hurley boldly states, “I drive trucks,
break arms, and arm wrestle. That’s what I love to
do, and it’s what I do best.” 15 In the same interview,
he says of Hawk, “All I want is to try to hurt him,
cripple him . . . so he never dares to try to compete
against me again.”16 Yet once again, Hurley does not
fulfill his violent threats nearly as well as he strings
together infinitives. Outside the match’s punching
incident, which does not involve a broken arm or
crippled victim, Hurley’s actions simply do not align
with his stated intent. Instead, threatening insults,
from Hurley or any other competitor, appear part
and parcel of the larger testosterone-fueled culture of
arm wrestling. Such insults might help show an intent to harm, but they are far from dispositive in an
case of an intentional tort.
If a defendant’s level of intent in an athletic
venue does not rise to the level of an intentional tort,
a plaintiff may find it necessary to allege the tort of
reckless misconduct. Reckless misconduct is characterized by a harmful action where the actor “knows
his act is harmful, but fails to appreciate the extent

Id.
Id.
16 Id.
14
15
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of the potential harm.”17 To be found liable for reckless misconduct, the wrongdoer must recognize that
the risk generated is “‘in excess of the risk of a negligent act.’”18 In other words, reckless misconduct represents the mid-point on the scale of wrongdoer’s intent among the three tort varieties discussed here.
The wrongdoer’s intent and knowledge need not be
as well-formed as in the case of an intentional tort,
but it must exceed that of simple negligence.
As a matter of tort liability in athletics, many
– and possibly most – jurisdictions hold that a
wrongdoer’s intent must at least reach the level of
reckless misconduct for a plaintiff to recover.19 The
policy behind this flows from cases like Nabozny v.
Barnhill,20 involving a recreational soccer player’s
over-aggressive pursuit of a back-pass to the goalkeeper.21 After the goalkeeper had gathered the ball,
the defendant struck the goalkeeper’s head, causing
serious injuries.22 In order to provide lower courts a
standard to assess the merits of claims like the
plaintiff’s, the Illinois Appellate Court developed a
standard more generally applicable to sports. While
the court acknowledged that “some of the restraints
of civilization must accompany every athlete onto the
Grell, supra note 6, at 760.
Id.
19 Ulysses S. Wilson, Comment, The Standard of Care
Between Coparticipants in Mixed Martial Arts: Why
Recklessness Should ‘Submit’ to the Ordinary Negligence
Standard, 20 WIDENER L.J. 375, 382 (2011) (“In the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, an injured sports
participant wishing to recover damages must prove to the fact
finder that the other participant’s act was reckless or
intentional.”).
20 Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
21 Id. at 259.
22 Id. at 260.
17
18
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playing field,”23 it also expressed concern about placing “unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous
participation in sports.”24 To strike a balance between these opposing policy objectives, the court established a test whereby:
when athletes are engaged in an athletic
competition; all teams involved are trained
and coached by knowledgeable personnel; a
recognized set of rules governs the conduct
of the competition; and a safety rule is contained therein which is primarily designed
to protect players from serious injury, a
player is then charged with a legal duty to
every other player on the field to refrain
from conduct proscribed by a safety rule.25

If the use of “duty” language would seem to permit a
cause of action for simple negligence, the court practically interpreted its test as concluding “that a player is liable for injury in a tort action if his conduct is
such that it is either deliberate, wilful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player so as
to cause injury to that player.”26 Barnhill, then, requires at least reckless misconduct on the part of a
defendant to permit a successful cause of action by
an injured participant in applicable athletics.
“Applicable” is the operative word in the previous sentence, as courts have seen fit to reject the
Barnhill standard where not all prongs of the test
are satisfied. Take Novak v. Virene,27 where the
Id.
Id.
25 Id. at 260-61.
26 Id. at 261.
27 Novak v. Virene, 586 N.E.2d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
23
24
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same Illinois Appellate Court considered a claim related to a skiing accident. The court distinguished
the facts in Barnhill from the claim before it based
on the fundamentally different nature of the sports
in the two cases. Where soccer involves “virtually
inevitable” contact with other players, a skier “does
not voluntarily submit to bodily contact with other
skiers[.]”28 The court did not believe that reckless
misconduct was required to serve the interest in vigorous participation in skiing in the way that the
Barnhill court required that standard of a contactbased team sport such as soccer. The Novak court
instead permitted the application of a claim of ordinary negligence to the skiing accident before it.29
Reasoning similar to the Novak court’s view of
skiing could be applied reasonably well to arm wrestling. First, it bears mention that the Barnhill test’s
requirement of a team sport does not apply to arm
wrestling, a sport cast in the fires of individual desire
and glory. And if arm wrestlers must consent to contact to their opponent’s hand and, possibly, wrist, no
other contact is envisioned by the sport. From that
perspective, arm wrestling resembles less contactoriented individual sports such as skiing or running.
Notably absent are the frequent and unpredictable
collisions attendant on a sport like soccer or football.
If presented with the question of the level of intent
sufficient to support a cause of action for an arm
wrestling injury, a court could conclude that ordinary
negligence should suffice in that context.
With that in mind, and by way of defining a
third intent standard after intentional torts and
reckless misconduct, it is important to understand
28
29

Id. at 580.
Id.
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what “negligence” means both generally and when
applied to arm wrestling. Under a typical definition,
negligence is “a failure to exercise the degree of care
in a given situation that a reasonable person under
similar circumstances would employ to protect others
from harm.”30 To be successful, a negligence claim
must show four items: the existence of a duty between the defendant and plaintiff, a breach of that
duty by the defendant, an injury sustained by the
plaintiff, and a causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of duty and the plaintiff’s injury.31
Over the Top furnishes a few examples of the
sort of duty whose breach might amount to negligence. As one example, the organizers of the championship arm wrestling tournament may owe a duty
to the participants to have appropriate medical staff
on hand in the event of an injury. They would equally owe a duty to provide well-constructed arm wrestling tables. The presence of qualified referees would
also be part of their duty. As the film reveals, each of
these duties at least appears to be satisfied.
Where legal duties seem to be satisfied at the
world championship tournament, the film’s protagonist Hawk is far more content to breach duties of
care towards his son, Michael. In one scene, this
negligence takes the form of Hawk allowing 13-year30 City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095,
1095 (Cal. 2007).
31 Some commentators and courts break the four-part test into
five parts, which is also fine for purposes of the Article. See
generally Estate of French v. House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 554
(Tenn. 2011) (noting that the elements of common law
negligence include “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to
plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that
amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause
in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.”).
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old Michael to drive Hawk’s big rig unaided and
without the niceties of training or a commercial driver’s license. In a scene more relevant to the topic at
hand, Hawk forces Michael to arm wrestle an older,
stronger adolescent despite Michael’s apparent arm
wrestling inexperience, the opponent stridently
threatening, “I’m gonna break your arm, punk.” Due
to his inexperience and age, Michael is in no position
to appreciate the risk of injury presented by arm
wrestling, nor is he particularly able to disobey his
father’s will. Had Michael sustained injury during
the subsequent match (fortunately, he does not), his
father would almost certainly have been negligent in
allowing the injury to occur. He knowingly exposes
his son to a risk of injury that only he, as the father
and experienced arm-wrestler, appreciated, in breach
of a duty of care for his son. His son would have been
injured as the direct result of this negligence, as he
would otherwise not have arm-wrestled the larger
adolescent. All elements of a negligence claim would
have been present.
A related cause of action for negligence might
also arise in arm wrestling due to what is known as
“break-arm” position.32 This position occurs when a
competitor’s elbow is planted at a point outside the
32 See SITDOWN & STANDING ARMWRESTLING TECHNICAL
RULES, Competition Fouls, Item 6(d), (World Armwrestling
Fed’n Rules 2007), available at
http://www.armwrestling.com/000rulesandregulations.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (“When a competitor starts to put
themselves in a “break arm” or “dangerous position”, [sic] the
referee will caution the competitor loudly so that the competitor
understands the caution. Referee will instruct the competitor
to face their competitive arm, so as to keep the hand, arm and
shoulder in a straight line. Competitors must never force their
shoulder inwards, ahead of their arm or hand, towards the
table.”).
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frame of his or her shoulder. In other words, if a line
were to be drawn directly away from the point where
the elbow is planted, it would not intersect the competitor’s body. In this position, the competitor is at
increased risk of suffering a spiral humerus fracture.
A knowledgeable arm wrestler continuing in an attempt to win a match – despite knowledge that the
other participant is in “break-arm” position – could
be liable for negligence if the other participant’s arm
does in fact break. In practice, however, this type of
claim is unlikely to be successful due to the assumption of risk doctrine.
Where a plaintiff arm wrestler brings a cause
of action for negligence, the assumption of risk doctrine could stand as a bar to the plaintiff’s case. Assumption of risk is the “traditional belief that a participant assumes the dangers inherent in the sport
and is therefore precluded from recovery from an injury caused by another participant.”33 Under this
rationale, a participant in a soccer match assumes
the risk of being struck by a kicked ball during the
normal course of play; a football player carrying the
ball on offense assumes the risk of being tackled;
therefore, an arm wrestler arguably assumes the risk
of an arm injury inflicted during a typical match.
These examples generally correspond to the
branch of the doctrine known as “primary assumption of risk.” Primary assumption of risk applies to
“those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plain-

33 Paul Caprara, Comment, Surf’s Up: The Implications of
Tort Liability in the Unregulated Sport of Surfing, 44 CAL. W. L.
REV. 557, 561 (2008).
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tiff from a particular risk.”34 Under a different type
of assumption of risk, called “secondary assumption
of risk,” the plaintiff knowingly courts a risk of harm
at the hands of the defendant despite the existence of
a duty between the parties.35 Had the Smasher
character in Over the Top said that he wanted to
show Hawk something by negligently jostling his
arm (in contrast to his original declaration that he
would break Hawk’s arm, Hawk would have assumed the risk of such “jostling” under a secondary
assumption of risk. Something gets lost in the translation of the taunt to negligence only, though, so it’s
fairly unsurprising that Smasher did not express
himself that way.
Therein lies one of the primary limits to the
scope of the assumption of risk doctrine. The doctrine only applies to actions in negligence, as athletes
are not generally deemed to assume the risk of another participant’s reckless misconduct or intentional
tort.36 Assumption of risk is also limited in its partially subjective view of the party assuming the risk.
When the plaintiff skier was injured in Seidl v.
Trollhaugen, Inc.,37 the court found “no evidence that
plaintiff had knowledge of that particular risk prior
to the time of injury or even that she knew such a
risk to be one of the ordinary inherent risks of ski-

Id. at 567.
Id. at 567-68.
36 Martin v. Luther, 642 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (“It is well established that [voluntary sports]
participants may be held to have consented, by their
participation, to injury-causing events which are known,
apparent or reasonably foreseeable, but they are not deemed to
have consented to acts which are reckless or intentional.”).
37 Seidl v. Trollhaugen, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1975).
34
35
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ing.”38 The court did not consider what an ordinary
skier would have known under the circumstances,
but what the plaintiff knew. Similar thinking would
limit the type of risk that a child assumes in athletics, as compared to the risk assumed by a more experienced adult.39
If assumption of risk only covers negligent acts
whose likelihood the plaintiff should have appreciated, protection from liability for arm wrestling injuries can be expanded somewhat if either an arm
wrestler or organizer of the match compels competitors to sign a waiver prior to participation. Such a
waiver effectively protected Arm World Promotions
in Jamison v. Arm World Promotions.40 In that case,
the plaintiff Jamison sustained a spiral torque fracture during an arm wrestling tournament organized
by the defendant. 41 Prior to participation though,
Jamison executed a waiver which stated in abbreviated form, “I hereby waive all claims against the
State of Calif., Arm World Promotions (AWP), . . .
Operators or Sponsors . . . for injuries that I may
sustain.”42 The California Court of Appeal noted that
waivers may effectively eliminate a legal duty if they
contain language that is sufficiently “clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the
Id. at 241.
Survey, Sports Law in the State of Wisconsin, 15 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 425, 437-38 (2005) (summarizing Little v. Bay
View Area Red Cats, No. 80-1801, 1981 WL 139187 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 15, 1981) for the proposition that “children lack the
maturity and experience to make responsible decisions, and the
jury should consider this when determining a child’s proportion
of negligence.”).
40 See Jamison v. Arm World Promotions, No. F058008, 2010
WL 3307462, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010).
41 Id. at *1-2.
42 Id.
38
39
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parties.”43 As the language of the Arm World release
was sufficiently clear,44 it was held to release the defendant’s liability towards Jamison.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6. As the Jamison court also noted, waivers are
unenforceable if they implicate the public interest. This occurs
when the multi-factor test set out in Tunkl v. Regents of
University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1963), is
satisfied. The test states that “the attempted but invalid
exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of
the following characteristics. It concerns a business of a type
generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party
seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of
the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming
within certain established standards. As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the
transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a
standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable
fees and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a
result of the transaction, the person or property of the
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the
risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” Tunkl, 383
P.2d at 445-48. In the original Tunkl case, this test invalidated
a waiver of negligence liability in the hospital context. It has
also been applied to invalidate a waiver for injuries arising out
of interscholastic sports. Wagenblast v. Odessa School District,
758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988) (finding that a waiver in for
participation in interscholastic athletics violated all 6 Tunkl
factors). Discussion of the Tunkl test is limited to a footnote
here as arm wrestling is not likely to trigger Tunkl. The sport
of arm wrestling is simply not a necessary incident of life in the
same way a hospital’s services are. Nor, to my knowledge, is
arm wrestling offered as an interscholastic sport such that it
would come under Wagenblast.
43
44
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The principle that waivers may eliminate liability for simple negligence has a flip side – waivers
generally cannot eliminate liability for gross negligence or intentional torts. As the Supreme Court of
California noted in City of Santa Barbara v. Superior
Court, “the vast majority of decisions state or hold
that . . . agreements releasing grossly negligent conduct generally are void on the ground that public policy precludes enforcement of a release that would
shelter aggravated misconduct.”45 In other words,
courts do not want to allow parties who show a complete lack of care for others to stand behind a piece of
paper to deflect any charge of wrongdoing.
Based on the foregoing discussion, some general trends become evident in the law likely applicable to arm wrestling. First, unless a jurisdiction has
established reckless misconduct as the minimum
level of intent necessary to bring an athletics-based
civil action, courts will likely reason that negligence,
reckless misconduct, and intentional torts are all actionable in arm wrestling. Practically speaking,
however, negligence will be fairly unusual and difficult to show in most arm wrestling cases, as the most
common risk associated with arm wrestling – the
fractured arm – will be deemed a risk assumed by a
knowledgeable participant.
However, slim the
chance of such liability, arm wrestling participants
may – and to a greater extent, arm wrestling tournament organizers will – want to obtain a clear, explicit waiver from other participants to limit their
liability for negligence. Arm wrestling plaintiffs will
be more likely to succeed on an intentional tort or
reckless misconduct theory, provided the alleged
45 City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095,
1103 (Cal. 2007).
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wrongdoer’s misconduct rises to the level of such
torts. Additionally, such torts will not be susceptible
to protection by waiver in most jurisdictions as a violation of public policy.
II. ARM WRESTLING AT WORK
If someone really likes arm wrestling as a recreational pastime, it may only be logical for that person to want to get practice in the sport whenever
possible. That could mean arm wrestling strangers
in truck stops; it could mean using the intermission
of a Broadway play to arm wrestle; and it certainly
could mean arm wrestling at work. Nearly all published judicial opinions on arm wrestling flow from
just this latter case, where an arm wrestler injured
on the job seeks workers’ compensation from an employer (or employer’s insurance) for the injury. Due
to the limited likelihood of success of a negligence action against an arm wrestling opponent, workers’
compensation represents the only viable outlet for
liability where an arm wrestling match occurs at
work. But just as a case for negligence would be hypothetically difficult for an injured arm wrestler,
courts have proven practically averse to granting relief to arm wrestlers injured on the job, 46 even where
that employee is traveling for work. Normally, such
cases find that arm wrestling either falls under a
statute expressly prohibiting recovery or remains
46 See Quinones v. P.C. Richard & Son, 707 A.2d 1372, 1372
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (arm wrestling falls under the
New Jersey skylarking statute, accordingly outside the scope of
employment); Saunders, 57 Van Natta 796 (Or. Work. Comp.
2005) (arm wrestling injury excluded from workers’
compensation claim by statute); Fitzpatrick, 64 Van Natta 174
(Or. Work. Comp. 2012) (finding arm wrestling outside the
scope of employment).
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outside the scope of employment protected by workers’ compensation.
If the plot of Over the Top strains credibility to
its breaking point, at least one case at the intersection of employment and arm wrestling lends a grain
of verisimilitude to the movie. That case is Hackney
v. Tillamook Growers Co-op., and it actually involves
trucking and arm wrestling.47 The workers’ compensation claimant, a long distance trucker, was alternating driving shifts with his supervisor at the time
of the incident giving rise to his claim. 48 During
their trip, the supervisor and the claimant had an
overnight layover in Jacksonville, Florida, where
they initially passed the time drinking and watching
football at a motel bar.49 With alcohol in his system
and examples of testosterone-fueled behavior parading before his eyes, the supervisor proposed a (fairly)
predictable projection of these stimuli – by challenging the claimant to an arm wrestling match. 50 The
claimant initially refused the challenge, but eventually accepted without coercion.51 During the ensuing
arm wrestling match, he suffered a broken arm.52
The claimant sought workers’ compensation for his
injuries, a claim initially denied by the Oregon
Workers’ Compensation Board.53
Claimant appealed the denial to the Oregon
Court of Appeals, which reached the same conclusion
as the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Court of
47 Hackney v. Tillamook Growers Co-op, 593 P.2d 1195 (Or.
Ct. App. 1979).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1196.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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Appeals found the case to turn on a single issue:
whether the injury occurred within the scope of the
claimant’s employment. 54 The Court began by acknowledging that employees engaged in travelintensive lines of work are usually held to be within
the scope of their employment throughout their travel. The nexus between the trip and the scope of employment is broken, however, where the employee
makes “a distinct departure on a personal errand.”55
The Court found just such a departure in the case
before it, concluding, “the claimant’s injury arose after 5 1/2 hours of delay and the consumption of ‘three
or four’ beers. Claimant’s arm wrestling had no relationship to his employer’s business.”56 As the arm
wrestling match was outside the scope of the claimant’s employment, the Workers’ Compensation
Board’s initial denial was deemed proper.57
At least one case has found in favor of a workers’ compensation claimant in an arm wrestlingrelated incident occurring on the job, but the case is
probably not particularly probative. In Varela v.
Fisher Roofing Co., the claimant Varela repeatedly
challenged a co-worker to an arm wrestling match
after Varela had been teased for carrying a lighter
bucket than his co-workers.58 At some point as the
participants were either preparing for, or engaging
in, the agreed-upon arm wrestling match, Varela
slipped on a skylight and severely fractured his ankle.59 The trial court found that Varela’s injury was
Id.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1196-97.
58 Varela v. Fisher Roofing Co., Inc., 572 N.W.2d 780, 781
(Neb. 1998).
59 Id.
54
55
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sustained within the scope of his employment, a decision not reversed on appeal by either a review panel of the Worker’s Compensation Court or the Court
of Appeals.60
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s conclusion fell
in line with the decisions of the lower courts. As a
basis for its decision, the Court adopted the Larson &
Larson test to determine the bounds of the “scope of
employment.” That test finds injuries sustained on
the job eligible for workers’ compensation where the
deviation from employment is insubstantial and the
deviation does not “measurably detract from the
work.”61 The Court concluded that each of these
prongs was satisfied, as “the work stoppage was of
momentary duration, the injury happened at the
very outset of the horseplay, this was not the sort of
incident which carried a significant risk of serious
injury, and the incident was a trifling matter, at
least in its intention by the two employees.” 62 In
view of this, the Court concluded that workers’ compensation was properly awarded.63
While breaking from the overwhelming trend
of cases that have found arm wrestling on the job
outside the scope of employment (and workers’ compensation protection).64 Varela is probably not very
significant. For one thing, the Court’s explanation of
its decision places explicit reliance on some timing
oddities particular to Varela’s arm wrestling bout.
That bout could only be lumped in with the rest of
Varela’s employment because the stoppage was moId. at 782-83.
Id. at 783.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 784.
64 See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095,
1103 (Cal. 2007).
60
61
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mentary, and the injury occurred at the outset of the
match, possibly even before the arm wrestling had
commenced. According to this understanding of the
facts, the incident fell close to the boundary between
employment and non-employment activities; the
Court simply chose to view it on the employment side
of the line. Had the arm wrestling lasted longer, or
even begun, for that matter, the Court likely would
have been compelled by its own reasoning to reach a
contrary decision.
But beyond the case’s fairly liminal set of
facts, the bigger reason that the Varela decision
should be afforded limited weight is the weakness of
its analysis. As the dissent in Varela noted, the
boundary between activities within and outside of
the scope of employment coincided with the moment
that Varela set his work aside to arm wrestle. As of
that moment, Varela was “no longer serving his employer’s interests;” quite to the contrary, he was unequivocally contravening a written policy prohibiting
“boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace.”65
According to the dissent, failing to treat an arm
wrestling contest occurring “on a slippery roof under
construction” as outside the scope of employment
would render the scope of employment requirement
“essentially meaningless.”66 This reasoning is persuasive – rather than losing the forest for the trees
by focusing on the fortuitous timing of the injury in
relation to the extracurricular activity, the dissent
recognized that the very activity of arm wrestling on
a non-arm wrestling job moves the participant’s conduct outside the scope of the employment.
Varela, 572 N.W.2d at 785 (Neb. 1998).
Id. One may observe slippery slope logic applied to a literal
slippery slope.
65
66
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Given both the majority of decisions finding
against arm wrestling workers’ compensation plaintiffs and the weakness of the single case to buck that
majority, the employee who decides to explore his or
her passion for arm wrestling at the workplace is
likely doing so at his or her own risk. Unless a
worker is employed to arm wrestle, that worker is
not likely to be acting within the scope of employment when arm wrestling. From the perspective of
employers, the risk that an arm wrestling injury’s
costs fall on their shoulders may be mitigated by
clear policies prohibiting such conduct. The employer should also affirmatively instruct employees not to
arm wrestle on the job as soon as the employer is
aware of such activities. These steps will limit the
likelihood that the employer will be found to have
acquiesced in the arm wrestling.67
III. ARM WRESTLING AGAINST A MACHINE
In this penultimate Part, let’s take a short
break from Over the Top to consider the story of John
Henry, one of the classic squares in the quilt of
American folklore. Inasmuch as the story is uncontested, it recounts the life of an African-American
steel-driver plying his trade in support of railroad
construction in the second half of 19 th century.68 The
67 No such concerns troubled our protagonist Lincoln Hawk.
As an independent, self-employed trucker, Hawk was a sort of
new American cowboy, arm wrestling where he liked and
answering to no one. All risk of injury, and all potential for
acclaim, remained on him.
68 See generally ROARK BRADFORD, JOHN HENRY (1931); SCOTT
REYNOLDS NELSON, STEEL DRIVIN’ MAN: JOHN HENRY, THE
UNTOLD STORY OF AN AMERICAN LEGEND (2008); RAMBLIN’ JACK
ELLIOTT, Ballad of John Henry, on THE LOST TOPIC TALES: ISLE
OF WIGHT 1957 (Hightone 2004); VAN MORRISON, John Henry,
on THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE (Polydor 1998).
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task of the steel-driver consisted of hammering a
steel spike into a rock face to create a hole where an
explosive could be implanted for detonation. The
detonation, in turn, would clear a path for further
railroad bed or tunnel construction. At the time
when John Henry supposedly drove steel, technology
had advanced to a point where, for the first time,
steel-driving could begin to be mechanized. As manual labor’s grip on the steel-driving hammer weakened, John Henry was enlisted to make a final stand
against mechanization, in the form of a race against
a mechanical steel-driver. As the legend goes, John
Henry won the race, but exerted himself so thoroughly that he died at the race’s end. Poets, musicians,
and novelists have subsequently latched on to the
John Henry story as a fountainhead of literary inspiration.
One may wonder what the legend of John
Henry has to do with arm wrestling. Well, at present, an arm wrestling enthusiast can personally enjoy a modern spin on John Henry’s story – without
the same risks – by testing his arm wrestling prowess against an arm wrestling machine. In this modern man versus machine combat, gone are many of
the deeply symbolic and historically notable aspects
of John Henry’s steel-driving race, as well as questions related to the process of mythmaking, but in
their place is more arm wrestling, which almost
evens the overall balance.
I say “almost,” because what made John Henry’s legendary feat so impressive is far less applicable
in the context of a modern bout against an arm wrestling machine. Where John Henry was called upon
to demonstrate the value of human strength against
the oncoming tide of machinery, human arm wrestling machines are making no such grand display.
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And where John Henry was working at his maximum capacity to defeat the best technology available
at the time, modern technology could very easily outstrip any human’s arm strength, with as little as a
simple adjustment of the arm wrestling machine’s
settings. In this way, challenging an arm wrestling
machine does not demonstrate very much, and exposes the participant to the risk of injury due to the
machine’s malfunction.
Yet an arm wrestling enthusiast might still
want to accept this challenge. Perhaps that person
cannot find a human participant to arm wrestle, in
which case a machine could serve as a surrogate. Or
maybe the arm wrestler just loves the sport so much
as to want to take on all comers, be they man or machine. If these, or other reasons, drive an arm wrestler to take on a machine, this Part discusses some of
the legal issues surrounding this specific class of contest.
As noted in the part on arm wrestling generally, the savvy operator of an arm wrestling machine
will likely require any user of the machine to sign a
waiver. A well-designed waiver can help shield the
machine operator from causes of action related to the
operator’s negligence.
Not all waivers disclaiming liability associated
with an arm wrestling machine will be found enforceable, however. The case of Macek v. Schooner’s
Inc.69 is didactic on this point. In that case, the
plaintiff visited a bar where an arm wrestling contest
involving a machine was taking place. 70 After consulting with the machine’s operators on its safety
69 Macek v. Schooner’s Inc., 586 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991).
70 Id. at 443.
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and testing its functionality, plaintiff agreed to participate in the arm wrestling contest. 71 Before he
was allowed to do so, however, the machine’s operators required plaintiff to sign a form broadly waiving
“any and all right and claim for damages . . . for any
and all injuries” sustained by plaintiff during the
arm wrestling contest.72 The waiver then contained
a representation that the person signing was in good
health.73 Plaintiff signed the waiver without reading
it, and proceeded to take part in the contest, where
he suffered a spiral fracture of his humerus and subsequent long-term impairment in the injured arm’s
flexion and extension.74 The plaintiff filed suit
against the tavern and machine operators alleging
breach of warranty, negligence in setting up the machine, and a claim that the machine was defective
and dangerous.75 The trial court dismissed each of
these claims on the ground that the waiver released
the defendants from liability for injury. 76
The Appeals Court reversed the dismissal and
remanded for further consideration of the waiver’s
meaning. In so doing, the Appeals Court commented
that Illinois state law requires that a waiver contain
“clear, explicit, and unequivocal language” to serve
as an effective release.77 Included in that rule is the
further requirement that the waiver clearly articulate what activities are covered by its terms. 78 Due
to its breadth, the exculpatory clause in Macek was
Id.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 444.
77 Id.
78 Id.
71
72
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found ambiguous as to its scope, an ambiguity only
exacerbated by the representation of the participant’s health.79 That representation, the Appeals
Court concluded, muddied the meaning of the waiver
by allowing for two readings of its terms – one in
which the waiver was of effect broadly and another
where the waiver only applied where the participant’s health caused the harm.80 Due to this ambiguity, summary judgment was deemed inappropriate, and the case was remanded to the trial court.81
The Macek case provides some general guidance as to how a waiver should be structured by an
operator of an arm wrestling machine. First, the
waiver should disclaim any warranties made in relation to the machine, particularly including any warranties of fitness for purpose. As previously noted in
Part I, the document’s terms should also explain
what activities are within its scope in clear, conspicuous language. But that should not be the entirety
of risk-mitigation that an arm wrestling machine operator undertakes. It is fair to wonder in the Macek
case whether the Appeals Court was persuaded by
the particular facts of the case, where the operators
of the machine seem to have made statements as to
the machine’s safety completely contrary to the machine’s operation in practice. That combination of a
misrepresentation and a dangerous machine only
gives courts more reason to find a waiver unenforceable for one reason or another. Arm wrestling machine operators should accordingly limit any statements that they make guaranteeing the functionality
of their machine, and otherwise take all reasonable
Id.
Id.
81 Id. at 444-45.
79
80
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steps to ensure that their machine functions properly. Exercising that level of care will increase the
likelihood that a waiver exculpating the machine’s
operator will be held enforceable.
Of course, as already noted, even the best
drafted waivers are likely of no protection in cases
where the party signing the waiver is the victim of
gross negligence or an intentional tort. Surprisingly,
the Macek court did not mention this possibility, although it is possible that the plaintiff did not raise the
argument.82
For lack of an enforceable waiver – or any
waiver at all, the cost of harm caused by an arm
wrestling machine is much more likely to fall on the
arm wrestling machine operator than it would in
cases of injury during a simple human-againsthuman arm wrestling match. While both of these
activities involve fundamentally similar physical motions to demonstrate strength and earn welldeserved social approval, the insertion of a machine
changes the character of the activity. No longer is an
arm wrestling match a struggle subject to the unpredictable hazards of sport and the whims of Fortuna;
it is instead converted into a predictable match in
which the machine should produce a controlled and
predictable force throughout its motion. Deviation
from that predictability is no longer a strategic or
random incident of human athletic struggle; it is potentially a malfunction of the machine.
Such malfunctions could serve as the basis for
myriad legal causes of action. A malfunction could
be the result of negligence, gross negligence, or even
intentional misconduct. Anything the machine operator says related to the functionality of the machine
82

See id.
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could constitute a warranty of fitness for purpose
that would be breached by a subsequent malfunction.
And unlike human arms, arm wrestling machines
are products likely subject to standard products liability law. That could trigger a duty for the operator
to warn users of the machine of any unsafe conditions. It equally could expose the machine’s manufacturer and operator to claims for strict liability for
any injury resulting from the machine’s malfunction.
The trade-off for arm wrestlers challenging a
machine, then, is an increased likelihood of recovery
in the case of injury, but a different risk of injury due
to potential mechanical malfunction. Arm wrestlers
desirous of contending with a machine might instead
choose to limit their contests to human opponents
who consider themselves machines. As Over the Top
demonstrates, there is apparently no shortage of
such arm wrestlers. One participant in the world
championship tournament brags, “My whole body is
an engine,” and then, indicating his wrestling arm,
“This is the fireplug, and I’m going to light him up.” 83
Even Hawk is not immune to such self-promotion, as
he notes that turning his hat backwards before a
match makes him feel “like a different person, like a
truck, a machine.” Such blurring of the line between
man and machine may not have any basis in reality,
but it does present the possibility of a simulacrum
combat against a machine. And somewhere, the
ghost of John Henry is either proud or completely
sickened.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to provide a general overview of how the law would likely treat the
83

OVER THE TOP (Warner Brothers 1987).
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pastime of arm wrestling. In the first part of the
overview, the type of torts likely applicable in the
arm wrestling context were extrapolated from the
law of other areas of athletics. That investigation
revealed that the legal standards applicable to arm
wrestling would likely require a participant to exercise a duty of care towards an opponent. Failure to
exercise such care might theoretically expose the
negligent arm wrestler to liability for negligence.
Practically, however, such claims are not likely to
succeed where an experienced participant can be
found to have assumed the risk of any injuries foreseeable in a typical match. The risk of such claims
may be further mitigated by the participants’ or
match organizer’s use of effective, unambiguous
waivers. Tort liability in the world of arm wrestling
may be more probable, then, in the more limited area
of intentional tort and reckless misconduct. That
said, these general guidelines should not be viewed
as bright-line rules; tort liability for arm wrestling
injuries will be dependent on both the circumstances
of the case and the state laws applicable to a cause of
action.
In its final two parts, the Article considered
arm wrestling in two specific contexts – at the place
of employment and against a machine. The liability
risks for third parties in these two cases diverged.
Where the third party employer would not be likely
to be found liable for a claim for workers’ compensation arising out of an employee’s arm wrestling injury suffered while on the job, the operator of an arm
wrestling machine runs much greater risks across a
wider swath of torts – from products liability and
breach of warranty to gross negligence and even ordinary negligence.
As a backstop to this overview, the Article has
294

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014)

“Meet Me Halfway”: Arm Wrestling and the Law

leaned heavily on events occurring in the 1987 movie, Over the Top. Such reliance on a Hollywood action-drama – particularly one involving late-80s Sylvester Stallone – should be taken with more than a
grain of salt. After all, this is a movie that depicts
arm wrestling competitors slapping each other in the
face and (apparently) drinking motor oil to prepare
for a match. The motor oil drinker is even willing to
extinguish a lit cigar prior to a match by eating it as
a ploy to intimidate his opponent. Needless to say, a
certain suspension of disbelief is in order when
watching the movie, and an even greater suspension
of disbelief is required when trying to generate legal
analysis from such a movie. Yet the law itself has
been presented here in a more serious manner, leaving the author to echo the request embedded in the
title of Kenny Loggins’ theme song to Over the Top –
“meet me halfway.”84

84 KENNY LOGGINS, Meet Me Half Way, on OVER THE TOP (CBS
Records 1987).
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